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Abstract 
  
 The European Union (EU) policy of gender mainstreaming has been discussed at 
length in the context of embedding gender equality into the EU’s internal market.  The 
effectiveness of gender mainstreaming has been less analysed in other areas of EU 
competence.  This PhD draws on feminist theory to explain the EU’s gendered treatment of 
vulnerable women within the asylum system.  Using a range of theories of gender equality, 
notably separate spheres, radical feminism, and intersectional feminism, the thesis analyses 
the relevant asylum legislation, judgements and guidelines in international law, EU law and 
the national legal systems of two EU member states: the United Kingdom and Ireland.  
These feminist theories provided a perspective which allowed this research to explain how 
the EU has failed to address significantly and meaningfully the gendered aspects of the 
asylum system in member states. 
Despite the EU’s stated attempts to ensure through gender mainstreaming that the 
member states rely on a theory of gender equality which provides protection to women in 
the asylum system, this PhD found both that the EU has not sufficiently embodied an 
intersectional approach to gender and asylum and that member states are still more 
influenced by their national political culture and treatment of gender equality than that of 
the EU.  This thesis uses that research to make recommendations at both an EU and 
national level to help the EU and its member states better incorporate gender 
mainstreaming in order to ensure human rights protection for vulnerable women.  As the 
EU manages increasing refugee applications and increasing nationalist sentiment, this 
presents an opportunity to embed more thoroughly intersectional gender mainstreaming in 
both EU asylum policy and the EU’s political culture. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The idea for this research began with a reading of the 2011 European Union 
Qualification Directive.1  One of the landmark pieces of legislation of the Common 
European Asylum System (the CEAS), this Directive legislated the content of the asylum 
law of European Union member states: directly determining whether an asylum applicant 
would be eligible for protection as a refugee.  When initially reading the Qualification 
Directive, the references to gender-based persecution were reminiscent both of gendered 
developments in UK law2 and best practice recommended for asylum seekers by the United 
Nations.3  This legislation seemed ideal to harmonise asylum practice in the EU; surely if 
the EU was creating legislation with gender-aware content, this was a progressive step for 
women in the asylum system and would press member states to use a more feminist 
approach to asylum seekers who had encountered gender-based violence? 
Gender-based violence exists globally, in every society.  One in three women will 
encounter domestic or sexual violence during their lifetimes.4  Yet there are some major 
differences between state treatment of societal sexual violence – between attempts to raise 
public and law enforcement awareness of the unacceptable but insidious nature of gender-
based violence to governments that deliberately choose not to interfere in intra-familial 
violence.5  While women should be protected by their government from abusive partners 
and family members, international law now holds that if a government systematically 
denies women safety from gender-based violence, women have the right to seek asylum in 
another state.6  
                                                        
1 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast) [2011]   OJ L. 337/9 (Recast Qualification Directive.). 
2 Islam (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Regina v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Another Ex Parte Shah (AP ) (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL). 
3 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution 
within the context of Article 1a(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees’  (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 7 May 2002.).  
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3d36f1c64.pdf>  accessed 09 June 2017. 
4 World Health Organisation,  ‘Violence Against Women: Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Against 
Women’.  (WHO Media Centre, November 2014.). 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en//> accessed 9 June 2017. 
5See ibid. 
6 See Islam and Shah  (n 2) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees.(n 3). 
  
7 
Not all gender-based violence is considered to reach the level of persecution.  In 
order to determine whether domestic or sexual violence can constitute persecution, it is 
essential to examine societal context.  Is there active protection for survivors in their 
member states, and efforts to impose criminal penalties on abusers?  Most notably, does the 
state fail to protect survivors for a specific reason discussed in the Refugee Convention, 
such as their ethnicity or because the state deems them to be members of a specific social 
group, such as adulterers, unworthy of protection? 7  Not all women who encountered 
serious sexual or domestic violence will qualify as refugees; yet all asylum seekers who are 
vulnerable due to these trauma should be treated with support and care during the asylum 
decision-making process. 
Both the EU and its member states have professed an interest in eradicating 
violence against women, within the EU and abroad.  This thesis critically examines whether 
the treatment of asylum seekers within the EU is consistent with the fundamental rights 
espoused by the EU and international asylum law as to treatment of women who 
experienced gender-based violence.  While human rights have been criticised from a 
feminist perspective previously, most notably by academics such as Catharine MacKinnon8, 
this research will determine whether member states have fully accounted for the multiple 
discriminations and oppressions that asylum seekers who have encountered gendered 
violence face. 
This is the first research to use feminist theory, especially intersectional theory, in 
order to critique handling of gender-based violence claims within the EU.  The Refugee 
Convention, the international instrument which sets standards for treatment and recognition 
of refugees, did not initially make any mention of gender or gendered discrimination.9  This 
is an area of international refugee law which has evolved over time through supporting 
documents from the UN – and cases and practice of the EU and its member states.10  This 
research focuses on a specific group of asylum seekers – women who have survived sexual 
                                                        
7 ibid. 
8 See Catharine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of State.  (Harvard University Press 1989) and 
Catharine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues. (Harvard University 
Press 2006).. 
9 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention.) 
10 See chapter 4, which exclusively focuses EU law, asylum and gender and the practices of member states in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
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violence or intimate partner violence, who have failed to receive protection or justice from 
their government.  This could be because they were assaulted by state actors, or more 
likely, because the state does not take sexual violence prevention seriously, particularly 
when it occurs within the home.  While these issues unfortunately do affect young girls 
(20% of girls experience childhood sexual abuse)11, this research will only cover adult 
women, choosing not to examine the additional legal protections and procedures which 
apply specifically to child asylum seekers.12  Children will be considered as part of their 
families, and through their relationship with asylum seeker parents,  rather than as 
independent actors. 
Gender-based violence, including rape and physical abuse by a family member, is a 
deeply traumatic experience with effects which can manifest for years after the event.13  
This  research argues that any survivor of gender-based violence should be categorised as a 
vulnerable survivor.  While all asylum seekers should have their human rights respected 
and vindicated, states have a particular obligation to support vulnerable asylum seekers.14  
While this research specifically focuses on these vulnerable asylum seekers, certain 
findings will be more broadly applicable to the experience of all asylum seekers.  
The thesis will argue that the EU has professed an awareness of the challenges and 
discriminations faced by women in the asylum system who have experienced gender-based 
violence.  Yet the thesis will demonstrate that the EU has not been able to translate the 
awareness of the need for intersectional policies into practice.  The EU has made many of 
the same fallacies and oversights as the radical feminist theories described by Catharine 
MacKinnon15: failing to recognise the differing support needed for migrant women dealing 
with culture shock, isolation and discrimination in a new state, as well as their trauma. 
The research will demonstrate that the EU has not only been unable to develop an 
intersectional law and practice within its own organs, but has not imprinted a progressive, 
                                                        
11 See World Health Organisation (n 4). 
12 For more examination of these issues, see Helen Stalford, ‘CRC in Litigation under EU law’ in Ton 
Liefaard and Jap E. Doek (eds.) Litigating the Rights of the Child. (Springer 2015). 
13 Jennifer A. Bennice, Patricia A. Resick, Mindy Mechanic and Millie Astin.  ‘The Relative Effects of 
Intimate Partner Physical and Sexual Violence on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptomatology.’ 
(2003)  18 Violence and Victims 87. 
14 European Council on Refugee and Exiles.  European Comparative Report: Dublin II Regulation – Lives on 
Hold.  (ECRE.website, February 2013). 
<http://www.ecre.org/component/downloads/downloads/701.html> accessed 09 June 2017 
15 ibid. 
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intersectional approach onto its member states either.  The two member states highlighted 
in this research, the UK and Ireland, have chosen simply to use European law to enforce the 
status quo of their previous treatment of migrant women, rather than adjusting to the EU’s 
advocacy of support for migrant women. 
The second section of this chapter will discuss the methodology of this research.  
Like all theses, this work began with an interest in a particular gap in current academic 
research: the effects of gender mainstreaming in the EU’s asylum processes.  The 
methodology of this thesis, through a literature review, interviews with immigration 
professionals and observers and the connective independent research, was instrumental in 
developing the major thematic questions and then structuring the research in order to 
address the ideas which stemmed from the findings, threading the results of these research 
questions throughout the six substantive chapters.  The research uniquely uses various 
feminist theories to better analyse the EU’s understanding of gender mainstreaming – and 
the fallacies in its application to vulnerable women in the asylum system. 
The research questions illustrated by the literature review and professional 
interviews constitute the third section of this introduction.  These research questions, 
crafted to explain the treatment of vulnerable women under the EU’s asylum processes, 
formed the skeleton of the research, providing a clear divide in chapters: providing the use 
of feminist theory, discussing the EU’s competence and interest in incorporating gender 
mainstreaming into asylum, and comparing the treatment of women in the asylum process 
in two member states, the UK and Ireland.  These research arguments crafted the final 
recommendations in chapter 7, which will demonstrate that the current increase in asylum 
applications from the Middle East has provided the EU with an opportunity to use these 
recommendations in order to embed better fundamental rights and equal treatment of 
women at a time of deep-seated changes for the EU’s views of asylum and migration.  
Though the majority of this thesis was written before the United Kingdom’s decision to 
leave the European Union,16 the recommendations and research will provide an invaluable 
                                                        
16 Steven Erlanger. ‘Britain Votes to Leave EU; Cameron Plans to Step Down.’  The New York Times.  (New 
York City, 23 June 2016..  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-
european-union-referendum.html> accessed 10 June 2017. 
  
10 
perspective as part of the British process to determine which EU legislation and policies to 
maintain within UK law after Brexit.17 
The final section of this chapter will illustrate how the various chapters use the 
structure of the research questions and themes to present a clear argument that the EU and 
its member states have failed to promote an intersectional approach to support women 
within the asylum system – and to use intersectional feminist theory to suggest 
improvements to both the asylum applications process and living conditions of women who 
have encountered sexual violence and seek refuge within the European Union. 
I. Methodology 
The data gathered and used in this thesis originated two major sources: a literature 
review and primary legal materials.  These methods were supplemented by interviews, both 
unique to this research and publicly available government statements, which helped to 
clarify and develop the major research questions.  Independent research was then 
assembled to provide the answers and recommendations for this original thesis in order to 
improve the EU and member states treatment of fundamental rights within the asylum 
system.  All research was conducted with an emphasis on incorporating a feminist 
perspective and understanding. 
The literature review included primary sources, academic commentary and media and 
NGO reports.  Feminist scholars have historically been sceptical of qualitative research 
methods, claiming that traditional research methods reinforced existing male power 
structures.23  Yet over time, feminist academics began to adopt qualitative methodology to 
criticise male oppression and to argue for a more just society for women.24 Rather than 
simply using research to “objectively” observe, feminist work attempted to argue for the 
value of gender equality.25  This thesis follows in that tradition.  Agreeing with Sylvia 
Walby that the international community now recognises that freedom from gendered 
                                                        
17 See Jessica Elgot. ‘Theresa May to trigger Article 50 by end of March 2017..’  The Guardian,  London,  02 
October 2016.) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/01/theresa-
may-to-propose-great-repeal-bill-to-unwind-eu-laws.>  accessed 24 November 2016. 
23 Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kanter, ‘Introduction to Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on 
Social Life and Social Science’ in Sandra Harding (ed) Feminism and Methodology: Social Sciences 
Issues.  (Open University Press 1987.) 
24 Susan Hekman, ‘Feminist Methodology in William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Turner (eds). The Sage 
Handbook of Social Science Methodology. (Sage Publications 2007). 
25 Millman and Moss Kanter (n 23). 
  
11 
violence is a basic human right27, this research will argue for the greater prominence of 
fundamental rights, through women’s rights within the EU and its member states, within 
their treatment of asylum seekers.  This has meant that along with liberal use of primary 
sources such as legislation and judgements, this research also made use of observational 
reports from NGOs and interviews.  These sources had strong viewpoints, challenging the 
traditional research value of objectivity.  Feminist research continues to debate whether any 
research can be truly objective28, suggesting that if a professional or an NGO has developed 
strong opinions over time through exposure to asylum cases, those opinions should not be 
rejected or balanced simply in order to attempt to achieve an impartial perspective.  This 
research is often critical of government positions and treatment of asylum seekers, although 
the government perspective is discussed and considered throughout the thesis. 
The thesis will also rely extensively on the feminist concept of gender mainstreaming.  
A theory which entered into broad discourse within the Beijing Platform for Action,29 
gender mainstreaming was intended to prevent the isolation of gender equality within law – 
instead of separating out specific “women’s issues”, gender should be entwined throughout 
government policies.  Gender mainstreaming is intended to be a process which enshrines 
gender in every aspect of decision making.  Yet the concept, and particularly how the 
theory of gender mainstreaming would translate into a process which provides a healthy 
protection  of gender equality, still remains particularly broad and ill-defined within the 
EU.  Gender mainstreaming is intended to incorporate gender into all areas of decision-
making and constantly to attempt to reduce structural inequalities and indirect 
discrimination against women.30  Throughout this thesis, the research will utilise the 
European Commission’s definition of gender mainstreaming, 
Gender mainstreaming can be defined as the integration of a gender 
perspective into every aspect of EU intervention – preparation, 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, legal 
                                                        
27 Sylvia Walby, ‘Gender, Globalisation and Democracy’  (2000) 8 Gender and Development 20. 
28 Sandra Harding, ‘Is there a feminist method?’ in Sandra Harding (ed.) Feminism and Methodology: Social 
Sciences Issues.  (Open University Press 1987). 
29 European Institute for Gender Equality.  Beijing+20: the 4th Review of the Implementation of the Beijing 
Platform for Action in the EU Member States.  (EIGE website, 30 October 2014.) 
<http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-publications/beijing-20-4th-review-implementation-beijing-platform-
action-eu-member-states-report> accessed 6 July 2017. 
30 Teresa Rees,  ‘Reflections on the uneven development of gender mainstreaming in Europe.’  (2005) 7 
International Feminist Journal of Politics  555, 559. 
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measures and spending programmes - with a view to achieving 
equality between women and men. 31 
 
This research will demonstrate that while the organs of the EU have verbalised the 
importance of gender mainstreaming32, the actual processes put in place to enshrine 
gender in all areas of decision-making have fallen short of this lofty goal. 
When beginning a literature review to better explain gender mainstreaming, it 
became clear that gender mainstreaming is an ideal that could be interpreted in many 
different ways.  Theresa Rees cautioned that in states with existing patriarchal structures, 
these ideals can often be reinforced in gender mainstreaming.  This can lead to equality law 
that reinforces gender stereotypes rather than attempting to eliminate gender roles.33  
Differing views of gender roles create different legislation from mainstreaming.  While the 
various interpretations of gender equality and the connection with gender mainstreaming 
will be discussed throughout this thesis (which advocates for an intersectional approach to 
gender mainstreaming), the thesis does not dispute or debate whether gender mainstreaming 
is a worthwhile and appropriate aim in order to achieve gender equality, but instead makes 
the assumption that gender mainstreaming is an improved approach to achieve gender 
equality. 
This research was originally intended to rely heavily on original interviews conducted 
with professionals.  The initial interviews were conducted from January until August 2014, 
with the ethical approval of the University of Sussex.34  The seven interview subjects were 
identified due to their long-term familiarity with the asylum processes of either the United 
Kingdom or Ireland, either as legal professionals, NGOs which work with those applying 
for asylum or as academic commentators.  When determining whether to interview women 
who had been through the asylum application process or those who provided support in a 
professional context, there were several considerations.  The first was a concern as to a 
power imbalance of interviewing refugees about traumatic experiences and asking them to 
                                                        
31 European Commission, ‘Commission staff working document: Mid-term review of the Strategy for 
Equality between Men and Women’ (2010-2015.) (European Commission website, 2013.) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/strategy_women_men/131011_mid_term_review_en.pdf> accessed 06 July 2017. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid 562. 
34 Social Sciences & Arts Cross-School Research, Certificate of Approval 1112/07/02 
  
13 
relive a potentially painful and difficult experience.35  The second is that refugees would 
only be able to speak to their own experience, rather than offer a more generalised 
perspective on various cases, and changes to asylum processes over time – particularly 
since the introduction of the Common European Asylum System.  After careful 
consideration, it seemed clear that any benefit of interviewing particular asylum seekers 
about their own cases would be outweighed by the stress of asking them to recount a 
frustrating, and if unsuccessful, potentially traumatic process. 
Representation of these interviews within this thesis was intended to minimise author 
interpretation as much as possible and to allow the interview subjects to express their views 
and findings without filters.36  While a schedule of interview questions and discussion 
tactics were drafted and provided in advance, the interviews were semi-structured and 
interview subjects were not held to a strict list of questions.37  The queries were facilitated 
to prompt interviewees to expand on themes that they believed to be essential and relevant 
to the discussion of asylum in the UK and Ireland.  All interviews were transcribed and 
when applicable, quotes were directly placed into the thesis in order to allow the context 
and meaning of the interview to be clearly understood.38  While the majority of the 
interviews merely provided background research, several are broadly quoted throughout the 
thesis’s substantive arguments.39  
When transcribed, the interviews contained evocative personal experience of the 
asylum process and frustrations of attempting to advocate for clients and service users.  
This was incredibly helpful in identifying topics for consideration within the research – one 
particular interviewee insisted that no conversation about the asylum process in the UK 
would be complete without a discussion of detention.  Yet many of these views overlapped 
with NGO reports (particularly that of an Asylum Aid worker, who had assisted in 
preparing several of the reports cited within this research).  Yet NGO reports were able to 
access many of the statistics and procedures which were inaccessible to practitioners.  As a 
                                                        
35 Mary Gergen, Joan C. Chrisler and Alice LoCicero, ‘Innovative Methods: Resources for Research, 
Publishing and Teaching’  (1999) 23  Psychology of Women Quarterly 431. 
36 A .Opie, ‘Qualitative Research, Appropriation of the ‘Other’ and Empowerment.’   [1992] 40 Feminist 
Review 52. 
37 Sandy Ou and John Dumay, ‘The Qualitative Research Interview’ (2008) 8 Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management 238. 
38 See Opie (n 36.) 
39 Marjorie L. DeVault, ‘Talking and Listening from Women’s Standpoint: Feminist Strategies for 
Interviewing and Analysis’ (1990) 37 Social Problems 96. 
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result, the interview transcripts eventually became more of a tool for crafting research 
questions and less part of the core literature review.  When the interviews became less 
essential, this research ceased to request further interview participation and use NGO 
reports for the role envisioned by the personal interviews.  As a result, the interviews will 
only be used to support thematic conclusions throughout the research, similar to the other 
literature reviews for the production of this thesis. 
The research also drew on non-original interviews with public officials in the UK and 
Ireland regarding asylum policy and legislation.  While these were not conducted for this 
research, they have been similarly transcribed and quoted.  Requests for interviews with the 
UK and Irish governments to better understand the government’s policies and positions 
were denied – public interviews and reports were thus the best example of the 
governments’ arguments for their treatment of asylum seekers.  While these reports and 
interviews did not directly answer criticism of the treatment of asylum seekers, they were 
extremely helpful in illustrating the government’s balancing of security issues and 
protection of the human rights of asylum seekers.  These statements were released for 
public consumption, intended to be dissected by interested analysts.  There was no 
restrictions on use of these interviews and reports in a public context. 
This research began with a comparison between the lofty gender mainstreaming goals 
of the European Union and the experiences of women who had experienced gender-based 
violence as asylum seekers within Europe.  The various literature – from primary sources, 
secondary sources, and even the findings of non-profit analysts, academics and 
practitioners, allowed this research to find the gap and offer an explanation of the 
contradictory forces (the governments of both the UK and Ireland’s advocacy for security 
and controlled borders) which have meant that the member states have failed to adequately 
protect these vulnerable women. 
All researchers face subjective decisions as to how much of interview transcripts and 
conflicting opinions to include.  This final thesis specifically included interviews topics 
which were directly relevant to research questions, although all interviews (including those 
not quoted or cited within the final thesis) were essential to forming the general background 
and helping to answer the research questions throughout the thesis. 
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II. Major research questions 
 The original interviews for this research were essential, along with early reading of 
the literature and legal data, in identifying the major research questions, and well as the 
thematic elements which run throughout the thesis.  The first question asked how the 
European Union has incorporated the ideal of gender mainstreaming into its asylum policy, 
specifically its major pieces of asylum legislation which provide the framework for the 
Common European Asylum System.  This is not only a factual question, examining the 
extent of gender mainstreaming policies within the EU asylum policy, but will also require 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the gendered aspect of this legislation and an 
understanding of the underlying themes of gender equality within the organs of the 
European Union.  This thesis will demonstrate that the EU has, so far, failed to insert 
gender mainstreaming sufficiently into its asylum policy. 
The second question will use the different strands of feminist theory to investigate 
how the political culture and views of gender equality in member states have influenced 
mainstreaming and whether this has led to greater protections for vulnerable women who 
have experienced gender based violence and are now claiming asylum?  My response to 
this question will draw on three strands of gender theory: separate spheres, radical 
feminism and intersectional feminism and will provide an explanation as to why only the 
norms of intersectional feminism are able to provide sufficient support to women applying 
for asylum. 
This discussion easily leads to the third major research question, which will provide 
an evaluation of how much the practice and views of member states has affected the asylum 
process, in contrast to the views of the EU.  Every EU member state has a different history 
of migrant relations, different views of gender equality and, as this thesis acknowledges, 
despite EU attempts to harmonise asylum procedures, still differing treatments of asylum.  
This thesis will weigh the influence of various sources of asylum law: international law, EU 
law and national law of member states and argue that the culture of member states is the 
strongest influence on law and practical treatment of vulnerable women within the asylum 
system. 
The final research question asks how applying an intersectional policy of gender 
mainstreaming could influence asylum seekers in various member states differently, 
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depending on how the broad theoretical aim of gender equality is applied?  The question 
uses the research’s findings around the current situation in EU member states, in order to 
make recommendations for the changes that can be made in EU legislation and within the 
legislation of member states (and even in the UK Parliament, post-Brexit.)  With the 
increase of turmoil in the Middle East and related upsurge in numbers of asylum seekers 
applying for refuge within the European Union,41 the Common European Asylum System is 
facing increased challenges.  As more people seek to access their fundamental right to seek 
asylum within Europe, problems and weak spots in EU asylum and migration policy will be 
more apparent.  This thesis will argue that now, while the EU and member states are re-
evaluating the effectiveness of the CEAS,42 that the EU and its member states should better 
implement an intersectional feminist approach to support vulnerable women in the asylum 
system and make tangible, practical suggestions for this enactment. 
This thesis is aimed at impacting the policy of the European Union and two 
particular states, the UK and Ireland.  The research conclusions and ensuing 
recommendations should better ensure that women in the asylum system are treated 
according to international best practice and European Union law.  Throughout this thesis, 
best practice will be highlighted and problematic aspects of process explained in order to 
improve migrant rights, particularly since so many more applications for asylum will be 
processed from women now currently within the territory of the EU. 
III. Chapter plan 
 The thesis as a whole critically evaluates the treatment of women who have 
encountered gender-based violence and fled to the EU to seek asylum.  As the EU has been 
granted competence over gender mainstreaming and asylum, it becomes more essential to 
analyse the influence of the EU along with other sources of international asylum law in 
                                                        
41 European Stability Initiative, The 2015 Refugee Crisis through Statistics. (European Stability Initiative 
website, 17 October 2015.). <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-
%20Refugee%20Statistics%20Compilation%20-%2017%20Oct%202015.pdf>  last accessed 6 July 
2017 
42 Regulation (EU) No 1051/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances [2013].  OJ L 295 1.  
Discussed in Clémentine d’Oultremont, ‘The Migration Crisis: A Stress Test for European Values.’  
(2015.) 38 European Policy Brief. <http://aei.pitt.edu/74541> accessed 06 July 2016 and 
Philip L. Martin.‘Europe’s Migrant Crisis: an American Perspective.’  (2016.) 13 Migration Letters  
307. 
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order to understand both the impact on current policies and to shape the future treatment of 
women seeking asylum for gender-based violence within the EU. 
The second chapter of this thesis will set out and examine the three main strands of 
theory regarding gender equality used throughout this research: the separate spheres theory, 
which advocates for natural differing roles between men and women,43 radical feminism, 
which seeks to challenge government’s inaction in the private lives,44 particularly within 
families, and intersectional feminism, which seeks to contextualise violence against women 
with other oppressions that women face, such as racism, xenophobia, or discrimination on 
the basis of migration status.45  In chapter 2, the thesis will argue that intersectional 
feminism is the best approach to provide protection and support to vulnerable women in the 
asylum system who already face various oppressions due to their previous trauma and 
persecution, as well as their experience as migrants in an unfamiliar state.46 
 Chapters 3 and 4 discuss different aspects of the issue of EU competence to act in 
this field.  The EU is evidently limited by its various ruling Treaties to only regulate areas 
in which it has been granted competence.  Chapter 3 argues that the EU does indeed not 
only have competence, but since gender mainstreaming has been enshrined into Treaty 
law,47 the EU has an obligation to ensure that all legislation and judgments related to the 
Common European Asylum System are fully cognisant of gender issues.  Unfortunately, 
while chapter 3 establishes that the EU has considerable competence regarding asylum and 
gender, chapter 4 argues that the EU has made many of the same problematic assumptions 
about women as radical feminist approaches: failing to take into account that not all women 
                                                        
43 John Paul II, Apostolic letter of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II on the dignity and vocation of women.  
(The Vatican website, 1988)  <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19880815_mulieris-
dignitatem.html>  accessed 06 July 2017 and John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paul II to women.  
(The Vatican website, 1995). <https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/letters/1995/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_29061995_women.html> last accessed 
06 July 2017. 
44 See MacKinnon, (1989) (n 8) and Catharine MacKinnon, (2006) (n 8).  
45 See Edna Erez, Madelaine Adelman and Carol Gregory, ‘Intersections of Immigration and Domestic 
Violence: Voices of Battered Immigrant Women’  (2009)  4 Feminist Criminology 32. 
46 ibid. 
47 European Commission, Equal Guide on Gender Mainstreaming.  (European Commission website, 2004)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal_consolidated/data/document/gendermain_en.pdf> last 
accessed 06 July 2017.  The policy of gender mainstreaming has been analysed in, amongst others, 
Fiona Beveridge, Building against the past: the impact of gender on EU law and policy.’  (2007) 32 
European Law Journal 193 and Sonia Mazey, ‘Gender Mainstreaming Strategies in the EU: Delivering 
on an Agenda.’ (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 227. 
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face the same discrimination and persecution and that their experiences are greatly 
influenced by the other oppressions in women’s lives. 
 The next two chapters contrast the treatment of women in the asylum system in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, two current member states of the European Union.  Chapter 5 
evaluates the UK’s attempts to single out specific groups of asylum seekers (such as 
women who have encountered gendered based violence) to whom it grants assistance,48 
while reducing fair procedures and access to the asylum process generally.49  The thesis 
maintains that this contradiction is inherently unstable and has resulted in the same 
oversights as the EU, with the same failure as radical feminist theory to really connect 
oppression as refugees with refugees as women – instead dealing with these issues 
separately.  This has led to the criticism of this research and others regarding the ill-
treatment of vulnerable women applying for asylum,50 particularly when fast track 
procedures or detention are applied.51 
 Contrarily, Ireland remains routed in a focus on Irish racial nationalism which 
applies totally contrary roles to Irish and migrant mothers.52  Irish law has viewed women 
through their roles as mothers – trapping Irish women to primarily embrace a role as 
caregivers, while women in the asylum seekers are discouraged from giving birth, isolated 
from Irish society and have legal status withheld.53  This view of vulnerable pregnant 
women, many of whom have suffered from gender-based violence, is deeply problematic 
and does not comply with international or European law and best practice.  
Although the Irish treatment of women in the asylum system is very different from 
that of the UK, neither have been strongly influenced by the EU’s treatment of migration 
and gender equality.  Chapter 5 and 6 will definitively find that the EU has not been able to 
                                                        
48 BBC Radio 4, ‘The Today Programme.’   (BBC website, 04 September 2015.) .  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b068c7n8> accessed 06 July 2017. 
49 Victoria Canning, ‘International conflict, sexual violence and asylum policy: Merseyside as a case study’ 
(2014) 34  Critical Social Policy 23. 
50 Helen Muggeridge and Chen Maman, ‘Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in Women’s 
Asylum Claims’.  (Asylum Aid website,  January 2011.)   <http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/unsustainableweb.pdf> last accessed 06 July 2017. 
51 Human Rights Watch, ‘Fast Tracked Unfairness: Detention and Denial of Women Asylum Seekers in the 
UK.’  (Human Rights Watch website,  February 2010.)   
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk0210webwcover.pdf> last accessed 06 July 2017. 
52 Ruth Fletcher, ‘Reproducing Irishness: Race, Gender and Abortion Law.’  (2005) 17 Canadian Journal of 
Women and Law 365. 
53 ibid. 
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exert its competence to affect the underlying attitudes towards vulnerable female asylum 
seekers.  These findings lead to chapter 7, which sets out policy ideas and recommendations 
for change within the EU.  As noted previously, the Common European Asylum System is 
at a time of transition, and many member states believe that the EU’s treatment of asylum 
seekers should be further fractured and decentralised.54  This thesis will propose that the 
EU should harmonise and coordinate legislation better to ensure that fundamental rights are 
protected within the territory of the EU and that an intersectional approach is taken to 
protecting vulnerable women applying for asylum.  While the UK is currently determining 
its relationship with the rest of Europe after leaving the EU, this research argues that the 
UK is still physically part of Europe and, as it shares borders with the EU, should attempt 
to echo the improved policy of the CEAS. 
The entirety of these chapters will demonstrate to the EU that it has not yet 
coordinated an intersectional approach to gender within the Common European Asylum 
System and makes tangible proposals as to how to implement stronger protections of 
fundamental rights for vulnerable women.  The lens of feminist theory is essential in order 
to describe and explain more effectively the core assumptions around gender (in)equality 
and the oversights in treatment of migrant women. 
Following this initial chapter establishing the broad aims and structure of the thesis, 
as well as the methodology and thematic discussions, we move now to chapter 2 in which 
three key strands of gender theory are represented. These provide a feminist theoretical 
framework for the current research and demonstrate the three views of gender equality as 
understood in the member states: separate spheres, radical feminism and intersectional 
feminism.  The subsequent chapter will demonstrate why it is intersectional feminism 
which is so essential to protecting the human rights of women who apply for asylum and 
why an intersectional approach is the theory which is most appropriate to improve the 
shortcomings in the EU’s approach to vulnerable women seeking asylum. 
                                                        
54 See d’Oultremont (n 22) and Justin Borg-Barthet and Carole Lyons, ‘The European Union Migration 
Crisis.’  (2016) 20 Edinburgh Law Review 230. 
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Chapter 2: Feminist Theory 
 
I. Introduction 
International refugee law was initially crafted to ensure protection from organised 
genocides for minority groups and widespread oppression of political opponents.  The 
preliminary drafting of the Convention on the Status of Refugees1 was initially done 
without any awareness of the breadth of experiences of persecution that did not fit into a 
heterosexual male perspective.2  Over time, drafters of international law norms have 
become more aware of the gendered implications of asylum law.  International human 
rights organisations such as the United Nations have begun to consider a perspective 
which analyses the difficulties in the asylum process as intertwined with other 
oppressions that complicate it – such as gender or sexual orientation.3  There has begun to 
be a greater understanding that women in the asylum system have particular needs and 
vulnerabilities that differ from those of male asylum seekers.4 
Throughout the different jurisdictions examined in this research, there are varying 
understandings of how best to support women in their jurisdiction and emphases on 
gender and asylum status.  There are contrasting lenses through which female asylum 
seekers are viewed.  In order to understand the various procedures for women in the 
asylum process, it is important to consider the background of legal perspectives on the 
roles of women in society and how organs of states can achieve gender equality. Each of 
the four legal systems which will be considered (the EU, the UK, Ireland and 
international law) presents a differing view of the role of women in the asylum process 
and how best to deal with sexual violence against migrant women.  This includes whether 
to include migrant women as part of generalised actions to eliminate violence against 
                                                        
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 
189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art 33 Hereafter the Refugee Convention. 
2 European Women’s Lobby, Asylum is not Gender Neutral: Protecting Women seeking Asylum.  
(European Women’s Lobby website, November 2007.)   
<http://www.womenlobby.org/Asylum-is-not-gender-neutral-the-refugee-
crisis-in-Europe-from-a-feminist> last accessed 09 July 2017.  
3 UNHCR  ‘UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls’ (Division of International 
Protection Geneva 2008) 
4 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence Against Refugees’ (Geneva 1995) 
and UNHCR ‘Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the context 
of Article 1a(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.’ 
(Geneva 2002.) This will be further examined in Chapter 4 (the EU). chapter 5 (the UK) and chapter 
6 (Ireland.) 
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women or to treat migration status as an additional vulnerability in the violence that 
women may encounter.  While theoretical influences are rarely explicitly stated, all of 
these legal systems can be described and analysed through specific theories of feminism, 
understandings of the role of women and recommendations for handling violence against 
women.  In order to describe the actions which have been taken regarding processing 
asylum claims of women who have experienced sexual violence, it is helpful to better 
understand these various theories of feminism and how they relate to views of the asylum 
system. 
The first section of this chapter deals with the theory of gender essentialism, or 
the separate spheres, consisting of traditional beliefs regarding women’s roles and the 
regulation of rights in society.  This is a philosophy which extolls the belief that men 
naturally fit working in the public world, maintaining a career for pay and participating in 
politics while women belong within the cocoon of family life within the home, focusing 
on nurturing their husbands and children.5  In the European rights tradition, there are 
protections for family life6 that have been judged to include non-interference by the 
state.7  This theory argues that danger and risk occurs primarily through lack of state 
protection outside of the home.  Inside the home is thought to be an area where state 
protection to regulate the interactions of family members would be actively harmful to 
family relationships.8  Those who support the idea of gender essentialism have argued 
that men and women have different natures due to biological factors.9  Women are 
considered to be better suited to family life while men are more apt at dwelling in the 
business or political spheres of the community.10  This theory requires reinforcement of 
stereotypes as to what constitutes masculine or feminine behaviour in order to justify 
                                                        
5 Jurate Motiejunaite (ed), Women’s Rights: The Public/Private Dichotomy. (International Debate 
Association Education, 2005) 1. 
6 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 8. 
7 The EU and the ECHR have been particularly active in providing for cohabitations for families.  See 
Cathryn Costello, Metock: Free movement and ‘normal family life’ in the Union.” [2009] 46 CMLR  
587 and Daniel Thym, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration 
Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay.'  (2008) 57 ICLQ  87. 
8 Catharine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of State.  (Harvard University Press 1989) 163. 
9 Alice Eagly, ‘The Science and Politics of Comparing Men and Women.’ (1995) 50 American 
Psychologist 145, 147. 
10 John Archer and Barbara Lloyd, Sex and Gender.  (2nd ed Cambridge University Press, 2002) 2 
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rigid gender roles, while ignoring behaviour which is less traditionally masculine or 
feminine.11 
This is a theory that enforces a form of substantive equality, arguing that genders 
have different strengths and needs and so should be treated differently; this theory allows 
women to face discrimination in public life based on gender.  This discrimination is 
strongly opposed by feminists.12  This idea of a separation between the lives of men and 
women has traditionally been supported by the Catholic Church and is emphasised by 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Constitution of the Irish Republic).13  While these ideals are 
not expressly stated in the Refugee Convention, they seem to have influenced the views 
of the treaty’s drafters, who take this traditional perspective as to the type of persecution 
that refugees will face, focusing on actions more likely to be taken by men to protest 
political regimes.14  While this theory is becoming less influential as feminist thinking 
becomes integrated into law and consciousness, it is essential to understand its 
complexities and continuing influence on perceptions of women’s behaviour. 
The second section will consider radical feminism, as most relevantly applied to a 
legal and political context by American academic Catharine MacKinnon.15  MacKinnon 
sought to challenge traditional American fundamental rights, which, as noted, limited 
government interaction into home life while regulating interactions in public domains.16 
She argued that while this may be advantageous to men (who are more likely to face 
domination and uncertainty outside the home),17 women are more likely to encounter 
violence and danger within the home,18 violence that the government historically ignored 
by citing a public/private divide.19  MacKinnon believes that it is essential for 
governments to focus on a feminist theory of state, which recognises that women need 
different support and protections than men do and that governments must focus on using 
                                                        
11 ibid 27. 
12 Catharine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues. (Harvard University 
Press 2006). 
13 Patrick Hanafin, ‘Defying the Female: The Irish Constitutional Text as Phallocentric Manifesto.’ (2008) 
11 Textual Practice 249. 
14 As discussed in European Women’s Lobby (n 2). 
15 See MacKinnon (n 8) and MacKinnon (n 12). 
16 MacKinnon (n 8)169. 
17 ibid 161. 
18 ibid163. 
19 ibid169. 
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human rights to ensure that women are safe from family members within their homes.20  
While MacKinnon does not specifically criticise the Refugee Convention, she does argue 
that international law should be more responsive to gender inequality and the response to 
violence against women internationally. 
This seems to be the theory that best describes policies regarding violence against 
women in the United Kingdom and by the European Union.  They have focused on the 
universal experience of sexual violence that women face21 rather than considering the 
distinctions that women of different races, socioeconomic status and immigration status 
must overcome when dealing with sexual violence or violence within the home.  While 
this will be discussed in more depth in chapters 4 and 5, it is important to establish the 
theoretical descriptor for this radical feminist viewpoint, as well as the criticisms which 
have made by intersectional feminists. 
The third section deals with the concept of intersectional feminism.  Originally 
created from the writings of black American academics such as Kimberlé Crenshaw22 and 
bell hooks,23 intersectional feminism disputes the universal experience of women 
perceived by radical feminists such as MacKinnon.24   As opposed to MacKinnon’s view 
that all women are united by their common oppression as women, Crenshaw argues that 
gender is only one of several factors which determine women’s inequality: along with 
race, sexual orientation and migration status.25 They note that women’s oppression 
cannot be treated as a monolith without considering these other factors; they greatly 
affect how women are able to deal with hardships and vulnerabilities. 
This seems to be similar to the realities being identified by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees26 and by various non-governmental organisations 
                                                        
20 MacKinnon (n 12) 23. 
21 One in three women worldwide encounter sexual violence.  See World Health Organisation,  ‘Violence 
Against Women: Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Against Women’.  (WHO Media Centre, 
November 2014.). <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en//> accessed 9 June 2017. 
22 Kimberlé Crenshaw,  ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence against 
Women of Color.’  (1990-1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241. 
23 bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black.  (Taylor & Francis, 2014). 
24 MacKinnon (n 12) 51-53. 
25 Crenshaw (n 22). 
26 UNHCR (2002) (n 4) and UNHCR  (1995) (n 4). 
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(NGOs).27  Using an intersectional analysis, these commentators argued that it is not 
sufficient to simply advocate that support for sexual violence survivors amongst the 
asylum population should be the same services offered to middle class white women who 
encounter sexual violence.28  It is essential to account for the additional difficulties and 
challenges that asylum seekers face.  Unfortunately, an intersectional awareness of the 
asylum systems in the EU and its member states does not seem to have developed.  An 
analysis of this theory can lead to suggestions and improvements for EU member states to 
better understand how to meet their obligations under international law. 
In the conclusion, this section will explain in detail why these various theories are 
so relevant.  Feminist theory can often seem removed from practical workings of law and 
governance, but theory is intended to also serve as a guide to better illuminate the 
weaknesses and absences of policy.  In this section of the chapter, this thesis will provide 
a better understanding of the impact that a jurisdiction’s choice of strategies for gender 
equality has had on the protection of the fundamental rights of female asylum seekers.  
These theories inform the decisions being made on priorities and treatment within asylum 
processes.  While there have been previous considerations of the EU’s treatment of 
women in the asylum system, and those of specific member states, there has been no 
analysis through the use of conflicting feminist theories.  This chapter will lay the 
understanding for this analysis, which will be explored in more context throughout the 
rest of this research. 
II. Separate Spheres Theory 
The idea of men and women having separate but complementary roles in society 
and within the family is an ancient one, dating back to ancient Greek and Roman 
cultures.  These governments emphasised the importance of women within the home: 
managing the household, raising children and the labour within the home, while men 
were classed as citizens, encouraged to participate in the political process and to 
                                                        
27 Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament, ‘Gender Related Asylum Claims in 
Europe.’  (European Parliament website, 2012).  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/462481
/IPOL-FEMM_ET(2012)462481_EN.pdf> last accessed 10 July 2017 and European 
Women’s Lobby (n 2). 
28 Crenshaw, (n 22) 1249. 
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financially profit from the household labour.29  As a societal ideal, this became more 
popular during the industrial age, when households no longer functioned as family 
businesses and so there became a broader separation in the daily routines, and work, of 
men and women.30  
 This theory has historically been a source of what Glick, Lameiras and 
Rodriguez-Castro term to be hostile sexism.31  Women were deemed to be too weak and 
delicate to survive in public life, inferior to men in their ability to reason and understand 
political arguments.32  This philosophy also meant that women were often blamed when 
there was any kind of problem within the home, such as child neglect or marital 
problems, as they were assumed to be responsible for the family’s health and well-
being.33  Women were isolated from the working world34 and yet still had limited 
autonomy and freedom within the home.35  This theory argues that the government 
should not apply a test of strict equality to laws affecting men and women, instead 
considering the different abilities and roles of men and women when legislating;36 it has 
been used to justify denying women participation in political life or equal access to the 
workplace.37 
 Currently, the theory of separate spheres has become less focused on hostile 
sexism which emphasises the inferiority of women and more on a form of benevolent 
sexism which describes men and women as equal but different and complementary.38  
This is most notably the position taken by the Catholic Church.  Former pontiff John Paul 
II has released several particularly relevant writings on the Church’s views on the role of 
                                                        
29 Mary Ann Tetreault.  “Frontier Politics: Sex, Gender and the Deconstruction of the Public Sphere ” in 
Motiejunaite (n 1) 33. 
30 Linda McDowell and Rosemary Pringle, ‘Defining Public and Private Issues’ in Linda McDowell and 
Rosemary Pringle (eds), Defining Women: Social Institutions and Gender Divisions.  (Polity Press, 
1992) 15. 
31 Peter Glick, Maria Lameiras and Yolanda Rodriguez-Castro, ‘Education and Catholic Religiosity as 
Predictors of Hostile and Benevolent Sexism Towards Men and Women.’  (2002) 47 Sex Roles 433. 
32 Mary Ann Tetreault (n 29) 35. 
33 Myra Marx Ferree, ‘Beyond Separate Spheres: Feminism and Family Research.’  (1990) 52 Journal of 
Marriage an.d Family 866, 867. 
34 Tracy E. Higgins.  “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing” in Motiejunaite (n 1) 
53. 
35 ibid 57. 
36 Chris Baron and Liisa Past. “Controversy in Feminist Theorizing: Differing Approaches to the Public and 
Private” in Motiejunaite (n 1) 16. 
37 See, for example, De Búrca v Attorney General  [1976] IR 38. 
38 Glick, Lameiras and Rodriguez-Castro (n 31) 433-441. 
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men and women.39  He referenced Biblical teachings, noting that Mary was entrusted 
with giving birth to and raising Jesus as particular recognition of the need for maternal 
affection and the importance of women’s vocations as mothers.40  John Paul II focused on 
the differing but complementary natures of men and women.41  Distancing himself from 
Biblical interpretations which stated only that women should be submissive to their 
husband, he explained it more as a system of mutual obligations; women’s submission 
should incur equivalent protection, love and kindness from their husbands.42 
 The pontiff emphasised that though women may seek to find equality, they should 
continue to retain an essential female character, along with an emphasis on motherhood 
and family life.  He stated, 
The personal resources of femininity are certainly no less than the 
resources of masculinity: they are merely different. Hence a woman, as 
well as a man, must understand her ‘fulfilment’ as a person, her dignity 
and vocation, on the basis of these resources, according to the richness of 
the femininity which she received on the day of creation and which she 
inherits as an expression of the ‘image and likeness of God’ that is 
specifically hers.43 
 
While he emphasises the importance of women’s biblical role as mothers,44 he also 
seeks to twine disrespect and abuse of women with a loss in male dignity.45  Rather 
than simply focusing on the Biblical or moral argument not to abuse women, it is 
disappointing that equal treatment of women cannot be justified to the pontiff in its own 
right without a focus on the effect on men. 
 The views of the Catholic Church have evolved over time, which keeping to the 
same core principles.  The teachings of the current pontiff, Francis, emphasise the 
importance of family life, focusing on the instability brought by individualism and 
                                                        
39 See John Paul II, ‘Apostolic letter of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II on the dignity and vocation of 
women,’.  (The Vatican website, 1988).  <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19880815_mulieris-dignitatem.html? last accessed 
10 July 2017 and John Paul II, Letter of Pope John Paul II to women. (The Vatican website, 1995).  
<https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/letters/1995/documents/hf_jp-
ii_let_29061995_women.html> last accessed 10 July 2017.  Analysis provided in Glick, Lameiras 
and Rodriguez-Castro (n 31). 
40 John Paul II. (1988) (n 39). 
41 ibid para 8. 
42 ibid para 9. 
43 ibid para 10. 
44 ibid para 19. 
45 ibid para 11. 
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declining reproduction.46  He notes that the family is the centrepiece of the Christian 
community.   
Glick, Lameiras and Rodriguez-Castro found that the Catholic Church’s view 
on gender roles was an influence for religious Catholics and that there was a correlation 
between active Catholicism and a belief in rigid gender roles and benevolent sexism.47 
They did not find that it was the most relevant factor (education was more strongly 
correlated) 48 but that there certainly was a relationship between Catholicism and 
benevolent sexism as to gender roles.49 
 This modernised view of separate spheres does not accord to a strict divide 
between public and private life.  Pope John Paul II expressed his views on the 
unacceptable nature of abortion50 and has maintained opposition to artificial forms of 
birth control,51 both areas which would have historically been considered in the domain 
of a private life.  This current theory of separate spheres seems to press for women to 
live their lives prioritising their roles as wives and mothers rather than existing in the 
public sphere of paid employment and public life; yet the home, considered to be the 
centre of the private life, is still affected by the strict standard of behaviour imposed by 
the Catholic Church.  Higgins notes that in societies which strongly emphasise separate 
spheres and a divide between public and private lives, there are often also strong 
restrictions on women’s access to abortion.52  Pope Francis takes some views which are 
progressive and do not fit with the tradition of separate spheres.  He notes that equality 
for women will not be achieved as long as domestic violence and female genital 
mutilation are used to abuse and control women53 and advocates for women to be 
                                                        
46 Pope Francis, ‘Amoris Laeticia’  (Vatican website, 19 March 2016.) 
<https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-
francesco_esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia_en.pdf> accessed 02 July 2017, 24. 
47 This was first studied in Laura Sanchez and Carla S. Hall, ‘Traditional Values and Democratic Impulses: 
The Gender Division of Labor in Contemporary Spain.’ (1999) 30 Journal of Comparative Family 
Studies 659.  This article was considered in Glick, Lameiras and Rodriguez-Castro (n 31). 
48 Glick, Lameiras and Rodriguez-Castro (n 31) 433. 
49ibid 438. 
50 John Paul II, (1988) (n 39) para 14. 
51 For a further exploration of the history of the Catholic Church and contraception, see John Thomas 
Noonan, Contraception: a History of its Treatment by Catholic theological and canonists.    
(Harvard University Press 1966). 
52 Tracy E. Higgins.  “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing” in Motiejunaite (n 
1). 
53 Francis (n 6) 43. 
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granted equal access to employment and political power.54  This is an updated view, 
one which seems to have responded to some feminist criticism of the Catholic Church  
As will be discussed in chapter 6, this view of separate spheres has yielded considerable 
influence on the Bunreacht na hÉireann and Irish constitutional law.55   
 When discussing the role of women under his jurisdiction, the Catholic Church, 
however, it is interesting that Pope Francis maintains a very traditional view of gender 
roles.  Women are lauded for their sensitivity and intuition, “which women tend to 
present more than men.”56  This is a clear view of gender roles which does not allow for 
individual men and women to have varying personalities, interest in parenthood and 
characteristic.  Francis continues that,  
I think, for example, of the special concern which women show to others, 
which finds a particular, even if not exclusive, expression in motherhood.  
I readily acknowledge that many women share pastoral responsibilities 
with priests, helping to guide people, families and groups and offering 
new contributions to theological reflections.57 
 
He notes that providing access to the priesthood for women is beyond 
discussion,58 but argues that greater appreciation and respect should be given to 
the essential roles which women provide to the church.59  While the dimensions of 
women’s roles have changed in Catholic theology, there are still strong ideas of 
the role women have to play within the church and roles and limitations placed on 
gender.  
 The doctrine of the Catholic Church is relevant so far as views supporting 
separate spheres and ideas have permeated jurisprudence of legal systems.  Most 
notably in Irish law, women were granted early legal equality – with voting rights 
secured before either Britain or America provided women’s suffrage.  Yet legal 
systems influenced by the view of separate spheres have prioritised protecting 
                                                        
54 ibid 43. 
55 Hanafin (n 13). 
56 Pope Francis.  ‘Evangelii gaudium’  (Vatican website, 26 November 2013.)  
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-
francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-
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women’s fertility and family protections rather than measures which would ensure 
flexible workplace access for men and women.  When Pope Francis seeks to 
provide an example of crippling poverty and family decline, he points to single 
mothers forced to leave their children in daycare for long hours.  The modern 
separate spheres analysis of Pope Francis argues that women should not be forced 
by economic necessity to leave their children in daycare; while providing lip 
service to social equality, he condemns marriage between same sex couples or 
single parenthood, noting that gender roles are not interchangeable and arguing 
that children need active parenting by both a mother and a father.  This idea that 
men and women have unique and different roles to play within the family is the 
core of the views modern of separate spheres. 
Virtually all strands of feminist theory agree that these understandings of 
separate spheres are problematic,60 yet not all feminists completely reject the idea of a 
public/private divide. For example, liberal feminists support the idea of a stronger 
protection for private life, allowing women to access abortion and contraception 
without government interference.61  Martha Albertson Fineman has specifically written 
about the extreme regulation that government has enforced on single mothers and 
limited privacy or autonomy that they are granted, advocating for an approach where 
the private family structure and behaviour are outside of the state’s competence.62  
While Albertson Fineman does not agree with the traditional understanding of separate 
spheres, she argues for an adjustment of the doctrine to allow women to make decisions 
on motherhood without government oversight.63 
Yet other academics disagree with the entire structure of a divide between 
public and private.  Catharine MacKinnon has objections to any form of separate 
spheres, stating her belief that the limited right to privacy has been extended only so far 
as to allow men more unfettered sexual access to women.  For example, she argues that 
abortion allows men to have sexual relationships without responsibility, as it can be 
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framed as women’s private decision to either have an abortion or to decide to raise a 
child without support.64  She suggests that the public/private divide has never actually 
been used to benefit women, instead providing a tool by men to subjugate and objectify 
women.65  The concept of separate spheres has also been rejected by intersectional 
feminists, who note that this “cult of domesticity” has historically only applied to white 
women.  Women of colour have always been expected to work, their families invisible 
to those who sought to encourage white women to stay within the home and manage 
household and family.66  Crenshaw argues that this lack of understanding by white 
feminists helped to divide the feminist movement – white women fought for the right to 
enter the workplace into which black women had historically been economically 
forced.67 
While there is currently debate and discussion amongst feminists as to whether 
the theory of separate spheres should be amended or totally rejected, there is an 
agreement that its traditional context is harmful and oppressive towards women.  
Vestiges of this theory still exist in law and society (particularly in Irish law)68 and 
while current feminists may find it objectionable, its influence remains, particularly its 
sway on the constitutional role of women in Irish society.69  There also appear to be 
echoes of these views within the asylum-decision making processes across Europe.  
Women are more likely to be granted asylum as part of a family than as individual 
actors.  Migrant, and particularly asylum seeking women, have often been described in 
the media and public statements primarily through their roles as wives and mothers.  
The theory of separate spheres provides a better understand of the lens through which 
many asylum decision makers and politicians see the role and experiences of women, 
including women who are applying for refugee status. 
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Yet criticisms of the philosophy of separate spheres and the reduction of women 
to their roles within the home, have lead to feminist academics developing alternative 
suggestions and recommendations for government and human rights structure.  Over 
time, several governments would adapt their legal systems in a way which is best 
described by another theory of feminist state, radical feminism. 
III. Radical Feminism 
 Radical feminism initially evolved in the 1960s as an expansion of the 
suffragette movement.  It was not enough, feminists argued, for women to be able to 
vote if societal conditions meant that women were not granted equality in their daily 
lives.70  Radical feminists particularly sought to highlight the role that male violence 
and sexual objectification played in preventing women from ending their oppression.71  
One prominent radial feminist academic, Catharine MacKinnon, argues that 
government treatment of women is based around a patriarchal attempt to force women 
in subservient household roles and to pressure women into remaining sexually available 
to men.  She considers the basis of human rights concepts and legal treatment of 
women through the prism of objectification.72  She sought to apply radical feminism to 
human rights law, international law and state actions to protect women.73 
 MacKinnon, an American academic, specifically examines American 
constitutional law,74 yet due to increasingly globalised content of human rights 
instruments and similar right-based content such as in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,75 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union76 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights,77 her argument can certainly be understood 
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more broadly in an American/European context.78  MacKinnon argued that 
conventional human rights were created by men in order to preserve their power over 
women and reinforce male privilege while protecting men from exploitation by other 
men.79  She considers the concept of privacy in a particularly strong manner, arguing 
that,  
The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of private freedom. 
For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate 
violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. 80 
   
MacKinnon believed that privacy was a right which allowed men to retain their power 
over women in the home without interference, a protection from forced government 
equality which would have empowered women.81  This criticism is incredibly relevant 
to the Refugee Convention.  It was originally intended to protect political activists and 
minority groups from a persecuting government.  There was no thoughts during the 
drafting of protecting women from the danger that was faced within the home, 
particularly if denied government protection.  Instead, the Refugee Convention judged 
oppressive governments to be the major threats to safety and security.82   
She then expanded her premise to consider the hierarchy of human rights in law.  
So-called “first generation rights,” such as those considered in the UN’s International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,83 dealing with issues such as freedom of speech 
and habeas corpus, are still prioritised within international law.  “Second generation 
rights”84 are those which are more concerned with freedom from hunger and economic 
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instability; these tend to be considered less essential for states to provide.85  Women 
who encounter violence within the home or sexual violence in their communities are 
not helped by freedom of speech or habeas corpus – protection from violence has never 
been a core enforceable human right.  MacKinnon suggests that it is no coincidence that 
when rights disproportionately impact women, they are dismissed as more optional or 
niche, less necessary.86  She noted that treaties for specific vulnerable categories of 
people, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child87 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,88 are not considered to be 
essential cornerstones of international law, with a high number of reservations allowed 
for CEDAW, and lacking any state to state procedure, like those found in other UN 
treaties.  MacKinnon notes that this is an example of a clear hierarchy being imposed 
by international treaties.89  MacKinnon interprets this to mean that international law is 
more concerned with reinforcing existing power structures rather than empowering 
vulnerable minorities.90  The Refugee Convention is obviously intended to protect 
minority groups from oppression and persecution.  Yet, as a document, it also 
reinforces the views about the roles and protection of the state which MacKinnon 
criticises.  The violence that is more likely to affect women, within the home and local 
community, perpetrated by friends and families, was not initially drafted to be within 
the remit of the Refugee Convention.91  Only over time did it become more accepted 
that the Refugee Convention did apply to particular social groups of women who faced 
persecutions by partners or communities and were denied government protection.92  
MacKinnon was able to identify the male perspective implicit in international law, a 
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perspective which this research will demonstrate, is still persuasive in determining the 
claims of female asylum seekers who have experienced this gender-based violence. 
MacKinnon suggested that international human rights law was initially written 
without awareness of gender oppression and so seems to assume that such oppression 
does not exist.  In order to combat this, she proposes, there needs to be specific and 
explicit recognition that gendered oppression does exist and it is the role of the 
government to eliminate its effects.93  She notes that, 
Rape law assumes that consent to sex is as real for women as it is for men.  
Privacy law assumes that women in private have the same privacy that 
men do.  Obscenity law assume that women have the same access to 
speech men have.  Equality law assumes that women are already socially 
equal to men. Only to the extent women have already achieved social 
equality does the mainstream law of equality support their inequality 
claims . The laws of rape , abortion, obscenity, and sex discrimination 
show how the relation between objectification, under stood as the primary 
process of the subordination of women, and the power of the state is the 
relation between the personal and the political at the level of 
government.94 
 
MacKinnon sees current human rights law as entrenchment of the social realities, rather 
than as a revolutionary force to protect vulnerable women.95 
 MacKinnon’s solution, interestingly, can seem on the surface quite similar to the 
philosophy advocated by the Catholic Church96 in that she also advocates for a more 
sensitive equality law that recognizes the effects of historical difference in treatment and 
status between men and women.97  MacKinnon recognizes that these different legal roles 
have often been used against women, to justify discrimination and removal of legal and 
political freedoms in public life.98  Yet she notes that, for example, if special 
circumstances of women are not recognised, women would be greatly disadvantaged for 
their treatment during pregnancy.99  Laws which do not account for the particular health 
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needs for pregnant women are theoretically “equal treatment,” but it is an equality which 
fails to account for basic biological gender differences.100  MacKinnon argues that an 
understanding of the current reality of women and how their rights have not previously 
been adequately realised are required in order to ensure that women’s human rights are 
fully protected in future.101  In order for the state to act, it must first acknowledge that 
women are mistreated and face inequality both at home and in the workplace and seek to 
redress this imbalance.102  It is essential, in MacKinnon’s view, for state governments and 
international law to recognise that domestic violence and sexual abuse are a form of 
torture103 and unacceptable to allow under international obligations.104  MacKinnon 
would argue in favour of a refugee system which provides protection to all women denied 
protection and justice from gendered violence within their home or local community. 
 MacKinnon’s view on the roles of women and international law have been 
criticized both from those who believe that women are defying their natural roles by 
attempting to increase their social power105 and by those who believe her analysis fails to 
take account of the divisions women face due to class and race.106  In one of pontiff John 
Paul II’s Vatican addresses, he made comments that were assumed to reference the effect 
of radical feminism,107 claiming that in order to escape male oppression, women have 
sought to deny their biological role and consider lesbian relationships to be a credible 
alternative to family life.108  He urged women not to withdraw from men, but to accept 
their biological differences and cooperate in order to follow the Biblical example of 
family.109  He argued that women could not achieve their full potential by viewing men as 
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enemies.110  John Paul seems to view radical feminists as disrupting the natural, 
biological role of women, although the statement is silent on the role that male 
oppression and objectification may have played in disrupting the natural harmony and 
diversity of family life.  The Catholic Church chose not to consider whether women are 
currently discriminated against or how this could be improved.  Unlike MacKinnon, the 
Catholic Church seems to be uninterested in the methods of achieving women’s equality, 
choosing instead to focus on the importance of women maintaining their separate and 
specific societal obligations.111 
 Conversely, intersectional feminists are particularly concerned with ending 
oppression and achieving equality, rather than enforcing prescribed gender roles for 
women.  Radical feminism has been criticized for narrowly focusing on the experiences 
of white women, rather than recognizing the diversity of the roles that race and class play 
in women’s lives and their societal positions.112  In her article, intended to serve as a 
rebuttal to these criticisms, MacKinnon argues for the universal nature of women’s 
inequality, stating, 
To see that these practices are done by men to women is to see these 
abuses as forming a system, a hierarchy of inequality. This situation has 
occurred in many places, in one form or another, for a very long time, 
often in a context characterized by disenfranchisement, preclusion from 
property ownership (women are more likely to be property than to own 
any), ownership and use as object, exclusion from public life, sex-based 
poverty, degraded sexuality, and a devaluation of women's human worth 
and contributions throughout society. This subordination of women to men 
is socially institutionalized, cumulatively and systematically shaping 
access to human dignity, respect, resources, physical security, credibility, 
membership in community, speech, and power. Comprised of all its 
variations, the group women can be seen to have a collective social history 
of disempowerment, exploitation and subordination extending to the 
present.113 
 
MacKinnon sees this as the experience of all women, regardless of their ethnic 
background, socioeconomic status or sexual identity.114  She disputes the idea that 
                                                        
110 ibid para 4. 
111 ibid paras 12 and 13 
112 See Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought.  (Women’s 
Press 1990), as answered in MacKinnon (n 106). 
113 MacKinnon (n 106) 15. 
114ibid 15. 
  
37 
feminist theory could be applicable to the lives of white women and yet incomplete for 
women of colour, arguing that if the theory did not apply to all women, it would not still 
be considered viable and descriptive.115  MacKinnon ignores the obvious criticism – that 
academics like hooks116 and Crenshaw117 are responding because her theories do not 
account for aspects of their lives as black women. 
 It is disappointing that MacKinnon does not seem interested in allowing her 
theories to evolve with input from women of colour and in some ways seems quite hostile 
to their criticism.118  This is particularly concerning in the context of asylum seekers – 
women in the asylum system often face multiple oppressions, as ethnic minorities or 
forced to communicate in a foreign language and cope with insecure migration status and 
cultural differences.   She argues that while her analysis of gender discrimination is often 
criticized due to the absence of a racial understanding, analyses of race are not expected 
to include gender.119  MacKinnon does not seem to be aware of authors such as Hill 
Collins120 or Crenshaw,121 who do not only object to the absence of race in feminism, but 
also discuss the masculine assumption of writings about blackness.  Most disturbingly, 
MacKinnon offers a cynical analysis as to why women of colour were unwilling to accept 
white feminist theory: a desire to distance themselves from the stereotype of white 
women, preferring instead to racially identify, being part of a group which includes 
men.122  She rejects the idea that racial privilege has a tangible influence on white 
women’s lives, arguing, 
This is not to say there is no such thing as skin privilege, but rather that it 
has never insulated white women from the brutality and misogyny of men, 
mostly but not exclusively white men, or from its effective legalization. In 
other words, the "white girls" of this theory miss quite a lot of the reality 
of white women in the practice of male supremacy.123 
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MacKinnon is refuting an argument that has not really been made.  Black feminist 
academics do not dispute that white women face sexual violence124 or discrimination in 
the workplace.125  They simply argue that discrimination takes different forms and has 
more complex interlocking oppression for women of colour.126 
It is the refusal of radical feminists like MacKinnon to account for an 
understanding of women’s oppression which includes race, class and immigration status 
that has led to the development of a newer strand of feminism, intersectional feminism.  
MacKinnon provides a thorough explanation and increasingly a descriptive theory which 
aligns with how many legal systems are dealing with the issues of domestic violence and 
sexual abuse.127  However, the weakness in MacKinnon’s arguments are reminiscent of 
the oversights of these governments: a lack of understanding of the particular challenges 
involved in protecting women of colour and migrants from domestic violence. 
IV. Intersectional Feminism 
 Intersectional feminism stemmed from the frustration of black128 and lesbian 
feminists129 that they felt the depth and broadness of their oppression had not been fully 
vocalized by most radical feminists.  Similarly, black feminists often thought that anti-
racist writings ignored the inequalities within black families and the harmful sexist 
behaviours of black men.130  There was a definite lack of understanding by radical 
feminists such as MacKinnon that black women often felt that racial barriers were as 
essential to understanding their experiences as black women as feminist theory.131  Not 
only did they ignore this important aspect of women’s lives, they were actively hostile to 
its inclusion in feminism.132 
Black women133 felt compelled to write about their experiences having faced 
discrimination both through gender and race – and not always being able to pinpoint why 
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they encountered a specific instance of oppressions.  In coining the term 
“intersectionality”, which would be used for this multilateral branch of feminism, 
Crenshaw described it as being similar to a traffic accident which occurs at an 
intersection, writing, 
Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one 
direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an 
intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of 
directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman 
is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from 
sex discrimination or race discrimination.134 
 
At other times, it is all too obvious that women of colour are discriminated against not 
solely as women or due to race, but because of a combination of both.  The discrepancy 
between the average pay of white men and women of colour, for example, is wider than 
either white women or men of colour face.135  As noted previously, Crenshaw also uses 
the example of the domestic violence women face – black women are abused within the 
home because they are women, but services intended for middle class white women fail 
them due to the economic and social discrimination they face as black women.136 
bell hooks also writes extensively on black women’s struggles to carve a place for 
themselves both in the feminist movement and in the movement for racial equality.  She 
notes that the first step is for black women to become the authoritative authors of their 
own experiences – writing by white men is still seen as the most authoritative, even when 
it relates to the lives of black women.137  She also notes that failure of many feminists to 
focus on race could be related to the feminist cry that the “personal is political” – while it 
urged women to understand the wider oppressive context of the micro-aggressions they 
experienced, it also encouraged women to focus on their own discrimination in what 
hooks perceives as a self-absorbed manner.138  This, she believes, has led white women to 
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focus on issues such as abortion139 while ignoring the role that they, even while 
discriminated against as women, play in maintaining power structures which grant them 
advantage over black women.  hooks argues that racism is commonly understood to mean 
hatred of those of colour, when often there is no particular malice involved, just a desire 
to continue to benefit from the structures of white privilege.140  White women have the 
freedom to believe that patriarchy is the root of classism and racism and distance 
themselves from their role in perpetrating these oppressions.141 
Intersectional feminists cite specific examples of the ways in which white women 
and black women have different needs from feminism and feminist theory.  hooks 
references Betty Friedan’s seminal work, The Feminine Mystique,142 which explored the 
loneliness and the lack of emotional fulfilment of educated suburban white women who 
had opted to become housewives rather than enter the paid workforce in the 1950s and 
1960s.  hooks noted that this was a specific fear of educated, middle class women who 
were interested in intellectually challenging roles that white middle class men held; these 
women were not interested in the roles that black working class men and women were 
forced by economic necessity to fulfil.143 
Black women have had very different experiences of exploitation within the 
workplace,144 while also being denied autonomy in their homes.  Instead of black families 
unifying within their homes as a form of protection against racism, hooks argued that 
black men chose to exert power within the home in order to combat feelings of 
powerlessness in larger society.145  She notes that, unfortunately, this not only contributes 
to the hurdles of black women, but also means that marriage becomes a method of 
oppression rather than a partnership,146 
Would men but generously snap our chains, and be content with rational 
fellowship instead of slavish obedience, they would find us more 
observant daughters, more affectionate sisters, more faithful wives, more 
reasonable mothers – in a word, better citizens.  We should then love them 
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with true affection, because we should learn to respect ourselves; and the 
peace of mind of a worthy man would not be interrupted by the idle vanity 
of his wife, nor the babes sent to nestle in a strange bosom, never having 
found a home in their mother’s.147 
 
It is interesting that there are similarities between hook’s writings and the 
Catholic Church’s focus on the negative effects men face for perpetrating oppression,148 
as hooks also considers the pain that patriarchy causes men.149  The distinction is that 
hook recognises that men who oppress black women are also often oppressed themselves 
as victims of racism.150  She notes that in intersectionality, a more complex view of 
oppressors emerges.  White women can be racist and black men can be sexist; it can be 
difficult for black women to ally themselves with either.151 
 Intersectional feminism is also a theory which continues to evolve over time, as 
awareness increases of various societal oppressions.  bell hooks may understand the 
difficult intersection of race and gender, but her writings display a limited understanding 
about the barriers, discrimination and oppressions that LBT women face, even suggesting 
that most lesbian or transgendered women primarily face violence outside of gay bars 
rather than in the home.152  While this may be hooks’ belief, it is unsupported by 
academic research about the particular vulnerabilities that women in lesbian 
relationships153 and transgendered women154 may face within the home.  It is interesting 
that while hooks is able to verbalise her own oppression, she is less understanding and 
knowledgeable about those of other women facing multiple discriminations, illustrating 
that understanding of oppressions is not necessarily transferrable.   Women who 
understand the geography at their particular intersection cannot always read the map at 
another.  Baca Zinn and Thornton Dill also caution that even women from minorities 
backgrounds do not necessarily have insights into each other’s experiences: the racism 
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black women encounter is distinct from that which Asian women combat.155  As more 
women from diverse backgrounds continue to write about hurdles they face, 
intersectional feminism will become more complex and varied.  One wonders if hooks 
would respond to black lesbian writers with the same venom as MacKinnon or whether 
she would embrace an increased understanding of the intersections between race, sexual 
orientation and gender. 
 Erez, Adelman and Gregory specifically focused on the difficulties and 
oppressions that immigrant status creates for women.156  They note that the experience of 
migration can be quite isolating and lonely – women are separated from their family 
group and broader community to relocate to a new state.157  Migrant women also face 
discrimination as migrants in their new community – while this can be linked to racism, it 
is still encountered by migrant women from an ethnic majority background.158  These 
women are often left extremely vulnerable to violence within a relationship due to the 
vulnerabilities imposed by the migration process.159  While plenty of spouses are able to 
use the threat of financial dependence and child custody to maintain power and 
dependency, this threat is obviously increasingly worrying to women who have insecure 
migration status and are constantly vulnerable to removal from their child’s country of 
residence.160  Migrant women often also receive mixed messages about abusive 
relationships – both from the culture they come from and from the receiving state, both of 
which likely condemn abusive relationships while urging women to put emotional energy 
into maintaining nuclear families.161  It is naïve to expect that migrant women have the 
same support network for exiting abusive relationships that women with secure migration 
status are able to access.  When planning services and legislation aimed at targeting 
refugee and migrant women, it is insufficient to simply expect women to separate from 
their husbands; services need to take a holistic view and understand the variety of 
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dilemmas that these women face, and difficulties which can feel so insurmountable that 
remaining in an abusive relationship can feel like a necessary decision. 
 Intersectional feminism can often feel less like a series of answers and more like a 
list of questions – instead of, like MacKinnon, providing a clear road map to impose a 
feminist understanding of human rights, intersectional feminism is less directional and 
simply focuses on the myriad of different factors which complicate women’s lives.  
Intersectional feminism challenges the idea of a universal experience of domestic 
violence and notes that the influences keeping women in violent homes differ greatly 
based on women’s race, class, sexual orientation and immigration status.  Unfortunately, 
this does not seem to be incorporated into many states’ policies on combating domestic 
and sexual violence, instead opting to treat women as a universal monolith who require 
the same supports for domestic and sexual violence.  Intersectionality considers gender to 
be one of a number of important factors, rather than a unique experience.  This evolved 
lens through which to consider gender is an important change in perspective – from 
viewing gender as a monolith to a more fractured aspect of women’s lives.  Obviously, 
this change will greatly influence the type of legislation which affects migrant women’s 
lives. 
V. Conclusion 
 These three varying theories of gender equality have very different opinions about 
the natural role of women and how gender functions should be legislated in society.  It is 
worth noting that these theories have not necessarily influenced various governmental 
initiatives.  Although some of this thinking has been influential, such as the Catholic 
doctrine on separate spheres’ direct influence on the Irish policies on the role of 
women,162 radical feminist analysis of the need for government involvement in private 
life is more descriptive than influential as to the increased awareness of the ways in 
which human rights, criminal law and privacy have been harmful towards women.  
Intersectional feminism attempts to link feminism with other movements for equality and 
liberation, such as the LGBT movement, anti-racism and support for migrants, and 
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understand all of these in a broad holistic context.163  All three of these theories would 
describe different priorities and assumptions which are enshrined in policies and 
legislation. 
The entirety of this research is focused on understanding the treatment of female 
asylum seekers who are fleeing and combating violence within the home.  In order to 
better understand the legislation which affects these women’s lives (determining whether 
they are granted asylum, the resources that they are given, the procedures the government 
follows when interacting with them), it is essential to comprehend the assumptions 
behind these decisions and the sometimes unconscious, sometimes deliberate biases 
which have been enshrined into law.  Examining feminist theory can be helpful to try to 
understand why policy makers are drawn to specific focuses and how they view the 
complexities of gender and migration. 
 In the following chapters, this research will argue for the development in national 
law of EU member states of an intersectional approach, encouraged and legislated by the 
EU.  States need to consider their legislative biases in underestimating the difficulties that 
face women who are also handicapped by trauma, language barriers, racism, limited 
socioeconomic means and insecure migration status.  Intersectional feminism recognises 
that these women do not have the same support and resources as women who are not 
burdened by many of these oppressions.  Law dealing with gendered protection must 
work equally well for women encountering any of these hurdles.  Intersectional feminist 
theory cannot signpost the specific actions which need to be taken to better support 
migrant women, but provides a verbalisation of the considerations which need to be taken 
into account by national and EU law. 
 The European Union and its two member states which will be examined in depth, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, have failed to purposefully adopt an intersectional 
approach.  Now that we have analysed what an intersectional perspective means, and how 
it differs from separate spheres and radical feminism, the next chapters will more fully 
discuss the intersectional approach which has been used in international law for gender-
based asylum claims and the gap between international law and what has been enshrined 
in EU and member state law.  In the next chapter, the context of EU asylum law will be 
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more fully discussed and explained, in order to understand how an intersectional 
understanding does not, at the moment, exist.   
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Chapter 3: Laws Regulating Asylum by the European Union 
 
 
I. Introduction 
It is clear that the legal areas of asylum and migration are considered and debated 
more broadly than simply a national level.1  While the process of determining whether to 
grant asylum is still partially controlled by the member states of the European Union, an 
understanding of the laws regulating asylum must now have reference to the range of 
measures which have been crafted by the organs of the EU.  This current research 
examines the legal experiences of women who are seeking asylum in the UK and Ireland 
and how this is influenced by the legislating within these states.  National laws cannot be 
considered in isolation; it is important to look in depth at the variety of EU legislation, 
judgements and soft law regulating asylum, as well as the various organs of the EU and 
their differing views and contributions to asylum policy.   
Throughout this thesis, the research seeks to examine the EU’s effects on the 
process of asylum seeking; to explore whether there is a gap between the theory and the 
reality when an asylum seeker arrives at the borders of the EU.  In order to understand 
that gap, there needs to be an understanding as to how the EU has crafted the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), as well as the debates and differing viewpoints which 
created the current legislation, treaties, judgements and opinions.  A discussion of “EU 
asylum policy” does not only include the actual binding hard law, but also the values and 
culture which manifest in the EU legislation.2  It is important to see if both these 
legalities and these social views translate into the national asylum processes. 
Both the UK and Ireland have a complicated relationship with the CEAS.  Both 
chose to opt into the first stage of legislation, which set minimum standards for asylum 
decisions and practices, but not the later stages, intended to more completely harmonise 
national laws.3 This means that the EU’s laws governing the asylum process are an 
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essential aspect of the process that women undergo when attempting to access the status 
of refugees.  In order to understand all the factors involved in the process of seeking 
asylum in the UK and Ireland, it is important to clarify the EU’s position as a source of 
binding law and the substance of the Common European Asylum System.  
 The clash of legislative priorities are similar to those facing national governments.  
There are often natural conflicts between border protection and humanitarian-based rights 
concerns.4  The EU is not immune from these same discussions and conflicts and there is 
a broad variety of agendas contained within the idea of “EU asylum law.”5  There has 
been considerable debate between academics about how the EU has balanced border 
security and migration control with meeting obligations under the Refugee Convention 
and applying humane standard to asylum seekers and refugees within Europe.6  The first 
question is whether the EU has provided an excuse for member states to lessen the 
quality of their humanitarian protection through increased legislation at EU level.  As 
Costello notes, there is an idea amongst certain national-level officials, including those 
who frequently make up membership of the European Council of Ministers, that humane 
and inclusive treatment of asylum seekers provides a “pull factor”, which provides an 
incentive to asylum seekers to arrive in a particular state.7 
 As a result, there has been considerable academic exploration as to whether the 
EU has focused its asylum strategy primarily on reducing the perceived burden on 
specific member states8 or a more complex agenda, which includes a desire to preserve 
the current legal situation and protect human rights.9  There has also been broad interest 
as to whether asylum competence was moved to the EU specifically in order to “venue 
shop”10 – make decisions in a forum in which there is less oversight of fundamental 
rights and less input from both NGOs and legislatures (such as members of the European 
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Parliament) who have strong views about the importance of promoting fundamental 
rights protection for refugees.11  These discussions all relate to how the EU has managed 
to resolve the conflict between attempting to manage number of asylum seekers and 
maintaining humanitarian obligations.  At every level of the legislative process, there is a 
push and pull between these two factors.  In this chapter, we will provide an analysis of 
how various EU laws navigate the balance and whether this has provided adequate 
protection for asylum seekers. 
 The first section considers the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(the TFEU).  The EU treaties form the basis of all EU law, and the TFEU is the treaty 
signed by the member states which currently regulates the competence in asylum of the 
EU, including judgements of the CJEU and binding directives.  Even in this initial 
provision, the most basic and brief description of the EU’s role in regulating asylum, the 
tension between border control and humanitarian grounds is apparent, a tension which 
carries from the Treaty into other areas of European law. 
 The second section examines the legislation which makes up the Common 
European Asylum System.12  This legislation has been composed by the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers, with 
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varying degrees of influence and priorities that appear in the final text of the legislation.13  
It is often argued that the European Parliament has historically represented rights-based 
concerns while the European Council of Ministers has a harsher, security-focused view of 
asylum law, with the European Commission providing a mediating balance between the 
two.14  While this is reflected in reality to some degree, it is a more complicated 
relationship that has evolved over time,15 but still retains an ongoing push and pull 
between these factors.16 
 The third section focuses on the case-law developed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.  While asylum was historically not adjudicated by the European legal 
system,17 there has increasingly been recent court decisions regarding human rights 
within the EU’s asylum protection, especially echoing the close relationship between the 
Court of Justice and the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights.  Since 
the European Court of Human Rights has found human rights violations within aspects of 
the Common European Asylum System, the Court of Justice has also expressed concern 
about certain features of the CEAS.18  This would indicate that the Court of Justice is 
beginning to embrace a role defending the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and 
pushing back against some harsh initiatives to reduce asylum seeker numbers, while 
continuing to seek harmonisation and cooperation between member states.19 
 All of these sections together provide a comprehensive view of European law and 
a clearer understanding of the balance which is held between security and fundamental 
rights – a balance which impacts the experience of the most vulnerable asylum seekers. 
II. Primary legal sources 
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 The primary sources for all European Union legislation are the various EU 
treaties.  They function most similarly to a constitution in a national legal system, 
establishing the competences of the European Union, the areas of law in which the EU 
has jurisdiction and which organs of the EU will be involved in the legislation process.  
Most significantly, these treaties have been ratified by the member states, allowing the 
states to consider and approve sharing their jurisdiction and competence in these areas 
with the European Union. 
The treaties set the tone for the nuances of the EU’s views on a particular area of 
law.  The EU’s competence on asylum is no exception.  Two articles in particular within 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union deal with the regulation of asylum 
by the EU.  Article 67 states that the EU  
 
shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall 
frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border 
control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards 
third-country nationals.20 
 
 Article 78 expands into more detail on the role of this common asylum system, 
noting that the goal of the EU is to offer asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary 
protection in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement and specifically mentions 
that protection must be in line with the Refugee Convention.21  It is important to note that 
Article 78 specifically encodes the Refugee Convention22 as a source of EU law.  All of 
the member states of the EU are signatories to the Refugee Convention; yet by 
incorporating the convention into European Union law, it is clear that the EU is not 
discarding the tenets of the internal law on refugees. but using it as a base for the EU 
common asylum.  The Treaty also sets out that the goal of the asylum system is 
harmonisation and commonality, while working within principles of international law 
                                                        
20 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 115/47  at 
Article 67(2) 
21 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 115/47 at 
Article 78. 
22 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 
189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention). 
 
  
51 
and fundamental rights.  Within the current wording of the Treaty, it is clear the various 
tensions which exist in attempting to balance the priorities within EU asylum legislation. 
 The EU has historically had strong links with international refugee law.  Ten of 
the original twenty six signatories of the original Refugee Convention are current 
members of the EU.  The dissolution of internal borders, a key aspect of the Schengen 
Agreement, meant that the EU had an interest in regulating external borders and 
migration into the EU.  Throughout the history of the European Union, there has been a 
desire to limit internal borders and coordinate treatment of third party nationals, including 
refugees and asylum seekers.23  The concept of justice and home affairs coordination was 
introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht.  The Treaty of Maastricht turned the then-
European Community into one of three pillars of the European Union: with the other two 
pillars being built upon previous informal cooperations: the Common Foreign Security 
Policy and most relevantly, the Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.24   The Justice 
and Home Affairs Pillar was intended to handle issues such as police cooperation, united 
investigation of international crime and asylum and migration.25  It is interesting that 
asylum and migration were twinned with measures intended to combat crime, an insight 
into how the EU views third country asylum seekers. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam rearranged these pillars, with asylum and migration 
moving to the European Community pillar, as part of Title IV of the European 
Community.26  The move to the European Community pillar meant that the European 
Court of Justice would be able to rule on asylum issues and the European Parliament 
would be consulted, both changes which were considered helpful to increase the 
humanitarian protection for asylum seekers.27  This was not deemed to be totally 
successful28 and harmonisation of rights standards were further undermined by the 
decision of the UK and Ireland to opt out of Title IV (although both countries could and 
did choose to opt into specific legislative measures without permission of the other 
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member states.)29  Finally, in the Treaty of Lisbon, the three pillar system was abolished, 
with all areas of EU competence being judged to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice of the EU and with additional input involved from the European Parliament, 
often judged to be the European Union organ particularly concerned with human rights.30  
The Lisbon Treaty was considered by academics to be an opportunity to better harmonise 
the standard of treatments for asylum seekers.31 
 It is important to consider the meaning of the current Treaty articles in contrast to 
the former Article 63 Treaty of the EU established by the Treaty of Amsterdam.32  In ex-
Article 63, reference is made frequently to minimum standards – minimum standards to 
qualify as a refugee, minimum standards for the protection offered to refugees and 
general minimum standards of immigration policy.33  Kaunert and Leonard argue that this 
represented a shift in focus after the Lisbon Treaty.  Before the Lisbon Treaty, asylum 
was almost completely controlled by the European Council of Ministers, negotiated 
between governments, with minimal involvement by the European Parliament or the 
European Commission.34  While the Lisbon Treaty (and the Amsterdam Treaty) are not 
considered primary sources of EU law, they have amended the two original treaties: the 
Treaty of the European Union and any subsequent treaties could amend the relevant 
articles and their regulation of the asylum process. 
 The argument was made that the European Council of Ministers was initially 
“venue-shopping”, attempting to handle asylum standards at a European level, therefore 
avoiding interference from national legislatures and courts which were sympathetic to the 
human rights of asylum seekers, instead handling it with like-minded governments on a 
European level.35  This thesis would seem to be further supported by the initial lack of 
input from the European Parliament and the European Commission, as well as the 
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minimal jurisdiction held by the Courts of Justice in Europe before the Lisbon Treaty.36  
At this time, the wording of the Treaty also mentioned minimum standards, which led to 
fears by academics that, by establishing minimum criteria, there would be a “race to the 
bottom” between member states aimed at eliminating pull factors, each state believing 
that by minimising protections they would lessen their share of the “burden” of asylum 
seekers.37  At the least, it seemed that the European Council of Ministers wanted to 
ensure that member states did not have to completely overhaul their asylum systems to 
take account of additional fundamental rights.38 
 Regardless of whether this was true before the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has 
responded to several of these criticisms in the evolved Common European Asylum 
System.  The Treaty language changed to reflect that the next stage of the CEAS meant 
that instead of striving for minimum standards, the European Union now seeks to find 
common standards39 – language which makes it more difficult to avoid responsibility for 
insufficient human rights protection or violations under the Refugee Convention.40 
Legislation regarding asylum now uses the co-decision procedure, which provides 
a greater role for the European Parliament and more oversight by the European courts.41  
It is important, however, to note that along with changes to the framework of the EU 
treaties, there have also been changes to the membership of the European Parliament.  
Ripoli Servent and Trauner dispute the popular idea that all members of the European 
Parliament are necessarily sympathetic to the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.42  In 
a climate where British nationalist group UKIP won over 20 seats in the last European 
Parliament, a trend echoed by other nationalist parties around Europe, there will 
obviously be repercussions in the views of the European Parliament.43  It is also worth 
considering the research by Hix and Noury, which examines trends in the voting records 
of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on the topic of migration.44  Hix and 
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Noury found that female MEPs or MEPs from an ethnic minority background were more 
likely to be sympathetic to migrants and their fundamental rights,45 as were MEPs from 
countries with historical links to colonialism and high numbers of asylum seekers.46  
While the European Parliament has traditionally been more diverse than other branches 
of the European Union,47 its membership will obviously change both at every 
enlargement of the EU, as well as after every election.  The European Parliament will not 
necessarily always be an advocate for the human rights of asylum seekers. 
 The complexities of whether the EU has been an ally to asylum seekers and 
refugees will be discussed throughout this chapter.  Yet what is clear is that post-Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU has taken account of criticisms that they had swung too far towards 
emphasising a reduction in numbers of asylum rather than focusing on protecting the 
rights of asylum seekers.   Although these changes in viewpoint and relationship between 
the organs of the European Union are not necessarily enough in themselves to redress the 
pendulum swinging between border protection and fundamental rights, it is important that 
the EU is attempting to redress this balance by enshrining a more balanced approach 
through the legislative process and the wording of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
III. Secondary legislation and asylum 
 If the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is most comparable to a 
national constitution, it is logical that the Treaty is concerned primarily with broad 
principles and competences, while leaving more of the details to be spelled out by 
legislation.  As stated earlier, Article 78 of the Treaty notes that the EU will set up a 
common asylum system.48  The core of this Common European Asylum System is 
generally considered to be five specific pieces of legislation: the Asylum Procedures 
Directive,49 on standards for the process of seeking and granting asylum and other forms 
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of protection, the Reception Conditions Directive,50 which instructs member states on 
how to treat asylum seekers once they arrive in the EU, the Qualification Directive,51 
which explores the criteria for recognition for protection in the EU, the Dublin II 
Regulation,52 which sets down guidelines as to which member state is responsible for 
processing an asylum claim and the Eurodac Regulation,53 which governs use of the 
database of fingerprints from asylum seekers in the EU.54  These are currently the second 
version of these directives.  The initial versions, passed before the Lisbon Treaty 
amended asylum and migration procedures with the EU, were intended to create 
minimum standards of treatment of asylum seekers and to establish the criteria for 
recognition as refugees: a ‘basement’ which no member state could go below.  The UK 
and Ireland both chose voluntarily to opt into this initial legislation, but have chosen not 
to adhere to the directives at the later stages.  The majority of discussion in this chapter 
will concern the current recast directives, intended to increasingly harmonise asylum 
standards and treatment, unless otherwise noted.55 
 These five directives are the major legislation of the EU’s asylum policy and by 
examining this legislation, the conflict between fundamental rights and border security 
can still be clearly read, at times co-existing in the same legislation.  It has been debated 
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by academics as to whether the EU has provided a forum which allows member states to 
ignore the needs of asylum seekers56 or whether the EU’s influence has resulted in a more 
liberalised asylum regime.57  Part of the confusion seems to be that the EU has two 
different aims for the CEAS – both to ensure that the EU meets its obligation to refugees 
under international law and to equally divide the responsibility for processing the 
applications for asylum.  These two aims can often conflict,58 leading to member states 
attempting to shift what they perceive to be the “burden” of asylum seekers to another 
member state.59 
 Certain provisions of these directives seem to strongly support Costello’s 
argument that the EU, particularly the European Council of Ministers, see asylum seekers 
as being drawn to specific countries based on their “pull factor” – stronger protection in 
regards to housing, benefits or access to employment.60  This is obviously not a full and 
simple explanation for the behaviour and choices of asylum seekers – otherwise, all 
asylum seekers would have previously flocked to only one member state before the 
harmonisation under EU law.61    
 As a result, the EU has legislated under the shared idea that asylum seekers have a 
specific agenda as to which state in which they would like to claim asylum; they perceive 
the role of the EU as coaxing each state to take their fair share of the “burden” of asylum 
seekers,62 convincing member states not to raise their asylum standards out of line with 
the other EU member states.63  It also seems clear that member states, especially the UK, 
have tried to introduce measures in EU law which would echo the procedures that these 
states would like to include in national law, hoping to minimise the effects of the EU’s 
influence.64  At the Thessaloniki Council meeting of 2003, the UK suggested that asylum 
seekers could have applications processed outside the UK before being allowed to enter 
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Europe.  This suggestion was rejected by the other member states, specifically Germany 
and Sweden.65  The UK also attempted to impose a provision which would remove access 
to benefits for any asylum seekers who had not immediately declared themselves to be 
accessing the asylum process upon arriving in the UK, out of a concern that economic 
migrants in the UK without valid visas would claim asylum once discovered.66  This was 
not supported by the other European member states.67  This would argue that the member 
states will in many ways self-regulate the level of fundamental rights protection.  This 
will be particularly enforced by the states in the north-west of Europe, who aim to keep 
their own high rights protections embedded in European Union law, ensuring that there is 
not a “race to the bottom.”68 
There has also been considerable disagreement amongst states as to whether 
access to legal employment versus benefits provides more of a pull factor.  This arose as 
a debate between states which felt that providing benefits would place a massive burden 
on the state and those who feel that additional employment applicants would be more of a 
difficulty with the state’s economy.69  This debate and compromise was reflected in the 
Standards Directive, which requires states to grant access to the employment market only 
after one year.70  This examples indicates that member state priority disagreements can be 
a self-regulating factor which ensures that migrants in a variety of situations receive some 
level of protection. 
During the drafting of the legislation, the UNHCR and other expert non-
government organisations were not consulted or included during the process71 - the 
legislation was the result of internal debate balancing international human rights 
obligations with the views of member states.  While it is clear that there are many 
concerns about various aspects of the Common European Asylum System, it is also clear 
that the states did not lower their standards to a level that several member states would 
have preferred.72  Yet it is argued by several academics that states were more concerned 
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with trying to echo their own national law73 and see their national practices reflected in 
European law as much as possible.74 This has meant that while states have not completely 
decided to flaunt international law obligations, there are still areas of concern for the 
UNHCR.75 
One area that has concerned the UNHCR,76 and academics like Costello,77 is the 
concept of a safe third country.  The concept of safe third countries is one that does not 
exist in the 1951 Refugee Convention.78  Instead, European member states have argued 
that since Article 31 of the Refugee Convention requires refugees to present themselves 
to the authorities in a timely fashion, asylum seekers should seek to make an application 
in the first safe state that they are able to access.79  More than one member state sought, at 
the drafting process, to have their internal deportations processes to safe third countries 
recognised under EU law.80  
The core of the Dublin Convention, and subsequent Dublin Regulations, is that 
the European Union is a group of safe third countries.  The idea of the concept of safe 
third countries was seen to be a method of burden sharing between the European Union 
member states.81  It has been argued, however, that the main distinction between the 
Dublin Regulation and other safe third country policies, is that it is not a unilateral 
decision to return an asylum seeker to the safe third country – the state to which the 
asylum seeker is being removed can theoretically choose to accept or decline 
responsibility for an asylum seeker.82  While it is true that states should not be compelled 
to accept additional asylum seekers, it seems clear that the current Dublin Regulation is 
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dependant on border states accepting the majority of asylum seekers83 – the Dublin 
Regulation has been ineffective as a method of burden sharing,84 with the states along the 
Mediterranean still taking the largest percentage of asylum seekers.85   In the current 
unease which has led to the resettlement of may asylum seekers from political turmoil, it 
has become even more questionable that the conditions in several EU member states 
constitute a safe third country for these asylum seekers, particularly for lone women.86 
Since the Common European Asylum System has not been successful in more 
evenly distributing the processing of asylum seekers, has it at least ensured that member 
states maintain a common human rights protection?  The UNHCR noted concerns about 
the possibility of chain refoulement – asylum seekers being passed amongst countries 
which abdicate responsibility until they are eventually returned to the country of origin.87  
This is particularly true when member states treat asylum claims differently – Guild cites 
the example of the case of R v. Adan & Aitseguer.88  Determined after the passing of the 
Dublin Convention, the House of Lords noted that since France and Germany did not 
recognise persecution by non-state actors, they were not safe third countries for the 
purpose of refoulement.  While this case did occur before the subsequent Dublin 
Regulations, it provides an example of the gap between the lofty aims of the Common 
European Asylum System and the reality.  While the EU was intended to function as a 
collection of state third countries that would theoretically reach the same decisions in 
every asylum application, the Adan case would demonstrate otherwise.89  Furthermore, it 
has been noted by academics that the Dublin Regulation does not provide protection for 
recognised asylum seekers.  If a state denies an asylum claim, it is judged to be rejected 
by all the member states.  However, if a state grants refugee status, the other member 
states are not required to consider the applicant to be a refugee.90 More current examples 
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of this disparity in protections to asylum seekers and refugees will be explored in relation 
to several court cases which have highlighted disparities between fundamental rights and 
treatment of asylum seekers under the Dublin Regulation.  This split has been even more 
highlighted in the wake of the recent increase in Syrian and Afghan asylum seekers, 
where treatment of this refugee applicants has varied widely between member states.91  
It seems clear that the legislation passed under the CEAS attempts to achieve two 
goals: burden-sharing of asylum claims and a common level of fundamental rights.92   
These goals have been contradictory and have resulted in both an inconsistent level of 
fundamental rights protection93 as well as a lopsided distribution of asylum claims.94  
This seems to have resulted in a balancing act, where human rights standards are 
compromised but not ignored.  The European Union has balanced compromises on 
fundamental rights with security concerns.  Has this been effective and fair?  Various 
organs of the EU (the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) and NGOs have 
considered whether the organs of the EU are sufficiently considering the rights of asylum 
seekers.  Many of these criticisms predated the events of the recent wave of asylum 
seekers fleeing unstable governments and warfare in countries near the EU, but they do 
demonstrate that there were substantial problems and concerns of the effectiveness of the 
CEAS before it became tested by the increased number of applicants within the EU. 
IV. CJEU Jurisprudence 
 In Doede Ackers’ account of the negotiations of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive, he notes that the Commission reached a point at which, while they were 
sympathetic to European Parliament concerns about human rights, the Commission 
became unwilling to consider amendments which would adjust the balance between 
human rights and efficiency.95  Yet the European Commission does not provide the final 
analysis as to whether the balance of human rights and security has been achieved – there 
is additional oversight and evaluation by two specific courts, the CJEU and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  While the ECtHR is the judicial arm of an 
international human rights based treaty, the CJEU is the judicial arm of the European 
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Union, which deals with the interpretation of the various EU treaties, as well as 
legislative compatibility with the sources of EU fundamental rights (arising from both 
international instruments and, within the EU, the primary source of fundamental rights, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).96 
 This form of judicial review means that both courts have offered their own 
opinions on the balance between fundamental rights and securitisation.  The ECtHR has 
released several decisions that have been critical of the CEAS, most specifically the 
Dublin system of transferring asylum seekers between member states.97  It is important to 
note that the ECtHR is not an organ of the EU – it was the judicial organ of the 
international human rights treaty, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
established by the Council of Europe, an international organisation with an emphasis on 
protecting human rights in Europe.  Although all member states of the European Union 
are also members of the Council of Europe,98 the European Union is not currently a 
member of the Council of Europe.  Yet there has been considerable reference to the 
ECHR within EU legislation and judgements; the case-law of the ECtHR has been a 
strong influence on the CJEU on fundamental rights based claims.99  The CJEU has been 
particularly concerned about ensuring that the two courts’ case-law remains congruent.100  
While the EU is in talks to accede to the Council of Europe and be subject directly to the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction,101 currently, the EU’s acceptance of the guidance of the ECtHR 
case-law is totally voluntary.  The ECtHR can, however, make binding judgements on 
member states, including, in certain circumstances, the member states’ transposition of 
EU instruments. 102   The Bopshorus principle, based on an ECtHR cases, established that 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the CJEU will provide equivalent protection to the 
CJEU.  Yet this is rebuttable and EU rights can prove to be inadequate in specific 
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circumstances.103  This includes the Dublin Regulations under the CEAS; the ECtHR has 
made several judgements considering whether or not the Dublin system adequately 
protects the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.105 
 The first ECHR judgement that dealt with the Dublin system in depth was T.I v. 
United Kingdom.106  The case concerned an applicant who had been tortured by the Tamil 
organisation in Sri Lanka (a paramilitary force opposed to the current government.)  The 
applicant initially applied for asylum in Germany; the case was rejected as those 
persecuting the applicant were not state actors.107  The applicant then entered the UK and 
made an asylum application there.  Although the UK Home Office did not doubt the 
applicant’s credibility, the potential of the applicant being offered subsidiary protection in 
Germany (although subsidiary protection was very rarely offered to those who had been 
rejected for asylum claims)108 was sufficient for the ECtHR to decide that the UK would 
not violate the Article 3 protection against torture in the European Convention on Human 
Rights109 if the applicant was returned to Germany.  The case of TI was eventually 
decided in a way which did not disrupt the EU’s Dublin system, but certainly indicated a 
willingness to examine the Dublin system.110  The case also demonstrates that while the 
CEAS was intended to harmonise the asylum system to the point that there would be an 
identical experience applying for refugee status in any member state, there were still 
major differences between the policies of the member states: ie the distinction between 
the UK, which considered actions by non-state actors to be persecution and Germany, 
which did not.111  Although these differences were not sufficient yet for condemnation 
from the ECtHR, they clearly existed. 
 Yet over time, differences in the asylum system became more pronounced.  
Human rights groups began to be more vocal about the conditions surrounding asylum 
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seekers in Greece; both the UNHCR and the European Parliament released statements 
cautioning other member states about transferring asylum applicants to Greece, as the 
care standards did not meet the fundamental rights standards required by either 
international law or the CEAS.112  Yet oddly, these cautions were ignored by the ECtHR 
in the case of KRS v. United Kingdom.113  The KRS case involved an Iranian applicant 
who the UK sought to transfer to Greece in order to have his asylum claim processed 
there.  The applicant argued against the transfer on the basis that the conditions in Greece 
were a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and so incompatible with his human rights.114  
Interestingly, the ECtHR chose to focus not on the risks presented by transferring the 
applicant to Greece, but aiming the judgement instead at whether there was a risk of 
refoulement to Iran, noting that regardless of the conditions in Greece, the applicant 
would not face refoulement.115 
While protection against refoulement is an essential aspect of ensuring 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers, there are also strong protections both within EU 
and international law which go beyond refoulement, dictating the asylum seekers’ 
treatment within the second country.116  Protection from refoulement is far from the only 
criterion to be considered when examining a member state’s human rights record; the 
level of humane treatment of applicants is also an essential consideration.  The ECtHR 
also ignored the public information which had been released by NGOs and human rights 
bodies on the situation in Greece, stating that “in the absence of any proof to the contrary, 
it must be presumed that Greece will comply with that obligation in respect of returnees 
including the applicant.”117  While there was information in the public domain that 
Greece had violated the required standards for asylum seekers (the ECtHR even 
specifically mentioned the relevant UNHCR report),118 the ECtHR instead chose to focus 
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on the procedure of the CEAS and ignore the practical evidence of the reality in which 
asylum seekers were living.119  At this point, the ECtHR seems to have followed the EU’s 
lead in emphasising European harmony over protection of human rights for asylum 
seekers, rather than analysing the information about the state of the asylum process in 
Greece.120 
The KRS case allowed the EU to strongly strike a balance towards efficiency 
rather than human rights, placing procedure of the CEAS above protections.  It is not 
completely clear why the ECtHR subsequently decided to readjust that balance.  Costello 
argues that the awareness of deteriorating standards in Greece became too much for the 
ECtHR to ignore.121  Regardless, the MSS case122 focused in far more detail on the reality 
of the conditions for asylum seekers in Greece.  The case involved an applicant who had 
travelled through Greece to arrive in Belgium and then made an asylum claim in 
Belgium.  The Belgian government sought to return him to Greece for his asylum 
application to be processed there.  When offering a judgement for this case, the ECtHR 
focused far more on the practical experience that MSS had encountered as an asylum 
seeker in Greece, including various reports on the conditions of detained asylum 
seekers123 and analysis of the successful applications for refugee status (noting that at the 
initial point, less than 1% of applications were accepted, which only raised to 3% on 
appeal.)124  The state of Greece also had not given MSS any means in order to support 
himself, so he ended up sleeping on the streets of Greece.125  The ECtHR found this 
combination of factors meant that there was a violation of Article 3 if the applicant was 
returned to Greece to apply for asylum there.126   The ECtHR changed its focus from the 
narrow perspective of only considering the human rights involved with a possible 
refoulement to understanding that the conditions in which an asylum applicant is 
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maintained while an application is processed can lead to serious human rights 
violations.127  
This is an important point, because the mission of the CEAS was to harmonise the 
asylum process in every EU country; the previous case-law of the ECtHR accepted this 
policy as representing the actual state of the various asylum systems, despite evidence to 
the contrary.  The ECtHR noted that it was not just for member states to assume that 
other states offered strong protections and well-organised asylum processes, but to 
respond to information in the public domain and to actively seek to ensure that by 
transferring an asylum applicant, they would still be protected.128  Moreno-Lax notes that 
the system has clearly not succeeded in either evenly distributing asylum seekers or 
protecting their fundamental rights129 – the Dublin Regulation has not been a successful 
aspect of the CEAS.  It seems that the ECtHR is no longer willing to overlook the reality 
of human rights violations in favour of the theoretical aims of the CEAS. 
The ECtHR’s findings in the MSS case seems to have, in turn, influenced the 
CJEU to increase scrutiny of the Dublin system as well.130  The ECtHR judgement was 
clearly a disruption to the Dublin system;131 the CJEU seems to have found it important 
to offer its own analysis on the treatment of asylum seekers in Greece rather than merely 
voicelessly accept the ECtHR’s judgement.  The CJEU was not given jurisdiction over 
the area of asylum until the Treaty of Amsterdam, and so cases on asylum are still 
developing over the most recent decade and the Court finding its role in asylum policy 
oversight.132  In the case of N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,133 the 
CJEU considered several references from various member state courts (specifically the 
UK and Ireland) regarding the transfer of asylum seekers to Greece in order for their 
asylum applications to be processed.  The title applicant was an Afghani national who 
applied for asylum in the UK after passing through Greece.  He challenged the removal to 
Greece on the basis that it would violate his fundamental rights under both EU and 
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international human rights law.134  Member states clearly were curious to know the 
CJEU’s views on the Dublin system, after the ECtHR’s decision in the MSS case. 
The CJEU noted that the CEAS functioned on the basis of mutual confidence 
between member states; trust that asylum applications would be handled speedily and 
fairly in any state to which an applicant is transferred.135  Although that trust underpins 
the system, infringements do not necessarily mean that other member states will not be 
bound by the Dublin system;136 the CJEU considers the CEAS to allow for some 
individual human rights violations,137 but if there are sufficient human rights violations so 
as to be incompatible with Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union138 (which prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment), then member 
states would have to put the well-being of asylum seekers above other goals of the Dublin 
system and refuse to transfer asylum seekers.139  In this particular circumstance, the 
CJEU noted that member states had sufficient information available and so should be 
aware of the human rights situation in Greece.  Asylum seekers should not be transferred 
to states where they will encounter serious human rights breaches.140  Yet the solution, 
according the CJEU, was not to ignore the Dublin system, but to simply use the other 
criteria within the system in order to determine where the asylum application should be 
processed,141 while not further violating human rights by unreasonably delaying transfers.  
This judgement seemed to minimise disruptions to the status quo of the Dublin 
Regulation.142  This would seem to be a judgement which continues the EU trend of 
balancing human rights and efficiency – to a degree, the CJEU will overlook individual 
rights violations in order to preserve the CEAS, but once flaws become an irreparable 
aspect of the asylum process in a particular country, the other member states must ensure 
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that the low standards do not affect asylum seekers.  The CJEU has found an equilibrium 
that member states are expected to maintain.143 
It is unclear how the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will continue to affect 
this equilibrium.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights had previously been an 
unenforceable list of rights which were considered to exist within EU law, but after the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the rights contained in the Charter became enforceable as part of EU 
law and EU citizens will be able to bring cases for EU provisions which are not 
compatible with the Charter. 
The Charter does make specific reference to asylum, with Article 18 stating,  
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of 
the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 
1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaties"). 
 
Article 19 also prohibits removal from the EU when there is a risk of torture or 
inhumane.  It is unclear how much of a difference this change will make, since it was 
already clearly stated that EU asylum law would make reference to the Refugee 
Convention.  Yet the ability to sue to enforce this law may change the EU’s treatment of 
asylum seekers and refugees and increase inclusion of human rights provisions.  
It seems clear to various commentators that the CJEU requires proof of serious, 
systematic flaws in a member state’s asylum processes before halting the state’s 
responsibility under the Dublin system.144  Yet the CJEU has stopped short of criticising 
the tenets of the Dublin system, instead suggesting ways to work around the flawed 
human rights systems in Greece.145  It seems clear that the CJEU is not an element of 
radical change, but simply a force to moderate between competing aims.146  The CJEU 
has not made representations as to whether the Dublin system is an effective method to 
achieve its stated aims, simply sought to ensure that there is no fundamental collapse of 
human rights.  In a way, the CJEU seems almost politically neutral, ensuring the system 
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is maintained (albeit with a minimum level of human rights), rather than challenging the 
assumptions made in crafting the CEAS.147 
V. NGO Criticism of the CEAS 
 While the CJEU is in a unique position to enforce its concerns over the standards 
of fundamental rights in the CEAS, other human rights organisations both commissioned 
by and observing the EU have also considered the quality of rights protection for asylum 
seekers, as well as providing in-depth examinations of whether the CEAS currently 
protects human rights within the asylum system.  This includes reports from 
organisations within the EU,148 from within the Council of Europe149 and non-
governmental organisations which focus on human rights150 and migrant protection.151  It 
is interesting to consider the various perspectives on the balance between human rights 
and efficiency reached by the CEAS.  It seems clear that even the organs of the EU 
understand that the CEAS has not fully achieved the dual aims of better distribution of 
asylum seekers and offering a common standard of protections throughout the asylum 
process.152  Yet there is certainly disagreement as to which of these two aims should be 
prioritised and how best to improve the CEAS. 
More than one organisation has specifically mentioned that CEAS has failed to 
adequately protect vulnerable asylum seekers.  The Committee of Migration, Refugees 
and Displaced Persons for the Council of Europe has pointed to the lack of legislation 
specifically targeted as protecting categories of vulnerable migrants or even a definition 
of a “vulnerable” asylum seeker, which has led to inconsistent standards for protection of  
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asylum seekers across member states.153 This is echoed by the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), which also points out that despite EU insistence to the 
contrary, standards and procedures for treatment of asylum seekers remain inconsistent 
across member states.154  While also mentioning that less than 30% of asylum seekers are 
ever transferred under the Dublin system,155 the ECRE questions why the sovereignty 
clause (which allows member states to examine an asylum application made in their 
jurisdiction, regardless of the appropriate member state under the Dublin system) is not 
used more often and more consistently to protect vulnerable asylum seekers – and when 
the clause is used, this is not necessarily with the permission of the asylum seeker.156  The 
ECRE suggests that the CEAS is particularly harsh on vulnerable asylum seekers; there is 
no Europe-wide specific definition of vulnerability.157  The ECRE recommended that the 
EU Commission authorise research into the effects that the Dublin system has had on 
groups of vulnerable asylum seekers, allowing the EU to better support asylum 
applications.158  Transferring between states under the asylum system can be difficult for 
vulnerable asylum seekers, particularly considering the treatment of asylum seekers who 
are earmarked for a transfer.  These applicants can often be kept in separate 
accommodation and even given less financial support than asylum seekers remaining in a 
particular country159 – differences which would obviously disproportionately affect 
vulnerable applicants. 
 It is interesting that when choosing researchers for a report on asylum conditions 
and procedures, along with recommendations for improvements, the European Parliament 
chose to request work from the academic commentators who had been producing strong 
criticism of the CEAS and specifically the Dublin Regulation.160  It would indicate that 
the European Parliament was interested in receiving strong, objective feedback in order 
to improve the CEAS.  Accordingly, the report provided a harsh view of the current 
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reality of the asylum process within the EU, arguing that despite the massive amount of 
resources that have been directed into trying to improve the infrastructure of the CEAS, it 
has largely been ineffective both in protecting fundamental rights and in equally dividing 
asylum applications.  In 2015, 70% of asylum applications were handled by 5 member 
states.161  Only 3% of asylum applicants are eventually transferred within the EU.162  
While the chances of being transferred are low for any individual applicant, it can appear 
to asylum applicants, as well as officials in member states, to be a random and arbitrary 
process, which increases mistrust and fear of the common asylum system.163   
 The panel’s final report included some proposals of changes which could be made 
within the current CEAS.  The panel suggests that the EU lifts visa requirements on 
nationals from certain countries (these tend to be refugee-producing countries.)  While 
this would increase the number of asylum seekers who are able to reach the borders of the 
EU, it would eliminate dangerous journeys aimed at reaching the EU without a valid 
visa164 if migrants knew they would be able to lodge an asylum application upon reaching 
an EU member state.165  Unfortunately, when considering changes made to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers within Europe, the Commission argues that maintaining visa 
requirements for nationals from specific countries is essential.166  This would seem to 
support the idea that the Commission is prioritising reducing the number of asylum 
seekers over protecting fundamental rights of asylum applicants, ignoring the advice 
given which was aimed at providing more protections for asylum seekers.  It seems 
unlikely that this advice would be taken by the member states in light of the current 
“migration crisis”, but it could eliminate, for example, asylum seekers in camps at the 
Calais border, hoping to reach the UK. 
The panel also recommends mutual recognition between member states not only 
for negative asylum decisions, but also when refugee status is granted.167  Currently, 
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rejection of an asylum decision in any member state is considered a rejection in all 
member states, yet a decision to grant asylum status will not extend to other member 
states.  This effectively leaves asylum seekers stranded in the country in which they are 
eligible to apply for asylum under the Dublin Regulation, regardless of a common 
language, culture or distant family or community connections.168  If there were an 
obligation to recognise refugee status, refugees would not be stranded in a single member 
state.  The Commission does seem to agree with this argument, proposing mutual positive 
recognition.169  While this will not have an effect on human rights protections during the 
asylum decision-making process so long as asylum seekers are still subjected to the 
Dublin Regulation, it will give refugees more options for living their lives within Europe.  
While the Commission could be motivated by a desire to protect the human rights of 
refugees, it is worth noting that this change could have the effect of more evenly 
distributing refugees (if not asylum applications) throughout Europe. 
The panel set out two divergent options, either of which it believed could improve 
the asylum process within Europe.  The suggestions were drafted from a perspective of 
suggesting essential improvements in order for the Dublin system to support asylum 
seekers, while not grouping all applications in a small number of member states.  The 
first suggestion would be to almost abandon the Dublin system and allow asylum seekers 
their own choice of venue for asylum applications.170  The panel reiterates that since such 
a small percentage of asylum seekers are eventually ever transferred, the reality is that 
most asylum seekers can already choose the member state they feel the greatest 
connection with.  Yet even if they are likely to remain in their chosen state, there is still 
an omnipresent risk of deportation and fear.171  Allowing asylum seekers to make honest 
and informed decisions around their choice of forum for an asylum application would be 
a way for asylum seekers to more directly seek protection from the EU and be able to be 
more open about their experience of applying for asylum in particular member states, 
thus illuminating fundamental rights violations.172  This would remove the illusion that 
all member states follow the same procedures and hold the same standards of 
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fundamental rights, allowing the member states and the EU to improve asylum systems 
from a more honest understanding of the current situation.173 
The second alternative was a totally opposite solution – to create a centralised 
Europe-wide office that would have branches in each member state and would handle all 
asylum application.  The panel seems to suggest that if handled by one agency, the 
response to applications will be more coordinated and consistent.174  These two 
suggestions seem to be focused at the two different aims of the CEAS.  While allowing  
member states to choose which state in which to lodge an application should mean that 
member states are less tightly grouped in several states, it would not necessarily have an 
effect on the divergent human rights standards. A centralised EU office to hear asylum 
applications would theoretically provide a more consistent standard of human rights but if 
the Dublin Regulation was still in place, would not change the disproportionate number 
of asylum seekers in certain member states. 
The ECRE also reported extensively on the effect that EU and ECtHR judgements 
have had on the practice of member states.175  After the cases of MSS v. Belgium176 and 
NS v. Secretary of State,177 there is now a responsibility on member states to ensure that 
they are not aware of any systematic human rights violations before transferring an 
asylum applicant under the Dublin Regulation.  Despite the CJEU’s decision that Greece 
was not currently a safe place for asylum seekers, several member states continue to 
assess transfers on an individual basis.178  The ECRE interprets this to mean that member 
states and the EU are interested in superficial reforms, but are not willing to question the 
basic assumptions of the Dublin Regulation, which would be required in order to properly 
protect vulnerable asylum seekers.179 
The ECRE would agree with the panel from the Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies that while there are some simpler improvements which can be made to the 
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CEAS, a complete re-evaluation of the system is necessary.180  The CEAS has been 
ineffective in terms of fairly allocating asylum seekers and protecting fundamental rights 
– it seems that member states and the EU are unwilling to address the rights deficit or the 
unreasonable burden placed on several member states.  This can be seen by examining a 
statement by the Commission regarding the current migrant crisis in Europe.181  The 
Commission did note that the current situation – and the response by the various member 
states – was insufficient, leading to an uncoordinated response that failed to respect either 
the integrity of member states asylum systems or to protect asylum seekers.182 
In addition to suggestions regarding immediate emergency responses,183 the 
Commission sought to consider longer-term changes that could reduce the number of 
asylum seekers over time.  The Commission notes that foreign policy is an important 
aspect of asylum policy.  Unstable global situations will always produce more refugees 
and so the EU member states have a responsibility through their diplomatic actions to 
ensure that human rights are respected, reducing the number of people forced to flee from 
their countries of origin.184  This is a fairly uncontroversial proposition; of course, many 
asylum seekers would much prefer to remain in their home country, safe from threat of 
persecution.  The Commission also argues that more bilateral agreements are needed in 
order to return asylum seekers to their country of origin.185  While this may achieve the 
aim of reducing the number of asylum seekers processed by the EU, it is concerning from 
a human rights-based perspective.  There is already an EU-wide list of “super safe” third 
countries, states from which asylum applicants will face accelerated procedures, which 
includes a presumption of safety from those countries.186  Most of these countries have 
bilateral agreements with the EU.187  It is worrying if asylum applicants from particular 
countries are denied the same protections and consideration as other asylum applicants. 
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Most disturbing is the Commission’s argument that the EU should be focusing 
resources on  “abuses” within the asylum system.  The Commission argues that 55% of 
asylum applications are rejected and assumes that these applicants are committing fraud 
against the EU.  This is concerning, particularly that the Commission assumes that all of 
these applications are fraud or abuse, rather than ineligible applications made in good 
faith or, more troubling, mistakes by the evaluating member states.  The ECtHR has 
noted that only 1% of asylum applications in Greece are approved at the initial 
application.188  This is an incredibly low figure, even compared to other member states.  
It seems unlikely that the discrepancies in acceptance rates of asylum applications189 
across Europe are purely due to fraud; there are differences in procedure and treatment 
amongst member states.190  Disappointingly, the Commission has chosen not to examine 
whether member state procedures are responsible for the high number of rejected 
applications, instead of interpreting the numbers as representing fraud. 
It is concerning that the Commission is unwilling to consider the effectiveness of 
the CEAS or reconsider the system’s methods and core aims.  The Commission’s 
response to these reports seems to deliberately ignore the evidence that the CEAS has 
forced the EU to make trade offs between fundamental rights and equally distributing 
asylum burdens – and yet not quite been successful with either.  While there are 
comprehensive reports and improvement suggestions, it seems the EU is not yet willing 
to deal with the basic changes needed in order to make the CEAS more effective, both for 
member states and asylum applicants.  
VI. Conclusion 
 It is impossible to discuss the views of the EU without acknowledging the diverse 
views of the various organs within the EU towards changes to the CEAS.  From the 
European Parliament, which has commissioned academics who have historically been 
critical of the CEAS to make proposals for changes,191 to the CJEU, which has proposed 
short-term solutions to unacceptable transfers between member states to finally the 
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European Commission,192 which has suggested conservative solutions to amending the 
Dublin Regulation,193 there seem to be varying levels of awareness of the inadequacy of 
the Dublin Regulation both to protect the rights of asylum seekers194 and to evenly 
distribute asylum applications across the EU.195 
 The proposals for the most recent recast of the Dublin system (the Dublin III 
Regulation196) is the best tool for understanding the EU’s plan for the future of the Dublin 
system.  Although several member states, including the UK and Ireland, have opted out 
of the Dublin III Regulation, it is still applicable to a majority of EU member states.197  
The recast process seems to specifically focus on several criticism made by NGOs and 
the CJEU.  The ECRE has claimed that the older regulation was less protective of a wide 
variety of particularly vulnerable asylum seekers,198 while the CJEU has argued that 
dependant family relationships should be interpreted broadly.199  This was reflected in the 
recast directive, which broadens the protections for family members.200  The regulation 
also responded to CJEU’s concerns201 about transferring asylum seekers to member states 
with systematic human rights abuses.202  Asylum seekers now may appeal a transfer on 
the basis of inadequate standards, bringing information about human rights violation to 
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the attention of the member states in order to prevent referral to a particular member 
state.203 
 While the European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament did clearly 
draft the directive with the opinions of the CJEU in mind, the European Parliament seems 
to have chosen to ignore the advice from academics who argue that such changes will not 
resolve the fundamental complaints of the EU:204 namely that the Dublin system does not 
lead to an even distribution of asylum seekers205 and the CEAS has not adequately 
guarded human rights of asylum seekers.206  Without any will from the organs of the EU 
or the member states to readdress this major policy aims and the methods of enforcement, 
the CEAS is unlikely to change on a more substantial level. 
 Yet major changes should not be considered impossible.  Currently, EU migration 
policy is evolving in unexpected directions.  The EU’s long term plan has been disrupted 
by the extreme migration of displaced persons from Syria due to the country’s internal 
conflict.  Germany has, in light of the crisis, decided to ignore the Dublin system in order 
to process a large number of applications directly.207  The Syrian migrant crisis is a 
reminder that, although the various EU organs can hold consultation processes and draft 
legislation, member states will still respond to changing current events.  For that reason, 
it is impossible to totally predict the future of the CEAS; it cannot be divorced from the 
behaviour and intentions of member states, which is constantly evolving.   
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Chapter 4: The EU, Gender and Asylum 
 
I. Introduction 
The European Union has been heavily criticized for the effects that its asylum 
legislation has had on particularly vulnerable migrants.  In the Commission’s ineffective 
attempts to more evenly proportion asylum applications across member states, measures 
specifically supporting some high-risk groups of refugees have not been prioritised.1  
This overall academic research is aimed at considering the EU’s emphasis on protection 
of a specific vulnerable population of asylum seekers, women who are fleeing sexual and 
domestic violence.  Unfortunately, fleeing violence against women is far from an atypical 
experience for women seeking asylum.  In a report compiled by Women for Refugee 
Women of female asylum seekers detained in Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre 
in the UK, the NGO found that over 72% of women interviewed had been raped in their 
home country.  The number increased when taking into account sexual assaults in flight 
or upon arrival.2  In one interview for this research, a solicitor expressed her assumption 
that if a female client disclosed a period of imprisonment, she had likely been raped, as it 
was unusual to be held without encountering sexual violence.  
Unfortunately, sexual violence is a widespread experience for women worldwide 
– the World Health Organization estimates that at least 30% of women will encounter 
sexual violence during their lifetime.3  While it is a common occurrence, it is still a 
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deeply traumatic event for survivors.4  Unfortunately, sexual and domestic violence still 
disproportionately plague women around the world, yet not all states have stronger 
legislative and cultural protections for survivors..  The EU has expressed in strong terms 
the need for measures that combat violence against women in a multitude of forms.5 
 While women experience disproportionate discrimination and fewer legal 
protections than men in many states, including the home states of asylum seekers,6 
women applying for asylum in their own right only consist of approximately 1/3 of 
applications.7  Both the prevalence of gender-based violence and the discrepancy in 
protection would seem to violate women’s human rights.8  The European Union, since 
the initial landmark CJEU decision of Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2),9 has considered 
gender equality to be one of its essential principles.10  This has been expanded into the 
concept of gender mainstreaming, which has been interpreted to mean that the EU should 
consider the gendered implication of every policy in every area of competence.11  This 
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can often be a confusing concept to put into the practice of legislation governing the 
CEAS – the EU is also hampered by its limited competence in the field of asylum, as it is 
a shared competence with member states.  Yet as well as being hampered by limited 
control of asylum policy, the EU has not emphasized protecting sexual violence survivors 
and ensuring gender equality within the asylum process. 
 This chapter will provide a broad analysis of the various gendered aspects of 
asylum law within the EU.  The first section will focus on how far the EU’s competence 
extends in order to incorporate gender equality into asylum law and existing EU law 
regarding gender and asylum.  There are very few specific references to gender in the 
CEAS,12 but it is important to consider the roles and views of various organs of the EU 
and their emphasis on support for fundamental rights of female asylum seekers.  The EU 
has attempted to balance theoretical protection of the fundamental rights of women, 
ingrained in the TFEU,13 with its preferred priorities for the CEAS.  There is a gap 
between the theoretical intentions of gender mainstreaming and the applicable aspects of 
EU asylum policy.14  This section will consider EU treaty provisions and legislation.  
These are essential to understand the EU’s current policy regarding asylum and gender 
equality. 
 The second section will examine the international law on gender and asylum 
which has been incorporated into EU law.  The EU frequently references international 
human rights law15, particularly in the area of specific vulnerabilities.  Just as it is 
impossible to fully understand a member state’s asylum policy without reference to EU 
law, it is essential to note the EU member state’s international law obligations in order to 
better understand the theoretical framework in which states decide on asylum application 
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processes.  While not all international agreements are binding or enforceable, they can set 
out several aspects of best practice, or simply illustrate ideal fundamental rights 
protection in refugee situations,16 for the EU and member states to consider, as well as 
providing a guide for member state law and practice. 
 The third section will examine the NGO response to the gendered aspects of the 
asylum system.  Several reports by NGOs have focused on how EU asylum law treats 
women applying for asylum,17 examining the variety of practices throughout the national 
law of EU member states.  As we noted in the previous chapter, NGOs often can offer a 
more unbiased and honest assessment as to whether policy has managed to achieve 
human rights aims.  This section will criticize current EU policy towards sexual assault 
survivors and more fully explain the gap between international legal instruments and 
member state practice. 
 The final section offers feminist analysis of the current EU policy regarding 
asylum seekers fleeing violence against women.  Academics note that original 
recognition of the asylum process, the Refugee Convention,18 was not written from a 
gendered perspective and did not envision women fleeing persecution on the basis of 
gender.19  While there is growing lip service in EU law about the importance of ensuring 
gender-aware legislation, including in the area of asylum,20 there is not always an 
intersectional feminist understanding of how EU legislation in the area of asylum affects 
female asylum seekers.  This section will examine the behaviour of the EU from an 
intersectional perspective and offer suggestions as to how the EU organs can better 
understand the needs of female asylum seekers.  This chapter will provide insight into the 
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best practice expected of the EU and how that EU has translated that into policy – as well 
as where the gaps are in EU legislation. 
 
II. Gender Mainstreaming and the European Union competences 
 It is essential to establish whether the EU has competence to promote a more 
gender-aware form of asylum to its member states.  While the EU has fundamental rights 
standards that are intended to guide the legislative work of the various organs of the 
EU,21 there have been varying degrees of success in embedding human rights into the 
core of EU governance.22  Yet the EU has become more vocal about the essential role 
that fundamental rights do and should play in shaping policy.23  As previously noted, 
gender equality has now become an essential aim of the European Union.  Article 10 of 
the most recent version of the TFEU notes that “In defining and implementing its policies 
and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”24  The conceptual role of 
the EU in enforcing gender equality has progressed from its initial economically-focused 
ideal of ensuring equality within the workplace.25  As seen in the case of Defrenne v. 
Sabena (No. 2),26 early in the history of the then-European Community, gender equality 
was initially seen as a providing limited support for equal treatment within the workplace, 
unsurprisingly for an international organization primarily concerned with free trade and 
open markets.27 
 The EU seemed to recognise that this economic focus did not fully deal with the 
complexities of gender inequality, especially the non-economic factors which affect the 
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role of women within society.28  A major shift in the EU’s focus on gender policy came 
with the adoption of the concept of gender mainstreaming, which became embedded in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.29  Gender mainstreaming is a method of achieving equality, 
stemming from a desire for a more gendered focus on international law,30 a way of 
reframing conversations about gender from simply focusing on achieving traditional 
feminist goals to instead more broadly analyse the process of legislating and the varying 
effects that all policies and legislation may specifically have on women.  It is a relatively 
recent concept, meant to take a holistic approach regarding the role of women in society.  
Gender mainstreaming is intended to maintain constant gender awareness in government, 
using a variety of tools such as research and consultations with NGOs that focus on 
gender equality.31  Gender mainstreaming provides recognition that the EU’s traditional 
methods of correcting gender imbalance have not been effective in addressing global 
gender inequalities such as the gender pay gap and violence against women32 - more 
thoughtful, researched and organised techniques are needed.  Traditionally, as noted in 
chapter 3, organs of the EU such as the European Parliament have been more interested 
in the broader equality agenda than other organs such as the European Council of 
Ministers.  Gender mainstreaming was intended to remedy this inconsistency.33 
 The European Commission has set out a definition for gender mainstreaming 
which can be used throughout the EU, stating: 
Gender mainstreaming can be defined as the integration of a gender 
perspective into every aspect of EU intervention – preparation, design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, legal measures and 
spending programmes - with a view to achieving equality between women 
and men. It means assessing how such intervention impacts on both women 
and men and taking responsibility for any readjustment necessary. Gender 
mainstreaming makes EU interventions smarter and more effective by 
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making their gender relevance visible so that women and men benefit 
equally and inequality is not perpetuated.34 
 
The EU is making it clear that gender will not be treated as a “special interest” or 
cordoned off into a gender equality department, but considered in every policy area.  The 
EU is expanding the idea of gender awareness to every area of its competence.  This 
means that the EU no longer needs to justify trying to end oppression with economic 
arguments35 – equality is now one of the key values of the EU.36  Non-discrimination 
based on gender has been incorporated into the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the source of human rights for all policies of the EU.37  The EU is 
intended to constantly consider gender equality; this should include thoughtfulness when 
legislating for asylum, promoting best practice and when determining cases that relate to 
asylum. 
 Interestingly, the EU has focused on two major inequalities faced by women: the 
gender pay gap, which is the divide between the salaries that equally qualified men and 
women receive, and violence against women – these were even voted by European 
citizens to be the primary problems facing women within the EU.38  The European 
Commission has emphasized the importance of using the EU’s competence in criminal 
law in order to prevent violence against women, as well as the necessity for the various 
organs of the EU to promote the rights of women in states outside of the EU.39  The EU at 
times has even made the link between ending gender-based violence, promoting women’s 
rights and the asylum process.  In the EU’s Roadmap for Equality, aimed at creating a 
strategy to achieve gender equality, the EU acknowledges that women from immigrant 
backgrounds and ethnic minorities disproportionately face discrimination within the EU.  
The Roadmap for Equality specifically notes that immigrant women often face double 
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discrimination within society both as immigrants and as women – women of every ethnic 
background and social strata face more challenges than their male counterparts.40 
 It seems clear that gender mainstreaming has meant that every area of EU 
competence should be attempting to promote equality between men and women.  This 
should include the EU’s legislation and social programmes in the area of asylum.  It is 
unsurprising that the EU has made more progress in certain areas of competence than 
others41 – the EU has had an interest and competence in regulating the workplace for far 
longer than asylum and immigration.  Yet while gender has not been fully incorporated 
into the EU’s asylum process, more consideration and gender-aware legislation would be 
in accordance with the EU’s gender mainstreaming aims. 
 At the moment, the EU has done little to translate this emphasis on gender 
mainstreaming, and focus on preventing gender-based violence, into action within the 
CEAS.42  While the European Parliament has released a statement on the importance of 
equal consideration and treatment on the basis of gender in asylum claims,43 there is 
minimal mention of gender in the CEAS legislation.  The Procedures Directive44 does not 
mention gender at all,45 while the Receptions Directive46 does not specifically mention 
gender, although there are references to specifically vulnerable groups of women.47  In 
the recent recast Qualification Directive,48 the references to gender have increased.  The 
Qualification Directive does specifically mention that women can constitute a particular 
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social group,49 reaffirming the reasoning found in some national law cases,50 notes that 
persecution can be of a gender-specific nature51 and finally states that the country of 
origin information used in state decision-making on refugee status should include 
reference to the role of women.52  However, the most recently recast directives do not 
directly bind all of the EU’s member states (Ireland the UK were not affected)53 and so it 
is unclear if gender mainstreaming will mean that these gender-aware changes will be 
enforced upon all member states or if opting out of the recast directives will allow 
member states to avoid increased gender-based responsibilities. 
 The CJEU has also not always provided gender-conscientious reasoning in its 
judgments.  For a particular example, the case of K v. Bundesasylamt54 involved an 
applicant who sought to challenge a transfer between member states under the CEAS.  
She sought to remain in Austria on the basis that she had strong family connections there 
– her daughter in law, who was caring for a newborn infant while dealing with post-
traumatic stress after a sexual assault.55  The CJEU sought to establish whether the clause 
allowing for family reunification of the CEAS would apply to this particular family 
relationship.56  The Court did find that when there was a particular dependency, as in this 
specific case, the family reunification clause did apply to broad family relationships.57 
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 The CJEU did not use that specific case to consider the wider gendered effects of 
the family reunification rule and its requirement for a relationship of dependency.  Caring 
responsibilities disproportionately fall on female asylum seekers.58   
Amongst other complexities, adult siblings are not considered to be family for the 
purpose of the family reunification clause.60  This means that extended family who could 
potentially be able to help with childcare and household management would not be allow 
by the EU to relocate more closely in order to provide support.  Not all cultures follow a 
European nuclear family model; plenty emphasise the role of extended family in caring 
for children.61  This is clearly a situation in which isolation from family will 
disproportionately affect women and it is disappointing that the CJEU did not consider 
the gender implications of the reunification clause for women within families.  This 
means that when asylum procedures and guidelines do not account for caring 
responsibilities, by not granting access to care while scheduling interviews with asylum 
applicants, when limiting access to education and care within the community or by 
denying reunification with family members who share caring responsibilities.  Obviously 
these restrictions impact all asylum seekers, but since family care is disproportionately 
provided by women, policies which ignore family responsibilities will leave increasingly 
vulnerable.62 
Many romantic relationships break down during a journey or once asylum seekers 
arrive in a new country, leaving women without emotional and practical support, amongst 
other situational difficulties inherent to the asylum process.63   When migrant women face 
the common experience of violence within the home, they have little practical recourses.  
Without family links, ties to the community or secure legal status, domestic violence 
survivors often feel helpless to leave the relationship.64  Women are disproportionately 
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granted refugee status not as individuals, but as members of a family65 – leaving their 
marriage could mean deportation or remaining in a country without legal access to 
necessary services, as well as taking on the role of sole support and childcare for their 
family.  Legally considering women as members of a family heightens their dependency, 
increasing the vulnerability to exploitation. Obviously this is not the experience of all 
women, but as the majority of women receive refugee status as a member of a family, 
they are additionally vulnerable and dependent. 66 
The EU’s internal report on integration has focused on the particular vulnerability 
of refugee women at every stage of their journey: the danger in their country of origin 
which causes flight, sexual exploitation by human traffickers in attempts to cross borders 
and even mistreatment by the government officials and community workers tasked with 
supporting them in the country of reception.67  The report noted that, 
Policies aimed at guaranteeing asylum seekers and refugees’ rights and 
wellbeing cannot be gender-neutral, because women have to face gender-
specific challenges in the host country, as a consequence, reception and 
integration policies that are not gender-sensitive are destined to fail.”68 
 
Even the EU itself seems to recognise that women claiming asylum need specific 
and adequate protection for their increased vulnerability; there is a broad gap between the 
actions of the organs of the European Union and the theory of gender mainstreaming.  
Specifically in the area of asylum, the EU has neglected to confront all gendered effects 
and implications of its policies.  The EU currently does not seem to be producing 
particularly progressive legislation and judgments in the area of gender and asylum.  This 
has meant that the effectiveness of legislative tools to combat gender-based violence has 
not necessarily been carefully researched by the various EU organs.  How could the EU 
be more aware and conscientious in incorporating gender?  The most useful reference for 
the EU would be to use evolving international law on gender and asylum, including 
documents by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Convention 
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for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW.)  The next 
section will proceed to consider the amount of international law that has been 
incorporated into EU asylum law and how the EU could improve its focus on gender 
mainstreaming in asylum law. 
III. International Law and the EU 
 The undisputed primary source of international law regarding asylum is the 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (known as the Refugee 
Convention.)69  The Refugee Convention was drafted in the aftermath of World War II 
and intended to ensure that the ethnic cleansing which occurred during the Holocaust was 
never repeated, allowing refugees to escape persecution in another country.70  At the time 
of the drafting, women’s suffrage was not yet universal even in Europe,71 and 
discrimination based on gender was viewed as distinctive from the persecution 
encountered by ethnic minorities during the Holocaust.   
 All of the EU member states are signatories to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 
Protocol.72  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union cites a right to 
asylum in accordance with the Refugee Convention73 – the Refugee Convention is clearly 
a strong influence on EU asylum law.74  Unfortunately, this has meant that some of the 
original narrow focus of the Refugee Convention has been passed into EU law.  The line 
between persecution (which is necessary for asylum seekers to be recognized as a 
refugees) and discrimination (which is wide-spread to greater or lesser degree against 
women globally75 and does not equate to refugee status) can be difficult to determine in 
the cases of women who are not being directly persecuted by government officials,76 
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particularly since discrimination against women is a global problem.  Women are far less 
likely to be involved in traditional political arenas or involved in decision-making at a 
national or international level.77  Many women face violence not only in the course of 
governmental or political work, but within the home.78  
This form of persecution faced by many women is not contrary to the concept of a 
refugee in the Refugee Convention or to the goal of refugee protection.  Lack of political 
activism did not protect individual women in Bosnia, who were subject to sexual violence 
as a weapon of ethnic cleaning.79  While women are often relegated into roles within the 
home, they can still experience violent actions without government protection.  It is 
simply that national courts will not necessarily recognise the actions as constituting 
persecution.80  Feminist academics had long debated the inadequacy of the Refugee 
Convention to the lived experiences of women, arguing that protests against patriarchal 
society can occur in a myriad of ways.81 
 The UNHCR sought to broaden the focus on the asylum system and to ensure that 
states would consider gender throughout the asylum process.82  In the UNHCR’s 
gendered guidelines, the UNHCR clarifies how gender-based persecution can be fitted 
within the Refugee Convention.83  The UNHCR conceded that many asylum applications 
had previously been considered through a male-oriented perspective84, but disagreed with 
suggestions that gender should be added as a category of persecution, claiming that 
gender-based persecution should be judged to fall within the existing definition of a 
refugee.85  The UNHCR clarified that certain repressive laws can constitute persecution – 
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such as women being stoned as punishment for extramarital relationships86 – but mere 
gender-based discrimination is not enough to constitute persecution.87  Yet the UNHCR 
did concede that sufficient discrimination over time could constitute persecution.88  It 
also denied the argument that women could not constitute a particular social group 
(which is a Refugee Convention category for persecution)89 because women make up 
such a large percentage of the population. The UNHCR noted that other categories cited, 
such as race and religion, can also constitute a large percentage of the population.90  The 
UNHCR also stated that, contrary to the then-law in many states,91 non-state actors can 
indeed persecute women, as long as the government refuses to provide protection for a 
reason stated in the Convention.92  It also outlined procedures which would make it easier 
for women to feel comfortable with the procedural difficulties of applying for asylum, 
such as allowing for privacy to make disclosures, cases being heard by female case 
workers and translators, and for those making decisions to not only have information on 
the asylum seeker’s country of origin, but also information on treatment of women in the 
country of origin – including whether women are supported and protected by 
authorities.93 
 The UNHCR further wrote guidelines for member states in order to better support 
survivors of sexual violence.94  The UNHCR noted that while anyone could experience 
sexual violence, women and children are particularly a high-risk group for victimisation95 
and exploitation,96 which can reflect dismissive or oppressive attitudes towards women 
within society.97  The UNHCR warns states from assuming that sexual violence is just a 
concern in states of origin; unfortunately, assault can occur in countries of origin, during 
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flight or upon arrival.98  It is important to emphasise patience and understanding from 
asylum decision-makers, as recounting sexual violence can be traumatic and requires 
developing a trust with officials.99  Asylum seekers can also feel a sense of cultural 
shame after a sexual assault and feel fear or embarrassment in confiding in either officials 
or their family members.100  The UNHCR urges sensitivity and respectful treatment of 
asylum seekers, along with prompt medical care for those who have become pregnant as 
a result of rape or have contracted sexually transmitted infections.101  It is clear that the 
UNHCR encourages considerate and sympathetic treatment, promoting awareness of the 
various traumatic effects of sexual violence and has attempted to communicate good 
practice to the signatories of the Refugee Convention. 
 The other major UN agency which has produced work on gender and asylum is 
the Committee for the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women. The committee 
was established as the monitoring of the Convention for Elimination of all Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), which seeks to incorporate a gendered perspective and 
gender equality into international law.102  The Committee had previously published 
statements on violence against women and treatment of female migrants and sought to 
expand their recommendations to support asylum seekers.103  The current statement 
considered the obligations due to women both as a state’s nationals and as asylum 
seekers.  States have an obligation to promote women’s role in public life and make sure 
that women achieve political equality, both through standing for elections, through 
allowing women’s suffrage and through grassroots political activism.104  States should 
also take claims of persecution by non-state actors (particularly family members) 
seriously and consider the difficulties involved in relocating from non-state persecutors, 
particularly for caregivers.105  However, once asylum seekers have been unable to receive 
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protection in their state of origin, there are obligations on all signatories of the Refugee 
Convention to protect women, particularly vulnerable women, seeking asylum. 
The CEDAW Committee reiterates that the role of CEDAW is to add gendered 
shading to international law.106  The Committee notes that gender is not mentioned in the 
Refugee Convention, nor is there any reference to gendered violence or persecution and 
so it is important that signatory states apply a gendered-interpretation to all of the 
grounds for persecution.107  The CEDAW Committee argues that it is essential to 
recognise that all migrant women face intersectional oppression, both as women and as 
members of the migrant community.108  This can become more pronounced when women 
come from a cultural background of extreme discrimination against women or have been 
denied access to education,109 or if they are a member of an ethnic minority or identify as 
LGBT.110  Women and children also have particular risks of exploitation or mistreatment 
during flight or in arrival in another state.111  The CEDAW Committee seeks to ensure 
that women are not perceived through the male-centric gaze of the Refugee Convention 
and are instead considered through a gender-aware asylum decision.112  CEDAW also 
made some procedural recommendations for processing asylum claims, such as limited 
detention, particularly for pregnant women and nursing mothers,113 providing childcare at 
the asylum processing centres so that women do not have to disclose in front of children 
and to develop a professional relationship of trust and empathy to make women more 
comfortable disclosing traumatic events such as sexual assault.114 
The recommendations of both UN bodies are very similar and provide a 
comprehensive guide to improving the gendered asylum practice and decisions of EU 
member states.  While the European Union is not a signatory to either the Refugee 
Convention or CEDAW, all member states of the EU are signatories of both.115  
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International law has increasingly concerned itself with gender and asylum – there are 
plenty of good practices which the EU could use to model its own legislation and 
guidelines.  It is also worth noting that as signatories to these international treaties, the 
member states are already bound by these guidelines and the gendered interpretation of 
international asylum law.  It is important to consider whether or not this international law 
has been truly effective – and if not, what is the place for the European Union in ensuring 
that member states meet these obligations both in international law and through gender-
mainstreaming and the Charter for Fundamental Rights? 
IV. NGO Responses 
 How has this plentiful publication of guidelines in international law actually 
affected the law and practice of EU member states?  Both the UNHCR and CEDAW 
have been extremely detailed about specific factors which should be taken into account 
when determining women’s asylum claims; detailed ideal procedural guidelines in order 
to protect vulnerable women have been explained.  These UN bodies have thoughtfully 
considered best practice and communicated to the member states how to practically 
protect survivors of gender-based violence.  Unfortunately, various NGOs have reported 
that the practice of member states does not accord with their international law 
obligations.116  These recommendations and guidelines have not been adopted by the EU 
member states.  When considering the diverse yet detailed instructions that have been 
proposed in international law in order to meet obligations for refugees, NGOs are able to 
make recommendations as to how the EU would be best able to legislate to ensure female 
asylum seekers, particularly vulnerable women such as those who have faced sexual 
violence, could be better supported. 
The Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament 
supported research by various non-governmental organisations on the treatment of 
women asylum seekers by both the European Union and various member states.117  The 
NGO-based authors reiterated that the EU had committed to gender-mainstreaming and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
could the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW) be 
implemented in the EU Legal Framework’.  (European Parliament website, 2011)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201109/20110909ATT26166/20110909A
TT26166EN.pdf> last accessed 27 August 2017. 
116 Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament (n 1) and European Women’s 
Lobby (n 14). 
117 Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament (n 1).  
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ensuring equality in all areas of legal competence, as well as signing the Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which should ensure protection 
for women in the asylum system.118  Yet it is difficult to determine how effective most 
member states have been in achieving a gender-aware asylum system, as many EU 
member states have historically declined to release gendered statistics for their asylum 
process.119  While the EU did pass a regulation forcing member states to gather more 
comprehensive statistics,120 member states are only required to report these numbers to 
the EU, not to make them public within the member states or provide them for 
dissemination by NGOs.121 
When examining the named sources of asylum law in member state practice, the 
UNHCR gender guidelines have not been incorporated into the national law of more than 
a few member states.122  The UNHCR gender guidelines may be intended to increase 
awareness of gender issues in asylum, but this has not necessarily translated into 
implementation into national law.123  The authors noted regardless of the current reality, 
all of the member states should implement gender-specific guidelines into national laws – 
even if these are not exact replica of the UNHCR guidelines, they should be inspired by 
the general principles contained within them.124 
The study was able to identify several problematic areas of current member state 
practice, practice which deviates from UN recommendations or requirements of EU 
gender-mainstreaming.  The majority of claims based on sexual violence or gender 
require women to be considered with the asylum category of membership of a particular 
social group;125 not all states recognise women as a sufficiently narrow category as to 
constitute a particular social group.126  Women can also often be denied asylum status 
based on the argument that they should have sought protection from their own 
                                                        
118 See ibid 17. 
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120 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
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government against non-state persecutors (particularly family members.)127  The study’s 
authors caution that asylum decision-makers should not assume women face the same 
ability to seek protection from local authorities as men would.  They agree with the 
UNHCR that country of origin information available to decision-makers needs to specify 
treatment of women within the country and whether the authorities are willing to provide 
protection and to help women to relocate internally.128  This would also address the 
criticism that a majority of applications are dismissed on the basis of credibility129 – more 
accurate information on the experiences of women in that country could be useful for 
understanding why a female asylum seeker might behave in a certain manner or if her 
account seemed different from those of male asylum seekers.130 
 The authors also argued that the member states have not adequately ensured 
procedures which support asylum seekers who have been victimized by sexual violence.  
Only Italy has put in place prompt support for survivors of sexual violence on their 
arrival at the border.131  States also cannot guarantee that cases will always be heard by 
female caseworkers or female interpreters.132  The authors were concerned that childcare 
is not provided in a majority of member states, which means that women are forced to 
recount their persecution in front of their children133 – which would obviously mean that 
women feel nervous or unsure about recounting painful or traumatic experiences.  These 
findings as to member states practice seem incompatible with the EU’s stated objectives 
to promote prevention of sexual violence and support for survivors.134  There would seem 
to be considerable scope for the EU to enforce these goals simply through incorporating 
the guidelines in member state practice. 
 It is disappointing that so many of these gaps accord with the recommendations of 
the UNHCR and CEDAW.  The various member states have clearly not sought to ensure 
adequate protection for women seeking asylum in their state.  The European Women’s 
Lobby (EWL) is an NGO which serves as a lobbying organization on a European scale 
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while supporting smaller NGOs to affect national governments.  The EWL released 
guidelines on the EU’s asylum legislation and created a lobbying guide to help member 
states use this legislation and international law to better support women asylum seekers in 
their state.135 
 The EWL notes that the Refugee Convention was drafted from a heterosexual 
male perspective and can often be an uneasy fit with asylum seekers who suffer from 
multiple oppressions.  The EWL is careful to dispute that in the context of sexual 
violence, any country can be a safe third country, as women can be sexually assaulted in 
detention facilities or accommodation in any state.136  The EWL is concerned that the 
CEAS does not allow for nationals of the EU to seek asylum in another member state; 
seeking asylum is a right under both international and EU law and the EU should not 
abridge that right for EU nationals.137 
These EWL guidelines are particularly vocal in protecting those who have 
experienced sexual violence.  They note that women will not always understand why they 
were targeted for sexual violence, particularly if it is to serve as a warning or punishment 
for family members’ political activities.  It is essential that staff and asylum decision-
makers are patient and understanding, allowing a trust and respect to build up and giving 
women space and confidence to disclose painful and traumatic memories.138  Since 
disclosure of sexual violence can require time for applicants to feel comfortable sharing 
details (although survivors should never be forced to describe the sexual violence itself); 
survivors should never be subject to enhanced procedures, but given time to build a 
relationship with the decision-making officials.139  The EWL affirms several of the 
procedural demands of international law, including that women asylum seekers are able 
to deal with exclusively female staff, that it is essential to consider treatment of women in 
the asylum-seeker’s state of origin and that women can have a variety of responses to 
trauma.  They should not be judged based on their demeanour.140 
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The EWL guidelines are extremely similar to the recommendations by the 
UNHCR and CEDAW; this is unsurprising, as the EWL report presents itself as a tool for 
enforcing international obligations at a national level.141  Yet when reading these reports 
and recommendations, they can, at times, seem indistinguishable.  This can be useful for 
member states; there are no conflicting reports of obligations, simply clear guidelines to 
be achieved within the asylum process.  Unfortunately, though, the EU member states do 
not seem to have been able to meet their obligations under international law.  In the NGO 
study, the authors summarized that  
there are vast and worrying disparities in the way different EU states 
handle gender-related asylum claims.  As a result, women are not 
guaranteed anything close to consistent, gender-sensitive treatment 
when they seek protection in Europe.  Women seeking asylum are too 
often confronted with legislation and policy that fail to meet acceptable 
standards, while even gender-sensitive policies are not implemented in 
practice.142 
 
There is a gap between the strong practical guidelines and policies provided by 
international law and the practice of EU member states.  The study shows that 
harmonization is far from complete.143  There seems to be a role for the EU in better 
harmonising the asylum system and providing a stronger gendered emphasis for member 
states. 
 International law is extremely specific on recommendations for better integrating 
gender into the asylum system of EU member states.  Implementation has been erratic 
and varies between states.  The EU’s focus on gender mainstreaming has not led to 
results in the context of the CEAS, but there is competence to focus on gender equality 
and asylum in future.  In analysing why the EU has not applied its focus on gender-
mainstreaming, it is worth applying feminist criticism to the actions of the EU to better 
understand the priorities that the EU has taken within its gender mainstreaming agenda 
and how to reframe the discussion so that organs of the EU can better correct their 
inherent biases and focus on more effective legislation and soft law aimed at EU member 
states. 
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V. Intersectional analysis of gender mainstreaming 
 It is enlightening to use an intersectional feminist analysis of the EU’s gender 
mainstreaming policy.  All EU directorate-generals are intended to create policy goals in 
order to achieve progress regarding gender equality144 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has broadened gender equality to a core fundamental right for women in the 
EU.145  Yet despite that idea that gender should apply to all aspects of EU law, there has 
been far more progress made in certain areas of policy, particularly those linked to 
employment and the workplace,146 than others, such as immigration and asylum policy. 
 To understand the EU’s focus, it is worth considering whether the EU has always, 
as an organisation, primarily been focused on issues which affect white middle class 
women, rather than using a more intersectional understanding. The European Union’s 
focus seems to have expanded in line with Catharine MacKinnon’s criticism that for 
women, the home is often a place of violence and fear from which they seek 
protection.148    The EU does seem to agree with MacKinnon’s argument that a narrow 
economic focus simply reinforces male privilege by ignoring the disadvantages women 
face outside the workplace.150  Accordingly, the EU’s Roadmap for Equality pledges to 
deal with sexual violence and ensuring that women are able to consider their homes and 
family lives a place of safety.151  The EU has also considerably developed the soft law 
programme DAPHNE in order to convince member states to adopt better practice at a 
national level and to fund studies that improve understanding of violence against women, 
along with methods of prevention as well as supporting survivors.152 
 The addition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights indicates the EU has accepted 
a more holistic view of the need for societal equality for women outside of a workplace 
context.153   Yet similarly to a radical feminist view of the law,155 the EU seems to be less 
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focused in the ways that gender intersects with other oppressions, such as race and 
immigration status.  The EU has historically been less active towards eradicating racial 
inequality.  While gender equality within the workplace has been an issue that the EU has 
considered historically,156 racial equality was not mentioned until the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1999.157  The Charter of Fundamental Rights also recognizes the need for 
racial equality to be enmeshed into European Union law,158 yet racial and ethnic diversity 
is not as developed as gender equality within EU law.159  This seems to have resulted in 
intersectional oppressions, such as discrimination against migrant women not being 
prioritized in the way that issues facing white middle class women, such as domestic 
violence and workplace discrimination, have been.  While the EU will acknowledge that 
multiple oppressions exist, notably in the Roadmap to Equality,160 it seems that the EU’s 
focus on gender has not extended to protecting female asylum seekers,161 who are among 
the most vulnerable women in the EU.162  
 In their article focusing on the effects of intersectionality on abused migrant 
women, Erez, Adelman and Gregory argue that migrant status should be treated as a 
category which intersects with gender oppression, similar to sexual orientation and 
race.163  While there can be overlaps between racism and anti-migrant oppression, there 
are distinctions.  Not all migrants are from ethnic minority backgrounds and nationals 
from a minority background would often have more experience and exposure to the 
member state’s culture and language.164  It is also clear that asylum policy affects the 
amount that immigration status intersects with gender165 – EU and member states asylum 
policies are crafted through a male perspective and over two thirds of asylum seekers in 
the EU are men.166  Erez, Adelman and Gregory would argue that policy determines the 
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profile of asylum seekers167; this would indicate that if the EU attempted to enforce more 
gender-aware asylum policies, more women would feel comfortable applying for asylum 
in their own right (rather than simply as family members.) 
They also found, similarly to Bloch, Galvin and Harrell-Bond,168 that the process 
of migrants leaving their country of origin can be disruptive for family dynamics.169  
When an asylum seeker leaves her family and support system behind in her country of 
origin, or in another EU country, she would not be entitled to reunification with extended 
family members unless there was an unusual relationship of dependency.170  It can be an 
isolating experience and often means that she is more vulnerable and dependent on her 
partner.  This provides a power advantage that an abusive spouse may use to isolate and 
abuse her.171  Of course, domestic violence occurs across racial and economic barriers, 
but irregular immigration status provides insecurity, fear and isolation that an abuser can 
exploit.172 
The EU has not treated gender, race and migration status as interlocking factors 
which combine to oppress migrant women.  Instead, initiatives working towards ending 
sexual violence, preventing racism and supporting asylum seekers have been handled 
separately.  This is disappointing from an intersectional feminist perspective.  In her 
article about intersectionality and domestic violence, Crenshaw uses the example of rape 
crisis services, noting that most mainstream American services at the time were catered 
to middle class white women, who were able to deal with their sexual assault in 
isolation.173  Crenshaw noted that when African-American women came to use the rape 
crisis services, the centres did not have the resources to deal with the complexities of 
these women’s lives, such as low-paying jobs and insecure housing.174  The EU seems to 
have similar difficulties.  While the Roadmap for Equality specifically mentions the 
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double discrimination that immigrant women face,175 this has not been reflected in the 
CEAS and the practice of member states.176  Despite using rhetoric which seems to be 
aware of intersectional realities, the hard and soft law of the EU seems to be more 
reflective of a radical feminist viewpoint. 
VI. Conclusion 
The European Union now has competence to affect asylum procedures.  The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights has clearly stated that there is a right to asylum,177 as well 
as a right to equality based on gender and race.178  The CEAS is a mechanism for the EU 
to affect member state practice in the area of asylum.  It is puzzling why the EU has not 
chosen to emphasise additional protections for women within the asylum system.  Female 
asylum seekers face vulnerability throughout the asylum and resettlement process.179  
The EU does understand, at least in theory, the oppression and discrimination that 
migrant women face, as it was specifically mentioned in the Roadmap for Equality.180 
 While the difficulties for women in the asylum system have been cited, this does 
not seem to have translated into practice for improving the asylum system.  It is 
concerning that very few of the UNHCR and CEDAW guidelines have been 
implemented into EU or member state laws.181  Women are currently underrepresented in 
asylum decisions in their own right.182  These bodies of the UN have provided clear, 
unequivocal guidelines in order to help member states improve treatment of women in 
asylum decisions.  Yet despite rhetoric claiming that equality should be embedded in all 
areas of EU law,183 there is minimal reference to gender in the CEAS184 or exploration of 
the gendered aspects of the asylum process in cases before the CJEU.185 
 It seems unclear why the EU, if so dedicated to gender equality, has not 
implemented more policies intended to support women in the asylum process.  The EU 
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seems to have prioritized less complex oppressions, focusing on issues such as equal pay 
and protection for pregnant workers186 – issues which are less relevant to asylum seekers, 
many of whom are unable to enter the labour market.  It seems that the EU has taken 
more of an approach advocated by radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon187 
rather than intersectional feminists such as Kimberlé Crenshaw,188 stressing the need for 
increased protection in women’s private lives and protection from family-based violence, 
as seen in the workplace protections and the DAPHNE programme’s emphasis on soft 
law to prevent sexual violence, over the complicating factors, such as race, migration 
status and sexual orientation, which give rise to unique challenges.  In order to achieve 
the goals of gender mainstreaming, it is essential that the EU stop viewing women as a 
monolith and consider the different challenges and oppressions that various women can 
face.  International law has provided tangible methods of supporting women in the 
asylum system; the EU can choose to implement these recommendations and so achieve 
the goal of gender mainstreaming and ensure this specific area of policy making takes 
account of women’s perspectives and experiences. 
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Chapter 5:  UK National Law 
 
I. Introduction 
In the last two chapters, this research has explored asylum law within the EU1 
and specifically the treatment of women in the EU’s asylum legislation (with a broad 
feminist analysis of the existing policy.)2 Yet in order to more completely understand 
immigration policy within the territory of the European Union, it is insufficient to just 
examine the law and initiatives created by the EU3 – the European Union does not 
actually administer migration policy or deal with the asylum applications of refugees, 
instead relying on the cooperation of member states.4  Member states will always 
interpret and use EU law and intertwine it with their own national law values and 
policies. As previously discussed in chapter 3, implementation of EU and 
international law has had varied results between member states.5 
In light of this wide variation, this chapter is focused on a specific member 
state in order to provide a particular example of how much EU law influences that of 
member states.  Does the EU’s legislative content make a difference on the treatment 
of or decisions made regarding asylum seekers?  Or is there a greater influence from 
the member state’s legal and political culture?  The UK government, through both the 
Home Office6 and the Foreign Office7, have publicly and strongly condemned 
violence against women, both in Britain and globally, drafting strategies to prevent 
gender-based violence and hold perpetrators accountable.  Does this emphasis on 
ending violence against women extend to an intersectional understanding of the 
asylum process and claims of women asylum seekers? 
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In order to try to better understand the connection between various 
international obligations and national laws of member states, this research will 
compare two EU member states and how they have integrated EU and international 
law into their national asylum processes.  This chapter will concentrate on gaining a 
focused perspective of the treatment of women fleeing gender-based violence in the 
United Kingdom, while chapter 6 will provide a comparison to the national law of the 
Republic of Ireland.  This chapter will consider the various influences on the 
experience of women within the UK asylum system– and whether the UK’s emphasis 
on gender equality and national security are coherent in the treatment of women and 
attitudes regarding gender-based violence. 
The first section focuses on asylum law in the UK.  The content of UK asylum 
law is very multi-layered, with sources and influences using a variety of formats.  
While the relevant legislation from the UK Parliament is an essential structure for the 
asylum regime8, there are various other binding British influences on UK asylum 
policy, such as case law9 and administrative guidelines.10  It is important to note that it 
                                                        
8 There are various nationality and immigration acts.  See Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
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guidelines are considered in Sophie Ceneda and Clare Palmer, ‘Lip Service” or Implementation?  
The Home Office Gender Guidance and Women’s Asylum Claims in the UK’ (Asylum Aid 
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is almost impossible to separate the human rights principles of British asylum law 
from its international and EU influences – not least because certain leading British 
cases have been influential on international law.11 
Yet in the first section, it will be noted that there is already an interesting 
contradiction in British asylum law.  Over the last several decades, generalised 
asylum policy through legislation has become more targeted at quickly processing 
asylum claims, allowing for limited success rates or appeals and then removing failed 
asylum seekers from the UK as quickly as possible.12  Contrarily, case-law13 and 
administrative guidelines have become more aware of the different types of 
persecution that women tend to be fleeing when seeking asylum and additional 
challenges that women face in leaving their countries of origin and seeking refuge 
from persecution.14  It is an interesting contrast, with the philosophical underpinnings 
perhaps explained by the argument of Baroness Warsi, former Conservative party 
chairman, that the UK has specialist knowledge of certain types of asylum claims, 
such as women fleeing sexual violence, rather than a broader interest in protection of 
asylum seekers.15 
The second part of this chapter will attempt to clarify how much EU 
legislation has actually influenced British law.  Britain has always retained a certain 
amount of isolation from border and immigration measures of the EU16 and has the 
option to opt-out of any aspect of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
that it chooses.  While this was not relevant in the initial stages of the CEAS (the UK 
chose to almost completely opt in to the initial directives),17 the recent Coalition and 
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Conservative governments have chosen to only participate in security measures and 
those which focus on removing third country nationals, with no plans to opt into any 
of the most recent recast directives.18 
Yet despite not being bound directly by the recast directives19 or international 
law, they are already influential on UK legislation and guidelines.  It is also worth 
noting that as a signatory to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,21 the 
UK has committed to an asylum system in line with international norms codified by 
the UN High Commission for Refugees.22  UK also has gender-based obligations as a 
signatory to the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,23 which has written recommendations for the treatment of female 
asylum seekers, particularly those fleeing gender-based violence.24  While there is 
potential for conflicting rights and recommendations in these systems, the reality is 
that the EU and international law have very similar content in the context of gender-
based asylum claims, which means that the UK should have clear guidance as to 
procedures and substance for deciding these asylum claims.25 
The third section of this chapter will consider in more depth the divide 
between the political culture of the UK, with its “culture of disbelief” and harshening 
treatment of asylum seekers,26 and the case-law and administrative guidelines which 
are far more in line with the principles of international law, as well as the UNHCR 
and the EU.27  While the British government has proclaimed its desire to meet the 
standards of international law, unfortunately this is not supported by practice.  
Though Britain has implemented gender-aware procedures through the UK Home 
                                                                                                                                                              
<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/UK_EU_Asylum_Law_0.pdf> 
last accessed 31 August 2017, 2. 
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Committee on the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (UK Parliament website, 
22 June 2013)  <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-
f/GAMM/debatelettertaylor220613.pdf> last accessed 31 August 2017. 
19 See ibid.. 
21 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 
1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention). 
22 Alexander Betts, ‘Towards a ‘Soft Law’ Framework for the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants’  
(2008) New Issues in Refugee Research: Research Paper 162. 
23 Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
24 CEDAW, ‘General recommendation 32 on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, 
nationality and statelessness of women’ (5 November 2014)  CEDAW/C/GC/32. 
25 See ibid section 3, chapter 4. 
26 See Stewart and Mulvey (n 8) and Partos and Bale (n 8). 
27 Ceneda and Palmer (n 10) 11. 
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Office,28 it is clear that asylum decision-makers have not always followed their own 
guidelines in making refuge decisions.29  Through the NGO reports on the treatment 
of women asylum seekers, it seems clear the UK has not lived up to its own view of 
itself30 as extending special protection to women who have encountered gender-based 
violence.31  Instead, women who have suffered sexual violence have suffered from the 
same culture of disbelief as all other asylum seekers32 – one that seems rooted in 
political responses to the perceived “flood” of asylum seekers in Britain.33 
The fourth section is a feminist analysis of the laws and reports discussed in 
the previous sections of the chapter.  In chapter 2, feminist theory was introduced to 
this research and the various legal systems (international law, EU law) have been 
analysed through a feminist lens.  This chapter will attempt to note the multifaceted 
layers of the British government’s views on violence against women and the failure to 
take an intersectional approach to dealing with violence against women.  Both the 
Home Office34 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office35 have vehemently 
condemned violence against women and cited the unacceptable nature of gender-
based violence, both within the home and in combat situations. 
It is disappointing that while the UK government is so opposed to gender-
based violence within the UK and internationally,36 there is not a similar attitude 
towards asylum seekers fleeing gender-based violence.  The UK government has been 
dismissive of the idea that protesting domestic violence and abuse within the home 
can be a form of feminist political opinion,37 regularly detained women who have 
encountered sexual violence38 and allowed the trauma of sexual violence to negatively 
affect findings as to the credibility of the experiences of asylum seekers.39  This is 
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concerning from an intersectional perspective.  It is disappointing that the UK’s views 
on the importance of ending sexual violence does not seem to be evenly applied 
across the British legal system.  The British government’s perspective seems 
reminiscent of Catharine MacKinnon’s feminist theory of state40 – with an 
understanding that in order to prevent domestic and sexual violence, the government 
must involve itself within the home and interfere in family relationships.41  Yet there 
is not an understanding of the ways in which flight and migration status can 
complicate trauma42 – and so women suffering from rape trauma syndrome can 
appear to be without credibility.43 
An intersectional understanding is needed in order to protect female asylum 
seekers and treat them in line with international law.  So far the UK has failed to 
consider that sexual violence affects different populations of women in different 
ways.  In order to meet its EU obligations, a more intersectional approach needs to not 
only be discussed, but fully adopted by asylum decision makers. 
II. UK Asylum Law 
The rhetoric of the British government, especially across its various branches, 
appears to be incredibly contradictory to the implementation of its asylum policy.  
The current Conservative government has spoken approvingly of its specific expertise 
in supporting survivors of sexual violence.44  While the court decisions which have 
been most influential in this regard45 date from before the current Parliament, the 
government has also continued the trend of limiting rights and protections for asylum 
seekers,46 a policy which will obviously affect women and girls who are fleeing 
gender-based violence.47  The UK government’s attempts to isolate treatment of 
specific groups of asylum seekers,48 such as pregnant women and women who have 
encountered gender based violence, while representative of its wider disjointed 
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strategy to combat violence against women and girls,49 has not benefitted these 
vulnerable asylum seekers.  Instead, these women have been caught up in the 
legislative focus on quickly making asylum decisions (which, due to the culture of 
disbelief, have primarily been rejections.)50  This has certainly undercut the 
intersectional nature of UK court cases51 and gender guidelines,52 which urge gender-
aware sensitivity and procedural support, and left survivors of sexual violence to deal 
with the harsher aspects of UK asylum law. 
The UK government is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.53  The Convention, and the supremacy of its 
interpretation of the international law related to asylum, is enshrined in the Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993.54  The Common European Asylum System55 
has also been directly transcribed into UK law through statutory instruments56 or 
through national law measures.57  There have been considerable adjustments to the 
procedures58 for treatment of asylum seekers over time, yet the Refugee Convention 
has remained an essential influence within national law of the British asylum system. 
Legislative restrictions against asylum seekers began at the end of Margaret 
Thatcher’s term as prime minister.  The Conservative government imposed restricted 
appeals against rejection of asylum claims, limited asylum seekers’ right to work and 
provided harsh punishments for those who entered the UK irregularly.59  The 
increased limitations and restrictions on asylum seekers continued under the Labour 
government.  The 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act placed strong restrictions on 
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asylum seekers’ eligibility for benefits,60 a broad limitation which is likely 
incompatible with British fundamental rights.61  Despite the intention for the 1999 Act 
to be the definitive asylum legislation by the Labour government, the UK Parliament 
introduced another act in 2002.62 
The 2002 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act forbids asylum seekers 
from finding their own accommodation, forcing them to live in arranged 
accommodation centres.63  It also attempted to limit in-country appeals before asylum 
seekers were returned to their country of origin.64  This legislation also introduced a 
“white list” of countries which would be assumed to be safe countries for their 
citizens and for whom the citizens would be given accelerated procedures.65  This 
idea of “safe countries of origin,” for which accelerated procedures are used in EU 
legislation prevents citizens of a minority group from other EU countries from being 
given the same opportunities to present their case as those from outside the EU.66  By 
2005, the government had become focused on reducing the number of asylum 
seekers; resulting in accelerated procedures which quickly heard cases and then 
removed asylum seekers from the UK.67 
It seems to be no coincidence that when asylum legislation became harsher, 
there was simultaneously public political opposition to asylum seekers in Britain.  
Partos and Bale argue that when there is an increased number of asylum seekers, 
opposition to refugees becomes more vocal in society.68  While the Conservative 
government may appear to have softened in their rhetoric towards migrants, moving 
from a general opposition to a view which claims increased nuance, with a divide 
between good “genuine” migrants and dishonest, “bogus” asylum seekers who are 
denied refugee status.69  While the rhetoric may have become more nuanced, 
treatment of asylum seekers indicates the government’s attitude towards asylum 
seekers has not softened. 
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As one interview subject, a policy worker at Asylum Aid noted, the ruling 
Conservative party does not unanimously support ensuring a strong system of 
fundamental rights for asylum seekers. 
There’s a group of MPs called the [Conservative] Way Forward group, 
which is a bunch of right wing, back bench conservative MPs.  For 
those who have worked in the area for ten years, we’ve seen these 
ideas.  They cycle back around and every time they get shut down.  
Partially because they’re illegal, but also because they’re practically 
unworkable, but they’re arguing the same thing.  They’re saying that 
what you do is between asylum refusal and asylum appeal, is that you 
send someone back to a safe third country in Africa where the UK will 
help by building refugee camps.  So basically sending them to Kenya, 
holding them there – no matter where they’re from and the Kenyan 
government would have a role in moving them back to their home 
country. 
 
So we’ve already run into at least twenty major practical issues right 
there.  But actually, again, it’s particularly unviable – if you have a 
system where 33% of rape cases are overturned on appeal, that’s 
putting thousands upon thousands of rape victims who have suffered 
from terrible Home Office decisions, flying them across the world and 
once a judge looks at the appeal and says ‘this woman has clearly been 
the victim of horrible abuse, she deserves safety somewhere’, flying 
them back again.  And we’re talking about people who have seen 
horrible things and are clearly traumatised.70 
 
This is not a proposal that emphasises support and protection of the asylum seekers 
involved.  Even asylum seekers who have not encountered sexual violence are often 
fleeing trauma, conflict and violation of human rights71 and the idea of multiple 
moves between the UK and African camps is far from UNHCR-recommended best 
practice.72 
 In the same interview, the use of the phrase “bogus asylum seeker” was 
discussed.  The phrase evokes the idea of asylum seekers who deliberately arrive in 
the UK to falsely claim asylum in order to gain access to economic benefits.73  The 
interview subject noted that obviously there are plenty of asylum seekers who do not 
meet the necessary criteria to be recognised as refugees – there are plenty of people 
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fleeing environmental or economic disasters who would not be considered to have a 
well-founded fear of persecution for a reason listed in the Refugee Convention.74  Yet 
he disagreed with the idea that these asylum seekers understood the Refugee 
Convention, understood that they would not qualify and thus were attempting to 
mislead or defraud the British decision-makers.75  He noted that this view led to the 
idea of the “culture of disbelief”, when decision-makers believed that it was their job 
to try to find inconsistencies or untruths in the statement of asylum seekers, saying: 
What that means is that someone comes in with an asylum claim and 
the Home Office believes it’s their job to try and take hold of 
discrepancies.  Someone will say, ‘I was home, I was raped, soldiers 
kicked my door in and I fled’ and the Home Office will say, ‘how 
many soldiers?  How many times were you raped?  Were your kids 
there?  How many of your kids were there?  How old were your kids?  
Let’s go back to that first question again.  When was it?  What time of 
day?  How many times did they knock on your door?  Was your 
husband there?’  And it’s an interrogation designed to find 
contradiction.76 
 
The interviewee noted that this created a particular culture in the asylum decision-
making, a culture created by the parliament of the UK government,77 which 
disadvantages all asylum seekers. 
 Costello and Hancox described the two stereotypes of asylum seekers: the 
vulnerable and the abusive, noting that these caricatures are without context.78  
Vulnerable asylum seekers will often do things that authorities would view as 
abusive, such as entering the state illegally or delaying disclosure of crucial facts such 
as sexual violence.79  This also describes the duality of thinking in the UK.80  As 
much as these two groups can be separated in theory, it is impossible to do so in 
practice.  The conclusion, found from a variety of NGO reports and interviews, is that 
the UK Home Office treats all asylum seekers as if they are potentially abusing the 
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asylum system.81  As a worker from Asylum Aid noted in an interview, the Home 
Office seems to believe that it is their role to hear the evidence of asylum seekers and 
attempt to disprove it and focus on discrepancies in their evidence.82 
A. Initial asylum decisions 
 The British NGO Asylum Aid has completed research specifically on the 
initial decision-making in women’s asylum claims.  As authors Muggeridge and 
Maman noted,  
The research found that women were too often refused asylum on 
grounds that were arbitrary, subjective, and demonstrated limited 
awareness of the UK’s legal obligations under the Refugee 
Convention. Many of the UKBA’s decisions proved to be, in the words 
of an immigration judge examining one of the cases included in this 
research, “simply unsustainable”, and 50% were overturned when 
subjected to independent scrutiny in the immigration tribunal.83 
 
It is noteworthy that the most common reason for initial denial of women’s refugee 
claims is credibility: almost 90% of claims were denied after the initial assessment.84  
This is particularly concerning due to the subjective nature of judging credibility, and 
the effects that gender-based violence, and other trauma, can have on credibility 
assessments.85  Of course, not all women seeking asylum are survivors of gender-
based violence, but evidence from both Women for Women International86 and 
interviews with an immigration solicitor87 would indicate there is a high overlap 
between women claiming asylum and sexual violence survivors.  The Asylum Aid 
report also noted that late disclosure of sexual violence often counts against asylum 
seekers for determining credibility,88 even though it has been clearly established that 
survivors might need time and the opportunity to develop trust in order to feel 
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comfortable disclosing sexual violence to decision-makers.89  It is concerning that the 
UK is not following its own internal guidelines in regards to understanding effects of 
trauma and cultural differences in determining credibility.90 
The Asylum Aid report also noted that decision-makers generally did 
not seem to understand the meaning of the category of particular social 
groups,91 despite extensive litigation on the issue in the UK House of Lords92 
and specific explanations of particular social group in the UK’s gender 
guidelines.93  The report noted that in gendered cases where applicants attempt 
to argue that they are members of particular social group, 
in such cases, not only do women seeking asylum have to convince the 
case owner that their account is truthful, they also have to establish that 
they form part of a PSG and that they have no state protection. It was 
observed that case owners appeared reluctant to engage with the 
ground of membership of a PSG and this in effect created a very high 
threshold for women to cross in order to be recognised as refugees by 
the UKBA.94 
As previously noted, particular social group is a category which is often used for 
gender discrimination and those who have suffered from gender-based violence95 – if 
it is not correctly used when determining asylum applications, women and specific 
groups which do not easily fit into another Convention ground (such as those facing 
discrimination due to sexual orientation),96 will not have their asylum claims judged 
with adequate awareness and sensitivity.97  It is impossible to see this broad view of 
credibility without reference to the current government’s focus on reducing migration, 
including that of asylum seekers,98 and the portrayal of migrants as a threat to 
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cohesive society,99 as well as using dehumanizing language to describe displaced 
persons.100 
This has had implications in asylum decision-making; as a policy officer at 
Asylum Aid noted, it has led to a lopsided perspective where refusals of asylum are 
defended less rigorously than decisions to grant refugee status and initial decision-
makers are not corrected when inaccurately applying the Refugee Convention, to the 
asylum seeker’s detriment.101 
B. What constitutes gendered persecution? 
 The UK judiciary, however, (in the Supreme Court’s previous incarnation as 
the House of Lords) has been extremely willing to take a particularly protective and 
gender-sensitive approach to asylum cases.  In the two leading House of Lords 
decisions, the Shah and Islam case102 and the Fornah case,103 the court not only 
deferred to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but clearly relied upon the UNHCR’s 
supporting statements on gender in the asylum system.  The first case was a conjoined 
appeal by two Pakistani women who sought to challenge the rejection of their asylum 
claims.  While it was not disputed that the women had a well-founded fear of 
persecution by their husbands if returned to Pakistan (as both had been accused of 
adultery), it was disputed as to whether they would qualify as members of a particular 
social group, and thus as refugees under international and British law.104  Both the 
Court of Appeal nor the House of Lords agreed that non-state actors, specifically 
family members, were capable of being agents of persecution.105 
 The majority of the Court’s decisions were devoted to whether Pakistani 
women or women in Pakistan accused of adultery could constitute a particular social 
group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.  The House of Lords clearly 
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grappled with the universality of gender-based violence,106 particularly in determining 
how Pakistan could be distinguished from the UK, where 1.4 million women faced 
domestic violence in 2014.107  Because of the universal nature of domestic violence, it 
has clearly been a factor in the failure to historically accept it as a form of persecution 
or to define women as a persecuted social group.108  The judges were eventually able 
to reconcile the differences between domestic violence in the UK and Pakistan by 
noting that women in the UK were able to seek societal support and punishments 
within criminal law when victimised by domestic violence.109  Although this has not 
always been a realistic assessment of the British treatment of sexual violence,110 the 
House of Lords seem to be comfortable with this distinction.111 
 The case was eventually decided in favour of the applicants, with a clear 
majority holding that the applicants were either members of a particular social group 
of Pakistani women112 or Pakistani women who had been accused of adultery and 
were without protection.113  Yet just as interesting as the decision were several other 
discussions within the judgements.  The House of Lords was quick to dismiss the idea 
that these women could be persecuted due to their political opinions,114 despite the 
reality that for many women, protesting their discriminatory treatment as women and 
embracing feminism in their personal lives is an incredibly political action.115  The 
House of Lords also seemed unclear as to what amount of discrimination against 
women was, while not acceptable, also not equivalent to the level of persecution.  
They agreed that simply being a woman in a misogynistic society would not be 
sufficient to invoke the Refugee Convention.116 
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It is interesting that persecution has historically been linked to violations of 
fundamental human rights.  Treatment of minority groups in Nazi Germany – and the 
coordinated denial of their human rights – was the inspiration for the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.117  There is clearly a hierarchy within international asylum law as to 
importance of specific human rights.118  Catharine MacKinnon has previously 
discussed the sexism of prioritising civil and political rights over socio-economic 
rights.119  Yet from the discussion within the Shah and Islam case, it is unclear what 
level of discrimination and violation of essential fundamental human rights would be 
considered persecution120 or if discrimination against women has been so normalised 
that it is difficult to meet the level of persecution – even when women are denied the 
right to vote, to be educated, to participate in public civil society, to be protected from 
violence within their own home, throughout the world.121  This ambiguity is strongest 
in the dissent by Lord Millett, who notes that the delegates composing the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees did not consider the widespread discrimination 
faced by women as being worthy of mention as a particular category under the 
Convention,122 arguing that: 
The inclusion of sex as a basis of discrimination in the Universal 
Declaration and the failure to include it as a ground of persecution in 
the 1951 Convention is noteworthy. It may be due to the fact that, 
while sexual discrimination was widely practised in 1951, and women 
are condemned to a subordinate and inferior status in many societies 
even today, it is difficult to imagine a society in which women are 
actually subjected to serious harm simply because they are women.123 
 
As noted by Conneely,  
 
The omission was explained by Lord Millett in terms of the difficulty 
that one would have in imagining a society where 'women are actually 
subjected to serious harm simply because they are women'. I would 
have more difficulty in imagining a society in which they are not. 
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Perhaps the delegates could not envisage a place to which women 
could escape.124 
 
Lord Millett seems oblivious to the historical discrimination that women have faced 
in almost all societies.  Yet the majority opinion does seem to interpret the Refugee 
Convention in line with the evolving international law, especially the strong 
protections against gender-based violence found in communications from CEDAW 
and the UNHCR,125 and the House of Lords did seem to be able to draw a parallel 
between women in Pakistan and other populations who have been persecuted (for 
example, Jewish citizens of Nazi Germany.)126 
 The case of SSHD v K and Fornah v SSHD127 built on the gender-aware 
principles established in the Shah and Islam case.  K and Fornah also examined the 
definition of particular social groups, with the first applicant, K, claiming that 
membership of her marital family constituted a social group, while Fornah claimed 
membership within a group of Sierra Leonean women who had been targeted for 
female genital mutilation (FGM).128  It is concerning that the Court of Appeal felt that 
FGM did not necessarily constitute persecution against members of a particular social 
group,129 when both the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
have been outspoken about FGM as a form of discrimination and persecution towards 
women.130  Yet once the House of Lords heard the case, the debate seemed to be 
primarily between those who believed the relevant social group was all women in 
Sierra Leone131 or whether it was women who had not yet had FGM performed on 
them.132 
Most progressive was the decision of Baroness Hale (the first female member 
of the House of Lords – there were no women judges presiding in the Shah and Islam 
case), who argued that gender could play a role in determining what constituted 
persecution – Hale noted that she thought it was gender-sensitive to realise that K 
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would consider the pressing reason for flight to be not just a direct rape threat against 
her, but a threat to her young son.133  She also argued that it was a common pattern for 
women to be considered vulnerable, and that persecuting them will place pressure on 
male relatives.134  Baroness Hale is clearly viewing gender-based persecution in a 
holistic context, in which the role of women in their society is an essential framework 
for understanding the treatment of their persecutors. 
C. UK Home Office Gender Guidelines 
This decision by Baroness Hale is clearly in line with the gender guidelines 
incorporated by the British Home Office.135  While there are still some concerning 
provisions in the gender-based asylum cases, primarily the House of Lord’s findings 
on the issue of political opinion in the Shah and Islam case,136 the UK courts seem to 
be generally becoming more mindful of international law and aware of both 
international and UK gender guidelines.137  The Home Office initially implemented 
gender guidelines in 2004, after various NGOs complained that the Home Office was 
not using international law on gender-based asylum claims and even created their own 
draft gender guidelines138 (which were then referred to in the Shah and Islam case.)139  
The current guidelines drafted by the then-UKBA are the second generation of Home 
Office gender guidelines.140 
The Gender Guidelines clearly state that asylum decision makers should make 
determinations not only in line with international asylum law, but also with regard to 
the gendered provisions of CEDAW and the ECtHR.141  The guidelines also 
specifically note that several gendered provisions of the CEAS have been 
incorporated into UK law.142  The gendered provisions of the EU Qualification 
Directive143 are currently binding on British decision-makers.144  The guidelines 
incorporate the argument put forth by the House of Lords in Shah and Islam, and 
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expressly stated in the UNHCR gender guidelines,145 regarding the need for 
protection from domestic violence, by affirming that, “the fact that violence against 
women is common, widespread and culturally accepted in a particular society does 
not mean that protection on an individual basis is inappropriate.”146  While violence 
against women is a global problem, there are specific differences in how states 
respond to complaints against perpetrators and support survivors; context is essential 
in understanding whether this treatment is persecution. 
The British gender guidelines closely resemble the UNHCR guidelines,147 as 
well as provisions in the CEAS.  There is recognition that persecution can be 
perpetrated by non-state actors148 and that it is important to consider the actions in the 
context of the society (and whether a particular woman is able to access justice or 
protection from the state.)149  The guidelines also emphasise importance of a gender-
aware interpretations of the two specific Convention grounds of particular social 
group and political opinion.150  While the House of Lords was dismissive of the idea 
that fighting against societal acceptance of domestic violence constituted political 
opinion,151 it is expressly stated otherwise in the gender guidelines.  The guidelines 
note that political opinion often takes different forms for women – it can include 
something as simple as feeding other political activists or passing messages.  It 
certainly does not require the woman herself to feel that she was making a political 
statement if the government perceives it as political.152  Interpretation of political acts 
depends greatly on the woman’s country of origin – in some states, simply refusing to 
wear a veil can be a political statement.153 
The guidelines also focus on the procedural requirements for vulnerable 
women in the asylum system.  It is important to provide the option for both a female 
decision-maker and an interpreter if the applicant prefers.154  Childcare should also be 
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provided so that asylum seekers are not hampered from discussing details of their 
persecution by the presence of their children in the room.155  It is also important when 
judging credibility of asylum seekers to remember that many societal cues are relative 
to particular societies.  Certain indicators of demeanour which British decision-
makers interpret as furtive or incredible could simply be cultural differences, 
particularly when women are forced to recount difficult or traumatic experiences.156  
The guidelines also strongly opposed forcing women to dwell too strongly on 
recounting the details of the sexual violence itself, stating, 
For victims of rape or sexual violence, it is not necessary to obtain 
precise details about the act itself. However, information should be 
obtained about the events leading up to and following the assault, the 
context in which it took place as well as the motivation of the perpetrator 
(if known). It should be noted that a victim may not always be aware of 
the reasons for the assault or the identity of the attackers.157 
 
The guidelines are clear that women should not be forced to recount the details of 
their trauma or abuse; there seems to be an implicit recognition throughout the 
guidelines that female asylum seekers often are dealing with psychological effects 
from their persecution, which can be triggered through recounting their experiences. 
D. Detention and Fast Tracked Asylum Claims 
 It is noteworthy that there is no mention of detention in the gender guidelines.  
One of the most controversial aspects of British treatment of asylum seekers has been 
the increasing number of women who have been detained under the “fast track” 
system.158  Intended to focus on manifestly unfounded applications,159 the fast track 
allows the government to quickly make decisions and, if a decision is negative, hear 
appeals and then allow women to be speedily deported.160  Detention is not mentioned 
in either the UNHCR gender or sexual violence guidelines, but has been increasingly 
used in the British asylum model.161  Oddly, since detention has a high risk of human 
rights violations,162 the UKBA gender guidelines are strangely silent on procedural 
requirements and treatment by staff and decision-makers for women in detention. 
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The UK has been fairly meticulous at incorporating the UNHCR’s 
international asylum law regarding gender into national law in the form of case-law 
and gender guidelines.  Yet this has simultaneously been contrasted with worsening 
conditions for asylum seekers through legislation.   Much as the UK Gender 
Guidelines have put forth suggestions to recognize the traumatic effects of gender-
based violence and provide necessary support for asylum seekers to feel comfortable 
disclosing their persecution,163 women claiming gender-based violence are subject to 
the same “culture of disbelief” as other asylum seekers.164  This is not to say that other 
applicants are rightly subjected to interrogations or attempts to disprove their 
experiences, simply that gender-based violence survivors have additional 
vulnerabilities and require specific accommodations during the asylum process.165  
Yet these needs cannot be met so long as the UK government continues to treat 
asylum seekers with suspicion.  As noted by an Asylum Aid policy worker, 
it’s about changing that culture, and starting with the attitude of, “let’s 
find out as much as we can and assuming at the beginning that it’s 
true.”  That doesn’t mean they’ll actually be recognised as a refugees, 
it just means the decision will be founded on facts.  Not some kind of 
swirl of misinformation.  That needs to come from the top – from 
ministers and senior civil servants.166 
 
There have also been concerns expressed by NGOs about the dearth of accurate 
country of origin information specifically related to the treatment of women in their 
country of origin and the handling of gender-based violence.167  In her report focusing 
on inaccurate use of country of origin information, Collier notes that the Home Office 
compiles its own information, rather than relying on the information of NGOs such as 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.  These Home Office reports have 
been criticized for not including specific information on treatment of women within 
these states.168  As Collier argues,  
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many organisations producing human rights and country of origin 
information focus on the male experience as indicative of the human 
rights situation in a country. Although women’s human rights concerns 
are increasingly appearing on the agenda, information on women’s 
human rights in country reports often constitutes only a paragraph 
unless the report is specifically focused on women. This paragraph 
does not adequately reflect the fact that women represent 50% of most 
populations and are frequently subjected to forms of persecution 
different from men. 
 
Country of origin information is essential for determining the Convention ground of 
particular social group.  As noted by Lord Millett in the Shah and Islam case, there is 
no universal definition of a particular social group, it will often vary between cultures.  
Landowners may not have been a particular social group in capitalistic societies, but 
they would be perceived as such during communist revolutions.169  One of the 
requirements to be recognized as a particular social group is that the society regards 
them as a cohesive group170 – in order to understand the views of that specific society, 
accurate country of origin information is necessary.171  There are thorough reports 
produced by NGOs and even the Committee to Eliminate All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women will regularly evaluate the treatment of women in a 
particular state.  It is disappointing that the UK Home Office does not choose to take 
advantage of this information, particularly as the Home Office’s own gender 
guidelines note the importance of understanding not just the law but also the reality of 
treatment of women in their country of origin.172  Gender-based claims do not exist in 
a vacuum and an understanding of the context of a society in which a woman is 
seeking protection is essential for determining gender-based asylum claims.  The use 
of detention for asylum seekers has also been extremely controversial amongst 
NGOs.173  The UNHCR does not support the use of detention for asylum seekers 
(unless there is a necessary security reason.) 
As noted in section 2, this process begun in the mid-1990s with the Labour 
government’s emphasis on more promptly removing asylum seekers whose 
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applications had been rejected.174 The UK Home Office created a fast track system for 
applications which it judges to be manifestly unfounded on the surface or for 
applicants from a super-safe country of origin,175 which involved administrative 
detention for asylum seekers who were not judged to be a security risk, but to be at 
risk of flight within the UK.176  The UK government has presented this fast track as a 
fairly straightforward process, into which no one with a complex asylum claim would 
be sorted, and applications would be quickly determined and the applicant speedily 
removed from the UK.177  Fast track claims do have an incredibly low rate of 
success,178 which is attributed by the government to the lack of substance in the claim 
and by NGOs to the procedural difficulties in proving a fast track claim.179  The speed 
of a fast track claim makes it difficult for solicitors to develop a rapport and trust with 
their clients180 and it has been judged even by the Home Office to be incompatible 
with any complex cases, including any case with a gendered component.181  Women 
for Women International have noted that only about one third of the women who are 
detained by the UK Visas and Immigration Service (UKVI) are eventually returned to 
their country of origin – meaning that administrative detention has been ineffective in 
ensuring that those with rejected asylum claims leave the UK.182  The policy of 
detention is particularly questionable in light of the finding that detaining a woman 
costs over £30,000 more than allowing her to remain within the community.183 
 Regardless of the agreement that the fast track is unsuitable for gendered 
asylum cases, the UKVI has not been rigorous in ensuring that gendered claims are 
fully supported.184  The guidelines note that at the initial meeting between asylum 
seekers and decision-makers, substantive claims should not be discussed, yet decision 
makers often use this meeting to make a decision as to whether or not an asylum 
seeker should be fast-tracked185 – it is unsurprising that applicants are unwilling to 
disclose something as personal and traumatic as gender-based violence in an initial 
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meeting.  Unfortunately, this means that women are often moved into the fast-track, 
regardless of whether this is where their cases should belong.  As Human Rights 
Watch noted, 
Solicitors and other practitioners told Human Rights Watch that it is 
not at all clear what the criteria for placing someone into the Detained 
Fast Track procedure actually are. The referral form only gives “case 
can be decided quickly” as a reason. The most commonly used reasons 
according to solicitors (who hear this from clients or from immigration 
officers) are the perceived lack of credibility of the person, whether 
bed space is available at immigration detention centers, the country of 
origin.186 
The now-defunct anti-trafficking NGO, the Poppy Project, has noted that they have 
found women in the fast-track system who have been trafficked into the UK for 
sexual exploitation.187  Over 72% of the women detained in Yarl’s Wood Immigration 
Removal Centre who were interviewed by Women for Refugee Women had been 
sexually assaulted either as an aspect of their persecution in their country of origin or 
while fleeing persecution.188  Human Rights Watch has stated concern that the UKVI 
does not consider sexual violence claims to be immune from being transferred to the 
fast-track system; these are cases which often require additional time to build trust 
with legal representatives and to collect evidence.  Human Rights Watch recommends 
that the UKVI enforce protection of sexual violence cases from the fast track or 
administrative detention.189  Interestingly, Human Rights Watch recommends that this 
should be amended through EU legislation – that the Asylum Procedures Directive190 
should restrict use of the fast-track procedure and detention, along with providing EU-
wide training for those who provide direct services to sexual violence survivors.191 
 Women for Refugee Women examined the experience of sexual violence 
survivors detained in Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre.192  The Women for 
Refugee Women report noted that many of the women described their experiences of 
gender-based violence as being a form of torture.193  This description is echoed in 
international and European law, which has concluded that sexual violence can be a 
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form of torture.194  The UK has not set any limits regarding the length of time an 
asylum applicant can be detained195 and while the UKVI will rarely extend the time 
that women are given to prepare their claims, there can often be delays during the 
process (while a woman continues to be detained.)196  Women for Refugee Women 
also found that not all women were granted legal aid for an appeal and that the quality 
of the legal aid tended to be inconsistent.197  Some of the women interviewed also 
complained of being sexually assaulted at Yarl’s Wood or experienced inappropriate 
behaviour from male guards.198  The report noted that there was no requirement to 
ensure that female, rather than male, officers worked within Yarl’s Wood and 
recommended that the UK Gender Guidelines should advocate for female officers to 
work within centres which detain women.199 
 Overall, Women for Refugee Women were concerned that women in 
immigration removal centres would enter into a cycle where their claims were pre-
judged to be abusive and unworthy of in-depth consideration, which would then lead 
to detainment, where the low rate of success amongst claims of detained women 
would be used as justification to make claims more difficult to succeed.200  The UK 
government would be able to use this cycle to attempt to strengthen the narrative that 
the role of the asylum determination system is to quickly divide applicants into the 
abusive and the vulnerable.   
The culture of disbelief of asylum claims within the UK Home Office is 
particularly concerning when compared to the approaches suggested by the Home 
Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for dealing with sexual violence in 
other contexts.  These stark policy differences, mentioned briefly by both Asylum 
Aid201 and Women for Women International,202 would indicate that the UK is not 
taking an intersectional approach to sexual violence, and ensuring that its opposition 
to gender-based violence was consistent, regardless of migration status.  In the next 
section, the intersectional feminist rhetoric of the UK House of Lords and Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Office will be compared with the liberal feminist reality of women 
applying for asylum in Britain. 
Examining the British asylum system, it seems clear that the current and 
previous governments have attempted to introduce a divide within the population of 
asylum seekers, perhaps best exemplified by Baroness Warsi’s comments that the UK 
has a history of particular support for survivors of sexual violence.203  While imposing 
increasingly difficult restrictions on asylum seekers in general,204 the UK courts and 
the UKVI have focused on the greater gendered understanding of asylum law and 
particularly supporting sexual violence survivors.205  It is obviously an unsustainable 
separation – stricter general asylum procedures and protections will necessarily affect 
female asylum seekers who have suffered from gendered violence.  Yet this cognitive 
dissonance is unsustainable; to understand where this divide has come from, it is 
important to understand both the harsh political views of asylum seekers in Britain as 
well as Britain’s international obligations to protect fundamental rights.  In the next 
section, we will turn from British political views to a better understanding of Britain’s 
obligations to protect the fundamental rights of asylum seekers under international 
and EU law. 
III. UK obligations under international and EU law 
 The UK government cannot craft its own asylum policies without guidelines 
or restrictions.  As noted previously, the UK is a signatory to the 1951 Convention on 
the Status of Refugees.206  The Preamble of the Refugee Convention speaks of the 
need to ensure that asylum seekers are not an undue burden to a small group of 
countries207 (and therefore the need to distribute those in need of protection 
throughout the globe.)  Similarly, Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights argues that the right to seek asylum is a basic fundamental right.208  
Accordingly, as a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UK has agreed to 
hear the asylum claims of anyone who arrives at the UK border asking for asylum and 
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to grant protection to anyone with a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason 
listed in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention.209 The UK is bound by its Treaty 
obligations.210  While the UK is obliged to follow the text of the Refugee Convention 
incorporated into national law, it is not bound by UNHCR guidance and 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention.211  Anything produced by the UNHCR 
outside of the text of the Treaty itself is considered to be persuasive, rather than 
binding on the signatory states.  The UK was not required to follow the UNHCR’s 
suggested procedures as to gender-related persecution212 or on supporting sexual 
violence survivors213 until similar gender guidelines were incorporated into UK 
national law.214 
 The UK gender guidelines also obligate UK decision-makers to make 
determinations of asylum in accordance with two other specific international 
treaties:215 the European Convention on Human Rights216 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.217  The European 
Convention on Human Rights is primarily used for guidance on alternative, non-
Convention forms of subsidiary protection.  There are certain groups of asylum 
seekers who, while they do not qualify for protection under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, cannot be returned to their country of origin without violation of Article 
3 provision against torture or degrading treatment or the Article 8 right to family life 
of the ECHR.218  The UK is bound by the decisions and caselaw of the ECtHR219 and 
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so cannot violate these protections of family life and prohibitions against torture, 
including in the UK’s treatment of asylum seekers. 
 As noted in chapter 4, the CEDAW Committee has released statements on 
treatment of asylum seekers.220  As part of its regular non-binding evaluation of 
states’ compliance with the CEDAW treaty, the CEDAW Committee has included its 
assessment on the UK’s treatment of female asylum seekers.  In the 2011 report, the 
CEDAW Committee noted that in previous reports, they had emphasised the inability 
of women with insecure migration status to access domestic violence services.221  The 
CEDAW Committee noted that by 2011, this had not been completely remedied.222  
The CEDAW Committee also emphasised the necessity of a gender-aware approach 
to migration decisions (particularly those of women who had suffered from sexual 
violence,)223 as well as integrating migrant women into the healthcare and justice 
system.224  CEDAW has placed a strong emphasis on persuading the UK to apply 
national and international law from a gendered perspective. 
 The UK also currently has strong obligations as a member state of the EU.225  
The UK has historically been reluctant to opt into measures regarding freedom of 
third party nationals (for example, the common travel area of the UK and Ireland is 
separate from the Schengen Agreement of free movement within continental 
Europe.)226  The UK is not required to accept any of the EU’s asylum legislation, 
however, it chose to participate in all the measures at the initial stage of the CEAS.227  
The UK also participated in crafting the CEAS, including attempts to introduce 
several measures which were incompatible with international law and EU 
fundamental rights, such as transferring all asylum seekers to a non-EU country while 
their applications were processed228 or provisions to allow states to deny certain 
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groups of asylum seekers specific state benefits.229  For perhaps related reasons (since 
the recast directives have attempted to increase the fundamental rights protections of 
refugees),230 the UK has chosen to opt out of the most recent recast directives, 
meaning that the UK is restricted by the 2005 original directives. 
Because the UK is not bound by any changes or amendments made to the 
directives, it is unclear how much these changes affect UK asylum law.  The recast 
CEAS was developed to better take into account the concerns of NGOs and the CJEU 
as to fair treatment and standards of human rights protection for asylum seekers.231  
Yet the recast directives seem to have the same difficulty as previous incarnations of 
the CEAS – the inability to reconcile the focus on security of the EU border with 
ensuring fundamental rights for asylum seekers.232  In the Council’s note on the 
Stockholm Programme (the blueprint for the recast asylum system),233 this conflict is 
implicit – the section on “A Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in 
migration and asylum matters” does not focus merely on the need for European 
cooperation or more accurate decisions regarding asylum seekers, but on the need to 
ensure border protection for European states.234  This is echoed in the UK national 
legislation, which increasingly strips asylum seekers of support and fair processes.235  
With the recast CEAS falling short of hopes that it would raise the low threshold for 
fundamental rights in member states,236 would an opt in by the UK actually have 
changed the content of national asylum decisions or EU regulations? 
The UNHCR had complained about the lack of fundamental protections in the 
original Qualification Directive and thus the recast version has inserted various 
clauses intended to ensure a greater protection of fundamental rights in accordance 
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with the obligations suggested by the UNHCR.237  For example, Article 10 of the 
recast Qualification Directive238 now specifically recognises that gender identity 
should be considered when determining membership of a particular social group.  
While this may seem like a particularly important development, and a strong 
protection for those seeking asylum from gender-based violence, it is perhaps not 
such an essential requirement within the UK when case law has developed a similar 
understanding in the area of particular social group.239  The recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive has also incorporated particular mentions of gender-sensitive approaches to 
interviewing sexual violence survivors,240 asked that applicants be granted their 
choice of gender of interviewer,241 and noted that country of origin information must 
be used in a gender specific manner in order to ensure that asylum decisions are 
accurate regarding treatment of women in these countries.242  All of these suggestions 
are already found in the UK Gender Guidelines,243 although not all have been 
completely implemented in practice within the UK.244  It is certainly unclear as to 
whether additional binding legislation from the EU would have resulted in a better 
protection of fundamental rights for asylum seekers.245 
Costello and Hancox note that the new Qualification Directive seems to divide 
asylum seekers into two stereotypes: vulnerable asylum seekers in need of protection 
and asylum seekers attempting to abuse the system.  The EU still seems to believe that 
all asylum seekers can be neatly separated into these two categories.246  The idea of 
siloing migrants, strictly dividing them into categories of worthy and sympathetic 
migrants versus those exploiting British laws and support, is not limited to asylum 
seekers.  Instead it seems to be an aspect of the complicated British relationship with 
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migration, culminating in a vote to leave the European Union.247  Reducing migration 
was frequently cited as the leading factor in the popular vote to leave the EU.248  Yet 
in an interview with the policy worker from Asylum Aid, he noted that any early 
attempts to divide asylum seekers into different categories would lead to unfairness 
and a violation of human rights.  Instead, applicants should be treated as having an 
understanding of their own experiences, if not necessarily the legal procedures of 
refugee status.  There should be a collaborative approach to understand if asylum 
seekers meet the legal definition of refugee.249  This is certainly legally and practically 
possible, but for political reasons, the British government seems content to present the 
majority of claims as an adversarial process while claiming humanitarian concern for 
the small minority of “real” refugees.250 
This has meant that the EU continually sees asylum policy as requiring 
balance between efficiency and fairness.  Costello and Hancox argue that these are 
two contradictory aims, which will naturally clash when applied in practice.251  The 
European Commission’s statement on the recast Qualification Directive has 
emphasised that the changed directive would be less open to abuse by asylum 
seekers.252  This is reflected in several provisions of the recast Qualification Directive; 
for example, harsh sanctions on carriers who allow asylum seekers into the EU are not 
balanced by opportunities for asylum seekers to apply for asylum outside of the 
EU.253  The recast Directive also accepts that detention will be used by member states 
and instead of attempting to prevent detention, works to ensure that asylum 
procedures can still be accessed while detained.254  Despite the comments by the 
ECtHR stating that legal aid is an essential aspect of achieving fair treatment for 
asylum seekers, legal support is not offered throughout the process.  Overall, Hancox 
and Costello feel that the recast Qualification Directive has only been moderately 
successful.  It has incorporated some criticism as to the low level of protections for 
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asylum seekers and refugees,256 but remains simply a minimum threshold for member 
states.257 
Examining the entirety of the recast CEAS, Michels makes several of the same 
criticisms used by UK academics as to the UK interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention – including the focus on gendered interpretation of particular social 
group, rather than a broader gendered interpretation of any of the other grounds for 
refugee status.258  She also notes that the requirements to establish persecution as a 
particular social group are higher than in UK law.  In the Fornah case,259 the UK 
House of Lords established that one of two factors is required in order to form a 
particular social group: either the group has immutable characteristics or they are 
perceived as a group by society, even without their persecution.260  The recast EU 
Qualification Directive requires both categories to be present in order to qualify as a 
social group, making eligibility more difficult for the most gender-considered of the 
qualification categories.261  Michels also notes that it is difficult to improve the recast 
CEAS as a whole without changing the Dublin Regulation system, stating: 
As long as the Dublin regulation exists, member states are able 
to hand overexamination responsibilities to the countries at the 
edge of Europe. This scenario results in huge differences in 
asylum numbers and, without help or changes, it is not 
expected that these countries will be able to cope with 
situations of overstrained national asylum systems. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that the ‘better standards’ as set out 
in the recast Qualification Directive will be met accordingly.262 
 
Warnings about this gap seem to be even more relevant after the events of the Syrian 
migrant crisis, which has resulted in a greatly uneven distribution of asylum seekers 
throughout the EU and a temporary abandonment of the Dublin system.  The future of 
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the Dublin Regulation seems to be in doubt,263 but it is clear that the UK does not 
have significantly different standards for granting asylum status or for treatment of 
asylum seekers than would be incorporated by the recast directives. While there is 
considerable discussion as to whether increased legislative harmonization would 
improve the level of fundamental rights,264 refusing to opt in to the latest directives 
has not affected the content of UK national law. It would seem that the UK is far 
more internally focused, creating its own standards and interpretations of international 
asylum law. 
IV. Intersectional Feminism in UK Policy 
 In order to understand why the UK government’s approach to gender-based 
violence cannot be argued to be intersectional, three groups of survivors must be 
compared: British women (or women with strong legal migration status in the UK) 
facing gender-based violence within Britain, asylum seekers in Britain fleeing gender-
based violence from their countries of origin, and survivors of gender-based violence 
seeking safety and redress in their own countries of origin.  The British government’s 
policies seem to be extremely varied, arguing for implementation of policies which 
would provide support and stronger protections for the first329 and third330 groups, but 
not the second.331  This has led to a contradiction in which the British government 
conspicuously ignores the effects of gender-based violence depending on which 
women are victimized.  It is particularly concerning from an intersectional feminist 
perspective, and undercuts the current UK government’s verbalized commitments to 
end violence against women.  “No woman should live in fear of violence and every 
girl should grow up knowing she is safe”,332 the UK Home Office strategy on 
eliminating violence against women and girls argues.  It is unfortunate that this 
philosophy has not been equally applied to survivors detained in Yarl’s Wood 
Immigration Removal Centre in order to strive for an intersectional approach to 
ending gender-based violence. 
 Part of this gap is likely due to a lack of coordination by UK government 
departments.  Asylum decisions are made by the UK Visas and Immigration Service 
                                                        
263 Philip L. Martin, ‘Europe’s Migrant Crisis: an American Perspective’  (2016) 13 Migration Letters -
307 
264 Costello and Hancox (n 17) 3-4. 
329 HM Government (n 6). 
330 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (n 7). 
331 See section 4. 
332 HM Government (n 6) 4. 
  
135 
(UKVI), a branch of the UK Home Office, which also sets domestic and sexual 
violence policy within Britain.   Contrarily, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) is responsible for violence against women outside the UK333 – with the 
exception of the gender-based violence which has led to an asylum claim within the 
UK.  The UK Home Office has not historically offered good practice with regards to 
sexual assault334 and domestic violence,335 including a lack of intersectional 
understanding of the effects of gender-based violence.336  The current UK Home 
Office strategy to end gender-based violence focuses on two particular aims: 
preventing violence against women and girls through a strategy of societal education, 
particularly aimed at those in schools, as well as increasing prosecution of sexual 
offences.337  The strategy cites the increase in prosecutions during the recent Coalition 
government as an example of good practice.338  Interestingly, the report cites several 
times the importance of the UK’s international work to eliminate gendered violence 
on both a European339 and an international level.340  The strategy also notes the 
importance of sharing best practice with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for 
preventing sexual violence in conflict, as well as recognizing the importance in 
societal development of eradicating violence against women and girls.341  Yet 
contrarily, the strategy also emphasizes the need for local control over policies and 
services for gender-based violence,342 an interesting contrast to the focus on the need 
for international cooperation.343  Changing the culture outside the UK may be 
politically palatable, but enforcing best practice on UK local area is not a priority for 
the current government. 
The strategy has only one mention of the need to consider intersections of 
oppression within the British community (older women, LGBT women, those from 
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minority ethnic communities), but this recommendation does not specifically include 
migration status.344  There is a brief paragraph regarding the need to strengthen 
protections for women in the asylum system.345  Most of these changes have been 
incorporated into the Gender Guidelines, including access to childcare while meeting 
with asylum decision-makers, and an option to meet with female decision-makers.346  
The strategy also noted the importance of access to sexual violence services to deal 
with the physical and psychological aftermath of gender-based violence.347  While 
these ideas have been incorporated into the UK Gender Guidelines,348 they have not 
necessarily been applied by the UKVI in practice,349 providing another disappointing 
example of the gap between British government policy and reality. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is currently campaigning to end 
sexual violence in conflict; former Foreign Secretary William Hague organised a 
2014 Summit Event on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict, along with UN High 
Commission for Refugees ambassador Angelina Jolie.350  The Summit produced a 
report after the various meetings in London, which was said to represent the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office’s commitment towards international cooperation to 
eliminate sexual violence in conflict.351  Similarly to the Home Office’s views on 
preventing sexual violence within the UK, the FCO emphasizes the importance of 
education to change societal attitudes towards sexual violence in conflict,352 as well as 
greater focus on ensuring prosecution for offenders.353  It is particularly notable that 
the FCO recognizes that gender-based violence in conflict is rooted in societal 
attitudes towards women and girls, arguing that: 
overcoming the prevailing societal attitudes that perpetuate the 
subordination of women and girls and prevent their full participation in 
all areas of life is critical to challenging the culture of impunity for 
sexual violence crimes and its acceptance as an inevitable by-product 
of war.  We all have an obligation to tackle the root causes and drivers 
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of sexual and gender-based violence as an essential part of our fight 
against sexual violence in conflict.354 
 
This is certainly a contrast to Lord Millett’s assertion that it was hard to imagine a 
society where women faced discrimination solely because they were women (and so 
would need asylum based on societal views of women and lack of protection when 
they encountered gender-based violence).355 Colliers’ critique of the UK’s country of 
origin information also focused on the lack of information provided to decision-
makers about the role of women in society, including societal attitudes which allow 
sexual violence to occur without punishment or interference.356 
If the UK government understands that discrimination against women can 
allow gender-based violence to flourish, why is this not reflected in decisions 
regarding asylum?  The Home Office decision-makers do not seem to recognise that 
this discrimination makes certain actions by women (seeking protection from 
authorities, internal relocation, advocating for themselves to authorities) more 
difficult.357  This would seem to be a clear example of the UK asylum decision-
makers failing to take an intersectional approach to asylum claims.  Canning’s article 
emphasizing the treatment of sexual violence survivors claiming asylum in 
Merseyside criticises the Home Office, noting that their awareness of the long-term 
effects of sexual violence has not been extended to the asylum system.358  She 
summarises the opinions of various NGOs, stating, 
The wider reaching impacts of violence against women in conflict are 
arguably over- looked nationally and internationally, particularly in 
considering women’s rights, well-being and access to sexual violence 
support when seeking asylum. Specifically, in the United Kingdom, 
small pockets of research have pointed to severe inequalities, rights 
violations and an inadequate asylum system for applicants generally.359 
 
Like Asylum Aid,360 Canning agrees that this lack of sensitive treatment of asylum 
seekers is motivated by the UK’s political climate of fear towards asylum seekers.361  
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She cites the example of the “sham marriage” unit of the UK Visas and Immigration 
service (UKVI)362 – instead of considering possible exploitation of women who are 
used for their European Union passports, the UKVI simply views them as abusers of 
EU immigration law;363 the  UKVI is unwilling to consider asylum-seekers in 
complex roles both as victims and law-breakers.364 
 It seems clear that the UK Home Office’s determination to prioritise 
restricting refugees in the UK365 has negatively affected gender-based violence 
survivors.366  Despite the UK government’s stated commitments to ensuring 
protection of vulnerable asylum seekers,367 this has simply not been reflected in Home 
Office practice.  The effect has been that women who have been traumatized by 
sexual and gender-based violence have not received sufficient support navigating the 
asylum system368 and access to practical support and health services,369 and their 
treatment has fallen short of the UK’s international and European obligations.370  To 
consider whether the UK’s failure of human rights protection is influenced by the EU, 
or if the EU would be able to enforce better gendered interpretations of asylum law, 
the next chapter will compare the EU’s influence on another member state, Ireland, 
with a similar relationship to the EU’s border and asylum policy.  Does Ireland have 
similar concerns to the UK and if so, how much is rooted in Ireland’s internal political 
culture versus the views of the EU?  If Ireland is as affected by the political views on 
asylum seekers as the UK, is there a place for the EU to ensure fundamental rights 
protection through legislation?  Through the pressure between political culture of 
disbelief and fear of asylum seekers and international law ensuring protecting those 
subject to gender-based violence, the EU is forced to balance these two conflicting 
priorities.  The “culture of disbelief” has clearly strongly influenced asylum policy in 
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the UK – but has it in Ireland as well, and is this culture able to be readjusted by the 
EU? 
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Chapter 6: Irish National Law 
 
I. Introduction 
The treatment of asylum seekers in the UK provides one clear example of how the 
EU’s emphasis on incorporating international law and a minimum standard of human 
rights has been balanced with the political culture of a member state.  In the UK, the fear 
of the idea of an overwhelming number of migrants has led to a culture of disbelief, in 
which the UK Home Office focuses on questioning the credibility of applicants in order 
to reduce the number of recognised asylum seekers in the UK.1 
The political culture in Ireland is different in that, unlike the UK, there is no 
verbalised understanding as to the specific vulnerability of sexual violence survivors 
within the asylum process,2 and instead there is a racialised treatment of female asylum 
seekers in Ireland.3  The Irish government has chosen not to publish the majority of 
asylum decisions (with the exception of those which become court cases that reach the 
higher courts of appeal)4 and instead criticism of the Irish government’s violations of the 
rights of asylum seekers has been fixated on the conditions in which they are kept upon 
arrival in Ireland.5  The “direct provision” system effectively isolates asylum seekers by 
dispersing them throughout the country6 into dormitory style accommodation in which 
they are housed with other asylum seekers (often in shared rooms or bathrooms with 
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unrelated other residents).7  The direct provision system both creates a risk for female 
asylum seekers, particularly traumatised survivors, who are forced to share close quarters 
with strangers and extremely vulnerable to exploitation by management,8 and makes 
integration far more difficult, as asylum seekers are kept separate from the local Irish 
community, with strict timetables and limited financial means and childcare preventing 
community interaction.9  A housing and community strategy which does not consider the 
risk to vulnerable asylum seekers from other asylum seekers and the government is not 
truly intersectional.  Women can face gender-based violence from other refugees and 
even their own family members.   The policy of direct provision seems to be aimed at 
providing a distinct division between asylum seekers and the Irish community.  This 
sense of separation and facilitation of othering seems to have contributed to the idea of 
asylum seekers, particularly young female asylum seekers, as a threat to the Irish racial 
identity.10  Unfortunately, Irish policy seems to perceive female asylum seekers through 
this lens and strive to isolate them and prevent them (and particularly their children) from 
being granted all the rights and responsibilities of Irish citizens.11 
The second section will consider the national asylum law in Ireland.  Ireland has 
historically been a country of emigration, from which a large percentage of the native 
Irish population left for economic reasons.12  It was only in the 1990s that Ireland began 
to experience sizable immigration, including asylum applications,13 and the 1951 Refugee 
Convention14 was not incorporated into Irish law until the Refugee Act of 1996.15  As a 
result, Irish asylum law is still relatively new in its development, as is reflected by the 
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lack of progression of asylum law through case-law and legislation.16  The few Irish cases 
regarding asylum seekers involve whether asylum seekers who have given birth to Irish 
citizens are entitled to the same family rights as non-migrant Irish families.17  These cases 
focused on the perceived incompatibility between protecting the integrity of the asylum 
system versus the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.18  Irish case-law seems to 
incorporate the idea of female asylum seekers, especially pregnant asylum seekers, as a 
threat to Irish identity.19  This section will demonstrate the lack of intersectional 
awareness amongst Irish law and Irish decision-makers by noting that all women in 
Ireland have their childbearing choices restricted by the state – this simply manifests 
differently for Irish women and asylum seekers.  This section will also describe the 
origins and content of the direct provision system.20  Envisioned as a short-term solution 
to house new migrants,21 this system has provided an isolating and dangerous experience 
for women who are at risk of sexual harassment and sexual abuse,22 without reference to 
the human rights requirements of EU and international law.23   
In the third section, there will be a focus on relevant EU law transposed into Irish 
legislation.  Like the UK, Ireland has opted out of the recast Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) directives.24  Yet Ireland has also chosen not to incorporate the basic 
2004 Reception Conditions Directive25 into Irish law, on the basis that it would conflict 
with the current direct provision regime.26  The Irish government has currently drafted the 
2015 International Protection Act, which is intended to bring the Irish humanitarian 
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protection process more in line with EU standards.27  It is argued by NGOs that this is a 
missed opportunity to improve the rights protection for asylum seekers in Irish law;28 
Irish lawmakers do not seem focused on ensuring Irish asylum law meets the minimum 
standards of European law, much less international human rights law.29 
It also provides the broader context of international human rights law regarding 
gender-based violence and asylum.  Ireland is bound by the 1951 Refugee Convention, as 
well as the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).  Yet interestingly, Ireland has offered certain derogations to the 
CEDAW Convention.30  Ireland has maintained opposition to international human rights 
law which would undercut a strong defence of its constitutional-entrenched Catholic 
ethos, a philosophy which strongly supports defined gender roles and views women 
through their family position as wives and mothers.31  The UK has at least incorporated 
progressive policies and rhetoric towards UK citizens – Ireland has not even developed 
this awareness of the need for gender equality and protection of body autonomy.  While 
international law has provided an evolving understanding that women’s rights are indeed 
a crucial aspect of human rights,32 Ireland has attempted to maintain its autonomy to 
reject these fundamental rights in favour of its own sovereign view as to the appropriate 
treatment of women.33  There seems to be a conflict between Irish constitutional law and 
international law as regards the content of Irish law and its treatment of all women – a 
conflict which is being increasingly utilised by Irish feminists as a tool against national 
policy-makers.34   
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This chapter will rely heavily on Ronit Lentin’s theoretical work on female 
asylum seekers and the racialization of Irish citizenship.35  Lentin argues that the Irish 
identity originally became racialised as part of the colonisation strategy of the British 
empire – to affirm a right to rule over Ireland, there was a need to portray them as racially 
separate, less civilised and educated.36  While the Republic of Ireland has evolved into a 
post-colonial society, this idea of the Irish as a specific racial group has continued – as 
has the nationalistic view of the need to protect racial Ireland by marginalising female 
asylum seekers.37  Unfortunately, case-law and policy in Ireland38 is currently being 
conceived from the perspective which views asylum seekers, particularly female asylum 
seekers, are a threat to Irish identity who seek to misuse the asylum system and obtain a 
hollow, false citizenship for their children.39  This means that instead of specifically 
attempting to protect these women from gender-based violence, the Irish government 
often seems concerned with protection from these vulnerable women. 
It has been argued that feminism in Ireland has traditionally been concerned with 
the issues that most affect native ethnically-Irish women40 – primarily reproductive 
rights41 and economic security for women.  Due to the need for constant feminist struggle 
against a Catholic-influenced constitution,42 Irish feminist groups have primarily focused 
on these matters, perhaps motivated by the large numbers of women and families visibly 
affected by them.43  Yet when directly asked, members of Irish women’s group agreed 
that there was a need for more intersectional awareness in Irish feminist activism.44  It 
seems that an awareness of intersectional feminist theory is only beginning to develop in 
Ireland, which means that feminist groups have only recently begun campaigning for 
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stronger protections for women within the Irish asylum system .  While this delay in 
development compared to other states is unsurprising, considering the recent founding 
both of the Irish state45 and of the existence of sizeable migration into Ireland,46 it means 
that an intersectional understanding of the law, specifically one which recognises the 
vulnerability of migrant women, has not been implemented.  This chapter aims to 
examine the conflict between international law, specifically international law which 
provides protection from gender-based violence, and the idea that female asylum seekers 
are a force which will undermine the Irish state. Finally, this chapter will argue that under 
EU and international law, Ireland is required to take a more intersectional and holistic 
approach to supporting asylum seekers who have experienced sexual violence. 
II. Irish national law 
 Irish migration and citizenship policy has historically been crafted in light of the 
large waves of emigrating Irish citizens. Irish citizenship law, conceived to maintain links 
with a widespread diaspora stemming from emigration, was exceedingly generous – 
citizenship could be granted by descent for up to the second generation to be born outside 
of Ireland.49  However, in the 1990s, with an increased number of refugee applications,50 
the Republic of Ireland began to formalise the asylum application process.  The 1951 
Refugee Convention was incorporated into Irish national law through the Refugee Act of 
1996.51  The 1996 Refugee Act provides the definition of a refugee and sets out the 
process of applications and appeals in order to obtain refugee status.52  The 1996 Refugee 
Act was initially created as a broad and liberal interpretation of international asylum 
law53 – for example, both gender and sexual orientation were initially specifically 
mentioned as categories which could be used for membership of particular social 
                                                        
45 The founding of the Irish state, in a feminist context, is discussed in Hanafin (n 41), Carol Coulter, The 
Hidden Tradition: Feminism, Women and Nationalism. (Cork University Press 1993) and Yvonne 
Scannell. ‘The Constitution and the Role of Women’ in Brian Farrell (ed.)  (1988.)  De Valera’s 
Constitution and Ours. (Thomas Davis Lecture Series 1988.) 
46 Peter O’Mahony.  ‘Supporting Asylum Seekers’ in Ursula Fraser and Colin J. Harvey (eds). Sanctuary in 
Ireland, Perspectives on Asylum Law and Policy. (Institute of Public Administration 2003.) 
49 Bernard Ryan, ‘The Celtic Cubs: Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland  (2004) 6 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 173. 
50 O’Mahony  (n 46). 
51 Refugee Act 1996.  Discussed in Irish Refugee Council (n 5) 11. 
52 Refugee Act 1996. 
53 O’Mahony (n 46) 131. 
  
146 
groups.54  Yet as O’Mahony notes, this broad legislation was drafted when Ireland had a 
small number of asylum seekers – as the number of asylum applicants in Ireland 
increased, fundamental rights protections were gradually eliminated.55  O’Mahony argues 
that the Irish government created the original Refugee Act without an understanding of 
the changing patterns of Irish asylum seekers and then later felt the need to edit the 
legislation in order to cope with the increased number of applications56.  He concludes 
that, 
the extent to which the Irish authorities were caught by surprise was 
evident in the delay in commencing the Refugee Act 1996, which was 
unworkable in the new context of increasing asylum applications.  In this 
regard it appeared that progressive legislation relating to asylum seekers 
was dependant upon Ireland having a low level of asylum applications.  
The logic of this approach was that increased asylum applications would 
be matched by a diminution of the protections afforded to asylum 
seekers.57 
 
Throughout this understanding of the history of Irish asylum law, it becomes clear 
that the Irish government does not view protection of vulnerable asylum seekers as an 
essential international obligation, but as a political issues.  The Irish government is often 
influenced by political expediencies, rather than taking an intersectional humanitarian 
perspective.  Perhaps the most dramatic example in Irish national law of this shift 
regarding its enforcement of fundamental rights of asylum seekers is exemplified in the 
series of cases regarding the family rights of Irish child citizens.  Until 2004, Irish 
citizenship law was governed by a broad principle of jus soli (as well as a broad principle 
of citizenship by descent, applying the Irish diaspora) – every child born on the island of 
Ireland was entitled to Irish citizenship.58  The effects of this law meant that there were 
situations where a child may be a citizen, but one or both parents were migrants, 
including those with irregular migration status.59  Concurrently, Irish also has particularly 
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strong protections of marital families.  Article 41 of the Bunreacht na h Éireann (the 
Constitution of Ireland) states that, 
The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental 
unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.60 
 
Despite the implication of the text, the Supreme Court has held it to be 
constitutionally allowable to override family rights,61 specifically including immigration 
cases.62  It is not intersectional to view migrant families as less essentially interconnected 
than Irish families.  As noted in criticism of  the K v. Bundesasylamt63 case, asylum 
seekers who are the most vulnerable are in the most need of extended family support.64  
Whether dealing with post-traumatic stress after childcare or an abusive partner, isolation 
can further retraumatise women.65  It is disappointing that in the cases of child citizens, 
there is no mention of the parent’s experiences in their country of origin or the trauma 
that the family may have encountered.  Certainly these experiences may affect the 
family’s needs and should provide context for government treatment and decisions.  In 
two early cases concerning the deportation of migrants, and the effect on the family rights 
of their citizen children, the Supreme Court noted that migrants could not evade 
deportation simply by marrying an Irish citizen or due to a parental relationship with Irish 
citizen children.66  Yet the Irish government seemed to re-consider this judgement in the 
1989 case of Fajujonu v. Minister for Justice67 , in which the Irish government noted 
there was a high standard needed to deport the families of child citizens  
It is impossible to ignore the political context of this decision.  At the time, 
Ireland had fewer than 50 asylum applications79 and less than 2,000 applications by 
parents to remain in Ireland due to a relationship with their citizen children.80  In the 
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initial aftermath of the Fajujonu case, the Irish government routinely granted applications 
on the basis of parental relationships with Irish citizen children.81 Academic Siobhan 
Mullally argues that government’s attitude began to grow harsher as Ireland began to 
process an increased number of migrants.82  The Minister for Justice began to 
increasingly scrutinize and even reject these residency applications.83  It was against this 
background that the Supreme Court revisited residency applications from parents of Irish 
citizen children in the 2002 case of Lobe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform.84 
Unlike the migrants in previous cases, the Lobes were Czech nationals who did 
have permission to remain in Ireland as asylum seekers.85  The Irish government had 
planned to transfer the Lobes to the UK in accordance with the Dublin Regulation when 
Mrs Lobe gave birth to a child with Irish citizenship.86  The Lobes then applied for 
residency in Ireland due to their relationship with their Irish citizen child87 and fought to 
challenge their transfer under the Dublin Convention.88  It is unclear why the court at no 
point mentioned that the Irish government could choose to process the asylum claim 
within the Republic of Ireland and that there might be benefits to this for both the asylum 
seekers and their citizen children.  There is no discussion of the country of origin 
experiences or vulnerabilities of the Lobe family.  In his judgement, Keane CJ 
specifically noted that judgement of Fajujonu and argued that unlike the Lobes, the 
Fajujonu family had resided in Ireland for a long period of time.89  He was far more 
concerned with the connection to Ireland and did not take an intersectional approach 
which would look at the entirety of the family’s experiences.  Interestingly, he then went 
on to distinguish between the rights of adult citizens and children 
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 citizens.  While noting that both had the right to reside within Ireland, he argued 
that children has less of a right to assert their choice in residence, writing, 
The position of children of the age of the minor applicants is significantly 
weaker than that of adult citizens who are in prison or otherwise 
constrained from exercising a choice of residence, since the children have 
never been capable in law of exercising the right and in practical terms, as 
distinct from legal theory, it may reasonably be regarded as a right which 
does not vest in them until they reach an age at which they are capable of 
exercising it and, it may be, of asserting a choice of residence different 
from that which their parents would desire.90 
 
Keane CJ also argued for the importance of the Supreme Court considering the political 
context of this decision, stating, 
it cannot be right that this court should approach this case on the 
assumption, totally at variance with the facts known to us, that conditions 
in Ireland are as they were in the 1980’s when there was a relatively high 
level of unemployment, many Irish people were emigrating to seek work 
abroad and there were relatively few immigrants or persons seeking 
asylum as refugees.  I think it would be wrong for this court to approach 
the important issues which have arisen for resolution without having 
regard to the major changes in Ireland which have occurred over the past 
decade in this whole area.93 
 
In the next paragraph, Keane CJ (without citation or references) states that increased 
volume of immigration leads to a strain on social services and difficulties integrating into 
society94.  He did not mention any conflicting evidence as to the benefits brought by 
migration or the non-economic, social contributions that migrants bring to the 
community.  He concludes by distinguishing the Lobe case from the Fajujonu case95 on 
the basis that the Fajujonu family had been resident in Ireland for a number of years and 
Mr Fajujonu had even been offered employment – the Lobes were asylum seekers who 
had not spent an extended period of time in Ireland and did not have an opportunity to 
support their families.96  Accordingly, he rejected the Lobe family’s appeal.97  It is 
disappointing that the political considerations were not deemed to include the experiences 
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of the Lobe family as asylum seekers.  If this constitutional decision should reference 
context, it seems far from intersectional to only mention that the context of the Irish 
asylum system, rather than the background of the Lobes. 
The emphasis on this perceived abuse of the asylum system and strain on Irish 
resources also featured in the judgement of Hardiman J.98  Hardiman J notes that only a 
minority of applications for refugee status are granted99 (without examining whether this 
is due to a flawed decision making process or because the applicants do not qualify for 
refugee protection) and argues that the large number of rejected asylum claims which are 
processed are responsible for the lengthy period of time that asylum seekers spend in 
Ireland waiting for asylum decisions.100  Hardiman J used the term “anchor child” 
throughout the judgement,101 a term which implies derision for Irish citizens entitled to 
equal protection under the law.102  He then referenced the increasing numbers of 
applications for residency on the basis of “anchor children”103 and while noting that his 
comments were obiter to the decision he reached,104 the inclusion of these numbers in his 
judgement would indicate otherwise.  He acknowledged the Irish tradition of emigration 
– and the moral argument for the necessity of reciprocity from a state whose citizens had 
often sought residence elsewhere.105  However, Hardiman J seemed to distinguish 
between asylum seekers and the majority of migrants entering Ireland for economic 
reasons, writing, 
It must however be recalled that asylum seekers are a small minority of 
potential immigrants to Ireland.  The great bulk of such immigrants are 
people who come here in possession of work permits, and their families.   
Over 40,000 such permits were issued or renewed last year, to people from 
over 100 countries from Albania to Zimbabwe.  They work in thousands 
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of Irish enterprises and manage some of them.  They make a much needed 
contribution to Irish life by their skills and industry, just as Irish emigrants 
in the past made a valued contribution in their new homelands.   This 
orderly process of immigration seems likely to continue, bringing further 
welcome and productive  
newcomers to Ireland.  This case is not concerned with that large group of 
people which, however, constitutes the great bulk of immigrants to 
Ireland.106 
 
The comparison between the two groups of migrants is almost certainly irrelevant as to 
whether family rights in the Irish Constitution require the Minister for Justice to limit 
interference with these rights through migration control, yet Hardiman J uses it to almost 
form a distinction between good migrants, which the Irish state should welcome, and bad 
migrants attempting to use their “anchor children” to route Irish migration laws.  Instead 
of noting that Ireland, as a signatory to the Refugee Convention, has human rights 
obligations, Hardiman J focuses on the positive role of economic migrants.  He also 
ignores that many asylum seekers also have skills which could make valuable 
contributions to life in Ireland.  He then distinguished the case from Fajujonu,107 both on 
the basis that the Fajujonu family’s long residence in Ireland, during which the family 
had become part of their community,108 as well as the increased numbers of migrants in 
Ireland.109  
The idea that parents had a restrained role in asserting their children’s 
fundamental human rights, is interestingly absent when discussing other specific personal 
rights guaranteed by the Irish constitution.  Just a year earlier, in the Northwest Health 
Board case,136 the Supreme Court had decided for parents who were attempting to claim, 
on their child’s behalf, a right to bodily autonomy and asserted that the protection of the 
family was superior to legislation of the Oireachtas.  Keane CJ himself had even stated,  
While there may inevitably be tensions between laws enacted by the State 
for the common good of society as a whole and the unique status of the 
family within that society, the Constitution firmly outlaws any attempt by 
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the State in its laws or its executive actions to usurp the exclusive and 
privileged role of the family in the social order.137 
 
This rapid devaluation of the importance of family autonomy points to a distinction in the 
treatment of Keane CJ between Irish citizens born to Irish parents and Irish citizens born 
to non-Irish parents.  This othering of Irish citizens and the different enforcement of 
human rights in Ireland can also be seen in other policy areas,138 but it is a particularly 
stark differentiation between Irish citizen children and “Irish born” children – a phrasing 
which ignores that both are citizens entitled to equal rights.  This is not an intersectional 
response to the residency of asylum seekers – their families are treated as being different 
than families consisting totally of Irish citizens.  The Irish government does not seem 
concerned with taking a more inclusive view of human rights; the context they include is 
the strain on the Irish economy139, rather than the experiences of these families.  The Irish 
Supreme Court seems almost determined to reject an intersectional approach in favour of 
a protective approach towards Irish citizen parents. 
 This idea of a fundamental rights hierarchy between Irish citizens with citizen 
parents and Irish citizens with non-citizen parents violates international law protections 
against discrimination and protection of children’s family life.  As Claire Breen writes, 
the Irish judiciary have not only circumscribed the rights accorded to 
Irish-born children whose parents are non-EU nationals, it reinforced the 
notion that the effective protection and implementation of the citizen 
rights of Irish-born children will depend on the nationality of their parents, 
a notion which runs contrary to the non-discrimination provisions of 
national and international law regarding the rights of the child and the 
protection to be accorded to the family unit.140 
 
This creates the possibility that the divide between children of Irish parents and children 
of non-Irish parents will continue to be reinforced with the decision the Supreme Court 
reached. 
It is clear that the Irish government’s attempts, in the name of nationalism, to control 
women’s bodies, have had intersectional effects, varying quite differently on women of 
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various nationality.141  Irish citizen women can currently only access abortions in Ireland 
in circumstances where their lives are in danger;142 the Irish government has 
simultaneously used rhetoric that condemns migrant women for their reproduction and 
motherhood.143  This rhetoric has had reverberations on Irish policy – from the decision 
in the Lobe case144 to the government’s strong support for amending the Irish constitution 
to limit access to citizenship for the children of migrants.145 
 This idea of the separate racial identity of the Irish people is not a recent national 
concept (and is, perhaps, an example of the continued consequences of colonialism),146 
but has become more of a prominently influential idea in Irish policies as the number of 
economic migrants and asylum seekers has increased.147  While it is arguable whether the 
policy of direct provision is influenced by this idea of a need for the protection of Irish 
racial identity, it is notable that direct provision has meant that asylum seekers are 
isolated from Irish communities,148 forced into overcrowded conditions with other 
asylum seekers within direct provision centres rather than being allowed to integrate into 
their local communities.149  The Irish government enforces a strong separation between 
Irish citizens and asylum seekers – starting from birth, when children of migrants are not 
eligible for citizenship, there is clearly a difference in treatment between Irish families 
and non Irish families resident in Ireland.150 
The legal situation that has created families like the Lobes (with citizen children 
and non-citizen parents) has now changed.  In 2004, the Irish government, lead by 
Minister for Justice Michael McDowell, argued that a change was needed in citizenship 
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laws.151  McDowell claimed that maternity hospitals were unable to cope with the amount 
of migrant women giving birth in Ireland and that Irish resources were strained by these 
women and their young children.152 The government did not have statistics or facts to 
back up this assumption,153 but used it as the basis to introduce a referendum which 
denied citizenship to certain children of migrants (and all children of asylum seekers) in 
Ireland.154  The government assured the Irish public that this would not apply to the 
generous citizenship laws regulating the Irish diaspora155 or the children of British 
parents in Northern Ireland.156 
While ending the direct conflict of Irish citizen children whose parents are not 
granted residency in the Irish state, this has confirmed the idea of Ireland as a racial state 
intent on protecting its racial identity157 – including protection from childbearing migrant 
women and their citizen children.158  While the Irish Supreme Court relied on the Dublin 
Regulation as essential to the integrity of the Irish asylum system, the then-Minister for 
Justice strongly relied on the European Court of Justice’s decision in Chen v. Secretary of 
State159 to limit  Irish citizenship.  The Chen case involved the Chen family who fled 
China while pregnant with their second child to avoid repercussions of the Chinese one-
child policy.160  Their second child was born in Belfast (and so acquired Irish citizenship) 
and the Chens sought to rely on Catherine’s rights as an EU citizen outside her country of 
origin.161  The UK attempted to argue first that it was a misuse of citizenship law (as the 
Chens admitted they had moved to Belfast purely to give Catherine Irish citizenship) and 
that it was an internal matter, as the Chens had never left the UK.162 
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Interestingly, the Irish government argued against the Chens, claiming that a child 
as young as Catherine could not take advantage of free movement rights163 – this seems 
in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in the Lobe case.164  Yet contrary to the 
decision in the Lobe case, the European Court of Justice noted that to withhold residence 
from Mrs Chen would have the unacceptable effect of denying Catherine residency in 
Europe – and so agreed that through Catherine, Mrs Chen, who was financially self-
dependent, had a right to remain in the UK.165 
 The British government claimed that Mrs Chen had abused European law by 
intentionally securing Irish citizenship for her daughter in order to take advantage of EU 
freedom of movement.  The ECJ disagreed and interestingly, the Advocate General had 
argued that the problematic element was the Irish citizenship law which operated on a 
pure jus soli principle.166  The opinion made no reference to the broad eligibility criteria 
for Irish citizenship based on descent.  The ECJ rejected the idea this was solely a UK 
matter,167 which avoids ongoing complications in nationality law.168  As many EU 
citizens would be eligible for multiple passports based on their descent or if their parents 
have taken advantage of freedom of movement rights, isolating free movement from 
those who are eligible for multiple citizenship but have never left their state of origin 
would be extremely difficult in practice.  It is notable that the ECJ did not attach 
importance to human rights concerns for the Chen family – Catherine was not eligible for 
Chinese citizenship (or reunification with her family in China), the violation of the 
family’s rights through China’s one child policy or the importance of non-distinction 
between citizens with fellow citizen parents and citizens with non-national parents.  
Bernard Ryan argues that parents of Irish citizen children would actually receive more 
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protection in other EU member states then within Ireland.169  Claire Breen also notes that 
this case creates a two-tiered system, where independently wealthy migrants are able to 
take advantage of nationality laws in a way that impoverished economic migrants and 
asylum seekers cannot.170 
 In the Irish government’s campaign to pass the Twenty-seventh Amendment to 
limit citizenship, Michael McDowell relied heavily on the Chen case,171 ignoring that the 
Chen case would only be applicable to a limited number of families with sufficient 
resources to live elsewhere in the EU without a need for employment.172  While the EU 
has introduced various legislation within the CEAS intended to increase the minimum 
rights threshold for asylum seekers, the Irish courts and legislature have used the CEAS 
and EU rights to support the “othering” of asylum seekers, even asylum seekers with 
Irish citizen children.  It is disappointing that the CEAS directives from the EU has not 
lead to more integration of asylum seekers within Ireland. 
The idea of isolating asylum seekers, keeping them within separate communities 
which never integrate with Irish citizens, is also reflected in the policy of direct provision.  
Direct provision, an Irish executive policy rather than the result of legislation,173  is the 
system in which the Irish government pays for asylum seekers to receive full room and 
board and a small personal amount of money.174  This system was devised as the Irish 
government found it to be more economical than providing housing benefit to asylum 
seekers or finding self-catering accommodation.175  However, the direct provision 
services are often provided by private companies who have not had previous experience 
of working with asylum seekers or specific training on intercultural awareness or dealing 
with trauma.176  Asylum seekers are dispersed to centres throughout the country, without 
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being given choices as to where in Ireland they are being sent.177  More than any other 
aspect of the asylum system in Ireland, direct provision has received criticism from 
NGOs.178 
Some of this criticism is broad, applying to almost all asylum seekers.  The Irish 
government, concerned at increasing number of asylum seekers in Ireland, deliberately 
intended to limit the number of asylum seekers in Ireland by reducing the quality of 
conditions for applicants.179  This has meant that despite concerns as to the safety and 
efficiency of direct provision, the Irish government is unwilling to reform the direct 
provision system.180  Despite the direct provision centres being intended for short term 
occupation, applicants can remain in direct provision housing for up to 7 years;181 at no 
point are asylum seekers eligible to begin employment and find individual housing.182  
NGOs have cited concerns about mental and physical health effects of malnutrition (since 
residents are not able to cook culturally appropriate meals or cook with healthy 
ingredients)183 and of the overcrowded facilities.184  Several women noted in interviews 
that they felt unsafe allowing their children to use bathroom facilities alone and that toilet 
training their children was exceedingly difficult in direct provision centres.185  They 
expressed concerns about protecting their children from child abuse within direct 
provision centres.186  Removing asylum seekers from the Irish community has also meant 
that they are isolated – due to lack of funds and childcare, women cannot participate in 
employment, study or vocational training187 and have limited involvement in influencing 
their children’s education or extracurricular activities.188  There is no intersectional 
recognition that small children, or women who have been sexually assaulted, may have 
additional vulnerabilities and special needs. 
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In their report on the conditions of direct provision, the NGO Akidwa was 
particularly concerned that there is no provision within direct provision centres for 
vulnerable people, including women with a history of gender-based violence.189  There 
are currently no centres specifically for single women, or women who need protection 
from abusive partners;190 the Minister for Justice has rejected proposals to establish 
separate space for single women and households with single mothers.191  Women have 
been forced to share rooms, bathrooms and kitchen space with unrelated individuals, 
including men.192  Women are denied privacy, even from male residents and male 
employees, as bedrooms and bathrooms have master keys and private areas are accessible 
by CCTV.193  As Akidwa noted,  
Policies, procedures and practices in the Irish reception system do not 
provide all women security and safety whilst living in accommodation 
centres. One major obstacle to protection documented in this report is 
awareness amongst residents and advocates, as well as with potential 
perpetrators, of a weak complaints system for residents living in direct 
provision accommodation centres. Another obstacle cited in the report is a 
lack of effective follow-through of women’s allegations of sexual 
misconduct by residents, staff, management and local community service 
providers. The imbalance of gender in some centre populations, that of a 
few single or single parenting women living amongst a majority of single 
men, and the often random mix of populations has, in some circumstances, 
contributed to unsafe and insecure living conditions for women in 
Ireland’s reception system.194 
 
There are reports of sexual harassment and abuse within direct provision centres,195 but 
women noted that they felt uncomfortable reporting mistreatment to authorities for fear 
that they would be penalized.196  Akidwa noted that this was not a baseless fear; women 
had been transferred after making sexual harassment complaints and in several cases, 
there was no investigation or punishment against the perpetrator.197  Akidwa noted that 
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there was a culture of disbelief against claims brought by women – that the centre staff 
and the government seemed invested in personally attacking women’s claims of sexual 
harassment rather than granting them a fair hearing.198  There was also an insufficient 
number of female staff to work with female asylum seekers199 and staff providing 
services to asylum seekers had not received training in trauma or dealing with women 
who had experienced gender-based violence.200   
 The reports by various NGOs note that the Irish government has refused to 
reconsider the complaints regarding treatment of residents in direct provision centres201 
and have even restructured policies regarding government benefits in order to make 
asylum seekers more dependent on direct provision.202  It is concerning that the 
government has forced asylum seekers into an insular community, without sufficient 
opportunities for integration or protection and support services for trauma survivors.  As 
will be discussed in section 4, this seems to support Ronit Lentin’s writings that the Irish 
government views asylum seekers as threatening damage or pollution of the Irish racial 
identity.203  
 Aspects of the Irish government’s policies on asylum seekers clearly violate 
international human rights law.204  Yet the Irish government has also avoided binding 
legislation from the EU, which would prevent policies like direct provision.  The Irish 
government has simultaneously used the EU as a scapegoat for certain treatment of 
asylum seekers, such as denying residency and citizenship to asylum seekers family, 
while attempting to protect the status quo of Irish asylum law.  This complicated 
relationship between Ireland and EU asylum law continues to both provide some 
protections for asylum seekers while allowing the Irish government to use the EU as a 
reason for failing to protect fundamental rights. 
III. The EU and Irish asylum law 
 Ireland has had a complex relationship with the EU’s rulings on migration and 
asylum.  This is partially due to the influence of the UK. Historically skeptical of greater 
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involvement in the border and migration aspects,205 the UK chose not to join the 
Schengen Agreement206 nor the recast Asylum Directives.207  This has influenced Irish 
policy, particularly since Ireland has sought to maintain an open border with Northern 
Ireland as part of the Common Travel Area.208  It is unclear how the UK’s referendum to 
leave the EU209 will influence Irish integration into the CEAS, particularly if Ireland 
wishes to retain its open border with Northern Ireland.210 
 The Irish courts and legislature have made use of parts of the CEAS – particularly 
the Dublin Regulations,211 to justify the removal of Irish citizen parents and to argue for 
changing Irish citizenship laws.212  Yet the Irish government has been reluctant to enforce 
the levels of human rights protection inherent in the CEAS.  As the Irish Refugee Council 
describes it, 
CEAS foresees a sharing of the same fundamental values and the need for 
a joint approach among Member States to guarantee high protection 
standards for refugees and persons otherwise fleeing serious harm. 
However, Ireland’s engagement with CEAS has been piecemeal at best in 
that Ireland retains an option to opt in or out of Directives in the field of 
international protection. Increasingly Ireland is out of step with its 
European counterparts and has only signed up to the following minimum 
standard Directives: the Qualification Directive, the Temporary Protection 
Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive whilst continuing to 
engage in the Dublin system by recently adopting the recast Dublin III 
Regulation. 213 
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This conundrum – welcoming the ability to transfer asylum seekers under the Dublin 
Regulation, but rejecting incorporation of the humanitarian guarantees of the Reception 
Conditions Directive214 or any of the recast directives, encapsulates the contradictory 
views that the EU is both a force to aid isolation of asylum seekers while the Irish 
government also attempts to resist its attempts at integrating fundamental rights into Irish 
asylum law.  The Irish government has not sought to use the humanitarian measures of 
the CEAS to benefit the vulnerable asylum seekers currently unprotected by the direct 
provision system and harsh treatment of child citizens. 
 Ireland is able to choose whether to opt into various measures of the CEAS.  
Ireland has been particularly supportive of the Dublin Regulation215 (the original Dublin 
Convention was agreed in Ireland during Irish Taoiseach Charlie Haughey’s presidency 
of the European Council of Ministers).  The Dublin Regulation has meant that southern 
states such as Greece and Italy have processed a disproportionate number of asylum 
seekers in Europe; Ireland has taken far fewer.216  In the Lobe case, when heard in the 
High Court, Smyth J rejected the applicant’s appeal against a transfer to UK under the 
then-Dublin Convention, citing that transfer was required under the Dublin 
Convention.217  This was discussed by the Supreme Court.  Keane CJ218 and Denham J219 
argued that the existence of the Dublin Convention was a major change from the situation 
in Fajujonu, claiming this change required the Minister for Justice to transfer the Lobe 
family to the UK in order to maintain the integrity of the asylum system.220  Yet other 
judges noted that the Dublin Convention did not require member states to transfer asylum 
seekers – Ireland had the discretion to choose to process any asylum claims that it 
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chose.221  The insistence in the judgment that Ireland was obligated to transfer the Lobe 
family to the UK certainly gives the impression that the Supreme Court was using the 
Dublin Convention to reinforce the idea that an intact asylum system often would require 
deportation of the family members of Irish citizens and that Irish decision-makers are 
powerless to prevent this movement. 
 In 2015, the Irish Oireachtas passed the International Protection Bill,235 intended 
to rectify some of the criticism by NGOs and international organisations as to the gaps in 
protection in Irish asylum law.236  The most notable of these was the streamlining of 
subsidiary protection and asylum processes,237 which also served as the first 
comprehensive overhaul of the Irish asylum system since it was initially created in 
1996.238  The Irish Refugee Council (IRC) noted that despite rhetoric from the Irish 
government about the importance of further harmonization of the asylum system, Ireland 
had not opted in to any of the recast directives;239 yet interestingly, many of the 
provisions from the various recast CEAS directives were contained in the International 
Protection Bill, such as a definition of refugees which could include other EU 
nationals.240  Yet the Irish Refugee Council noted that simply streamlining the process 
would not fix many of the problems with the Irish asylum system and in fact, there were 
some concerning aspects of the bill – including provisions which allowed for detention in 
specific circumstances241 and the lack of emphasis on training staff members who come 
into contact with asylum seekers, but the major concern by the Irish Refugee Council was 
that this was a missed opportunity to incorporate a strong intersectional understanding of 
refugee rights into Irish law.242  
Unfortunately, Ireland has, instead of using its membership and accountability to 
international organisations such as the EU and the European Convention on Human 
Rights in order to craft a more intersectional approach to supporting female asylum 
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seekers, sought to create exceptions for itself in international law.  This has included 
incorporating reservations to international treaties protecting Ireland’s entrenched gender 
roles – as in the case of CEDAW243 and the Maastricht Treaty.244 
Ireland has also created an opt in agreement with the CEAS, which allows the 
Irish government to decide not to abide by the Reception Conditions Directive or the 
recast CEAS directives.245  The Irish government seems reluctant to commit to further 
harmonization within Europe246 or to respond to criticism by international 
organisations.247  While the Protection of Life in Pregnancy Bill248 was passed after the 
ECHR decision of A,B and C v. Ireland,249 the decision did not seem to be the catalyst; 
the Irish government seemed to be far more influenced by the death of Savita 
Halapanavar, an Indian migrant who was denied an abortion and later died.250  The Irish 
government seems reluctant to evolve national law in line with international norms.  
Disappointingly, the International Protection Bill, which was intended as a major 
adaption of the Irish asylum system, with additional rights protections in line with 
European law, has failed to reconsider the direct provision system, and even these limited 
changes have not been implemented into Irish law.251 
 NGOs have criticized the gap between the level of protections contained in EU 
law and the reformed system in the International Protection Bill.252  The recast Asylum 
Procedures Directive requires training to be incorporated into national law, yet Ireland is 
able to avoid the legal requirement of sufficiently trained and aware staff by not opting 
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into the recast Asylum Procedures Directive.253  The International Protection Bill seems 
intent on limiting the amount of asylum seekers within Ireland by considering asylum 
claims to be inadmissible if there is judged to be another first country of asylum (contrary 
to the intentions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which allows applicants to apply for 
asylum in any or every signatory country).254  The more vulnerable an asylum seeker is, 
the more difficult it is for them to relocate and resettle their families and so they can be 
disproportionately affected by rigid adherence to the Dublin Regulation.  This strict 
adherence to the Dublin Regulation, which ignores Ireland’s flexibility to process 
applications,  The IRC also references the European Court of Human Rights’ findings of 
the human rights violations of migrants in other European Union countries255 and notes 
that asylum seekers do not currently have a mechanism to protest removal under the 
Dublin Regulation to problematic EU states.256  The IRC complained that there was an 
assumption in the bill that certain countries were safe countries of origin;257 this is a 
dangerous assumption, particularly if country of origin information does not take into 
account differing treatment for women and minorities.258  In a country which is generally 
safe, but incredibly repressive for women’s rights, there should never be an assumption 
that women will be treated fairly and safely. 
 There was a particular notable absence in the International Protection Bill of any 
improvement of the reception conditions.259  In particular, the IRC argues that the direct 
provision system was not compatible with international refugee law.260  International law, 
specifically codified in the provisions contained in the Reception Conditions Directive,261 
requires that asylum seekers eventually be allowed to work and move into a self-
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sustaining role in their community.  This was ignored in the drafting of the International 
Protection Bill.262 
 The Irish Refugee Council was also concerned that the bill would 
disproportionately affect vulnerable asylum seekers.  There is no stated definition in Irish 
law of a vulnerable asylum seeker and so no particular protections for vulnerable asylum 
seekers within legislation.263  Similarly, the exclusion clauses, which allow rejection of 
asylum claims on the basis of “national security” and “public order” – are not defined, 
allowing the possibility of an interpretation of exclusion being extremely broad and left 
to the discretion of the decision maker.264  This could lead to discrepancies in the 
application of exclusion clauses and does not adequately ensure protection of the asylum 
seeker’s rights to fair treatment and fair procedures.265  The IRC also criticized the lack of 
legislative emphasis on family reunification – the bill would only allow for reunification 
for families formed in their country of origin, rather than ones formed after the asylum 
seekers had fled.266  The definition of family is extremely narrow – married children were 
not judged to be part of a family.267  This is disappointing from an intersectional feminist 
perspective; families could be fleeing a forced marriage of their daughter or their child’s 
abusive partner.  Dependent family members (those whose protection status stems from 
the claim of a family member) are also given fewer rights than their relevant family 
members;268 this is particularly concerning due to the prevalence of domestic violence 
within families of asylum seekers.269  Women could feel pressure to remain with an 
abusive partner in order to ensure protection within the Irish asylum system. 
 The International Protection Bill is not simply disappointing for the lack of 
adequate fundamental rights embedded in its content.  The Bill has not yet been activated 
by statutory instrument and so is not yet part of Irish law.270  After a recent 2016 
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election,271 it is unclear whether it will be brought into Irish law by the next Irish 
government.  The bill itself is particularly inadequate; instead of taking an opportunity to 
redraft the Irish asylum system to be more in line with European and international law, 
the Irish government chose to maintain the same violations of humane treatment for 
asylum seekers272 and to continue to ignore an intersectional approach.  Ireland seems to 
be enthusiastic about using relevant portions of EU law for specific policy objectives 
(removing asylum seekers and migrants from Ireland), but unwilling to abide by the 
fundamental rights protections contained in European law.  In the next section, a pattern 
will be established of an Irish government that opposes any international law, whether 
from the EU or international organization, which tries to impose a level of protection of 
minority rights.  The Irish government’s strategy, to opt out of international agreements 
which attempts to enforce human rights of minorities, will be discussed in more depth. 
IV. Ireland, women’s rights and international law 
 The intersection between Ireland and international women’s rights law cannot be 
understood without reference to Ireland’s colonial past.  Despite the active role that many 
Irish feminists played in the independence movement,273 once Ireland became an 
independent state, the Irish constitution was drafted with a strong influence from a 
Catholic ethos.274  This Constitution accordingly envisioned women not as participants in 
public life,275 although women were allowed and encouraged to vote276 (perhaps because 
women disproportionately supported the drafting government party, Fianna Fail),277 but 
as wives and mothers.278  This is certainly reflected in Article 41, which states 
 
“1° the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to 
the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. 
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2° The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their 
duties in the home.”279 
 
The Irish government constitutionally enshrined women (not parents, women) as having 
their primary role in the private sphere of the home.280  The interchangeable nature of the 
mentions of women and mothers lays bare the Irish government’s post-colonial view on 
women: that the appropriate role of women in shaping Irish society and public life was to 
raise a family and caretake the ideals of Irish nationalism within the home.281 
 The Catholic influence in the Irish constitution quite deliberately applied a 
“separate spheres” theory to the role of men and women.282  Even the guarantee of equal 
treatment under the Irish constitution references that in considering equal treatment, there 
should be due regard for the differences in ability and function between the genders.283  
This is obviously concerning from an equality law perspective, in that it enshrines 
stereotypes and rigid gender roles into Irish law.284   
 Irish feminism has been criticized for its lack of intersectional awareness; As 
Niamh Reilly writes, most Irish feminist groups are opposed to racism – and while they 
acknowledge that migrant women face racism, there is still an emphasis on the issues 
which face the majority of native white Irish women, rather than a broader understanding 
that feminist organisations should embrace a more intersectional form of activism.290  
Ruth Fletcher notes that Irish nationalism has asserted control over women’s reproductive 
choices in Ireland291 – a control which has different consequences for Irish women and 
migrant women, although both are restricted and regulated.292  The relationship between 
reproductive access in Ireland and international law is an example of the balance between 
Ireland’s obligations under international human rights law and the varying effects of 
these rights violations on Irish women and migrant women in Ireland.  Irish feminist 
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groups have focused on issues like abortion access and sexual violence, without 
specifically noting and campaigning on the intersectional nature of the experiences of 
migrant women.293 
 The context of Ireland and the UK, and the legislative protection of gender 
equality, are very different.  The early Irish feminist movement in the 1960s did 
challenge prohibitions on contraception and policies preventing married women from 
holding paid employment, but were careful not to campaign on decriminalizing 
abortion.301  Regardless, the backlash against Irish feminism lead to the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland;302 the constitution was amended to reflect the 
life of the unborn, equal to that of the mother,303 preventing any legislative access to 
abortion.304  This is quite different from the situation in UK, in which abortion is 
regulated by the more liberal Abortion Act of 1967305. 
 Access to abortion has obviously provided a challenge  to the nationalistic 
Catholic tradition of the Irish constitution and laws.306  Feminist groups and international 
organizations confronting these restrictions over women’s bodies have often been 
dismissed as anti-Irish and as a threat to the identity of Ireland.307  Despite this effective 
restriction on women’s groups within Ireland, Reilly argues that international law 
developments in the area of women’s rights have allowed Irish feminist groups to 
position themselves not as opposed to Irish identity, but as protectors of Ireland’s 
obligations in international agreements as a moral leader in international human rights – 
although with mixed success.308   There is a marked contrast between this treatment of 
women’s autonomy in the Great Britain and Ireland – while there is a campaign to 
improve abortion access within the UK309, outside of Northern Ireland, it lacks the same 
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controversy and harsh rhetoric as the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.310  The 
two provide different legislative starting points for discussions of bodily autonomy and 
migrant women’s rights. 
The Irish government has attempted to make reservations with the European Union 
in regards to abortion access.322  Obviously, freedom of movement and services provided 
a challenge to Irish abortion restrictions, as women could more easily travel throughout 
Europe to avail of abortion services.323  Yet Ireland seems to have had a mixed 
relationship with the EU – the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and Treaty of 
Amsterdam had overwhelming support amongst voters,324 but the Irish government 
inserted a protocol into the Maastricht Treaty to agree that the EU would not interfere 
with Irish abortion law.325  Accordingly, the EU, and particularly the Court of Justice, has 
attempted to avoid directly discussing the human rights issue of abortion laws.326  While 
the European Court of Justice has ruled that abortion is a service,327 in the case of SPUC 
v. Grogan,328 the Court attempted to avoid the substantive issue of whether British 
abortion clinics could advertise their services in Ireland and instead focused on the lack 
of connection between the student groups providing abortion information and the British 
abortion clinics.329  This would indicate that Ireland has developed a pattern not of 
yielding to human rights norns, but of attempting to negotiate exceptions.330 
The Court of Justice has deferred to member states on the issue of abortion, perhaps 
because the member states of the EU have a wide variety of levels of abortion access.  It 
is interesting, however, to compare the active role that the EU has played in ensuring 
economic equality between men and women331 (despite the broad variations between 
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member states when the EU initially advocated for gender equality.)332  The EU has 
historically presented itself as an advocate for women’s rights within its member states.  
While it is logical that in 1991, the EU would have more competence to interject into 
workplace and economic matters, subsequently, the EU has introduced the concept of 
gender mainstreaming333 and its organs are bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.334  The EU now has the competence to be able to argue for an 
increased protection of access to abortion services, particularly in extreme cases.  
Mercutio argues that the EU has been a strong influence on Irish recognition of the right 
of women to travel to access abortions and to receive information about overseas abortion 
services within Ireland.335  It is unclear whether the EU will use its competence to argue 
for greater integration of abortion laws or if the EU will continue to avoid this politically 
sensitive topic. 
Ruth Fletcher also argues that the constitutional protection as to the right to life for 
the unborn is also ignored in the circumstances of migrant women.366  When in the case 
of Baby O,367 a young pregnant Nigerian asylum seeker attempted to prevent a 
deportation back to Nigeria on the basis that infant morality rates were far higher in 
Nigeria than in Ireland.368  The Irish government hypocritically argued that no rights 
should be granted to the unborn child,369 while the Supreme Court argued that this 
provision was only intended to limit abortion access, not create a broader right to 
protection for the unborn foetus.370  Pro-life groups did not become involved or protest 
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this decision, instead focusing on the upcoming referendum intended to limit abortion in 
the cases when a woman’s life was threatened by suicidal intent.371  This example of this 
provision being used to prevent abortion access for Irish women while refusing to support 
pregnant migrants, demonstrates not only a lack of intersectional feminism in Irish law, 
but a lack of feminist understanding of the suppressive effect of the Eighth Amendment 
law on all women in Ireland. 
 Academic Ronit Lentin argues that Ireland views migration policy through an 
extremely racial lens.372  The Irish government seems to be unable to equate the 
experience of asylum seekers in Ireland with the vulnerabilities experienced by Irish 
citizens who have historically fled famine and economic depression in Ireland.373  The 
Irish government seems to view its obligations as a member of the European Union as a 
tool to avoid integration of asylum seekers into Irish society – vigorously defending the 
Dublin Regulation374 while arguing that the EU required narrower definitions for 
citizenship375 while avoiding the human rights standards contained in the recast CEAS 
system.376  This seems to place a serious limitation on the ability of the EU to continue to 
implement a more intersectional approach to women seeking asylum on the basis of 
gendered violence in Irish law.  
Unlike the UK,377 the Irish government has not considered an intersectional 
feminist approach in any aspect of its national law378 – it still has not totally developed 
from a Catholic-inspired philosophy which pressures women into a caring role, rather 
than economic action outside the home379 and attempts to limit women’s bodily 
autonomy in favour of a reproductive role.380  As Mullally argues, 
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Appeals to the sanctity of family life and to ‘pro-life’ traditions, have 
served to limit women’s human rights claims in Ireland since the 
foundation of the State. The priority accorded to such appeals have led to 
repeated attempts to restrict women’s freedom to travel and to a notion of 
citizenship that is deeply gendered. While such attempts have often 
focused on restricting women’s freedom to exit the State, legal responses 
to migrant women’s assertion of reproductive autonomy have sought to 
restrict entry to the State.  Common to both sets of legal responses is the 
curtailing of women’s reproductive autonomy.381 
 
Akidwa has agreed, arguing that, contrarily to the pressure placed on Irish women to 
prioritise parenting,382 – the direct provision system does not allow women freedom to 
parent383 – restricting the food they can serve their children,384 the location they can raise 
their children385 and even limiting privacy for such mundane activities as toilet-
training.386  This double isolation – complaints of migrant women being ignored both by 
the Irish government and their marginalization by feminist groups – seems to have 
resulted in the Irish government disregarding the ill-treatment of the direct provision 
system and no real strong feminist movement opposing the intersectional oppression of 
migrant women.387 
Siobhan Mullally notes that there is a need for an intersectional interpretation of 
the effects of this repression of reproduction in Ireland.388  This is clearly also 
representative of the view of CEDAW,389 which has argued that Ireland must ensure that 
marginalized women, such as asylum seekers, are protected both economically and from 
their particularly vulnerability to gender-based violence.390  Unfortunately, a more 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pdf/Files/National%20Womens%20Strategy%20PDF.pdf> last accessed 01 June 
2016. 
380 Harrington (n 145) 431, Mullally (n 81) and Ursula Barry ‘Movement, Change and Reaction: The 
Struggle over Reproductive Rights in Ireland’ in Ailbhe Smyth (ed) The Abortion Papers, Ireland 
(Cork University Press 1992.) 
381 Mullally (n 242). 
382 Hanafin (n 42). 
383 Akidwa (n 9) 11. 
384 See ibid 17. 
385 Free Legal Advice Centre (n 5) 13. 
386 Akidwa (n 9) 15. 
387 Reilly (n 32). 
388 Siobhan Mullally, ‘Migrant Women Destabilising Borders: Citizenship Debates in Ireland’ in Emily 
Grabham, Davina Cooper, Jane Krishnadas and Didi Herman (eds.) Intersectionality and Beyond: 
Law, Power and Politics of Location.(Routledge 2009.)  
389 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (n 246). 
390 See ibid. 
  
173 
intersectional feminist approach does not seem to be a priority to the current Irish 
government.  Is there a role for the EU in enforcing this intersectional theory through 
legislation and judgments on Irish legislature and courts?  The CJEU has missed 
opportunities to discuss intersectional treatment of migrant women and reproduction 
(specifically in the Chen case,391 when the European Court of Justice did not discuss the 
ill-treatment of women and violation of their rights protection due to China’s one child 
policy, which strictly punished women for reproduction.)392  While there is additional 
potential for the EU to include additional intersectional rights through gender 
mainstreaming and the Charter for Fundamental Rights (to which Ireland is bound),393 the 
EU’s ability to influence Irish asylum law will become more limited if Ireland continues 
to opt out of the majority of the CEAS. 
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Chapter 7: The EU Going Forward 
 
The EU currently faces a turning point in its treatment of vulnerable asylum 
seekers.  During the recent migrant “crisis”, the reaction of various EU member states has 
been to both impose internal borders1 or to create barriers to the right of all migrants to 
apply for asylum under international and European Union law.2  This increase in asylum 
applications3 has starkly illustrated the unsuccessful nature of the burden-sharing aim of 
the Common European Asylum System and provides a possible turning point for the 
European Union.  It has created an opportunity for the EU to make major changes in the 
CEAS.  The EU clings to a dichotomy which attempts to paint asylum seekers as either 
fraudulent or vulnerable, assuming that removing safeguards will penalise uncooperative, 
fraudulent asylum applications, without affecting those dealing with the effects of 
trauma.4  The media narrative of this migration has also sought to portray gender equality 
as directly oppositional to protection of migrants.  Periodical articles have noted that the 
majority of migrants are young unmarried men, unaccompanied by wives and children. 5  
These arguments are often cited in line with scepticism that these men represent genuine 
asylum seekers and is often discussed as problematic for host countries, both for 
population reasons and for the safety of European women.6 
This attempt to directly oppose protection for migrants and gender equality is far 
from intersectional, particularly as many of these men have female family members 
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remaining in home countries or refugee camps, hoping to flee in order to claim asylum.7  
Women and asylum seekers are not mutually exclusive groups whose human rights must 
be gained in opposition to each other; gender equality should not be an excuse to deny 
rights and protections to asylum seekers.  Increasing the difficulty of crossing borders 
simply makes it more difficult for the most vulnerable women to come to Europe to seek 
asylum.8 
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that in the current political circumstances, the 
European Commission will reverse the trend of nationalism and increased internal 
borders and promote greater understanding of the need for support for asylum seekers.  
Yet this research has recommendations for improving the rights-based focus of the 
Common European Asylum System in order to ensure a more consistent standard of 
protection for vulnerable asylum seekers across the European Union. 
 The current trend seems to be the reinforcing of the autonomy of member states to 
secure their internal borders and voluntarily choose whether to process additional 
applications from Syrian migrants.10  Particularly for the UK and Ireland, who are able to 
opt out from specific measures of the CEAS, the national governments have autonomy to 
choose which rights protections embedded into the CEAS to enshrine in national 
legislation and practice.11  UK voters have now decided to leave the EU through a recent 
referendum.12  Once the UK activates Article 50 in order to leave the EU,13 UK laws 
regarding asylum will be completely reconsidered on a national level.14  Reports 
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regarding British treatment of asylum seekers,15 as well as the current government’s 
emphasis on reducing all forms of migration, including asylum seekers,16 would indicate 
that the British government would not seek to increase protections for asylum seekers.  
At a minimum, this research suggests that Britain should choose to retain the current 
CEAS legislation in order to meet its international law obligations.  Ideally, when 
revaluating migration policies during the negotiations, the UK would make commitments 
to better protect vulnerable asylum seekers within the UK and seeking to enter the UK. 
While Ireland remains a member state of the EU, it would likely be affected by 
Britain’s removal from the EU, as the two share a Common Travel Area.17  The Irish 
government, which currently has not opted into the Reception Conditions Directive,18 has 
used that vacuum of enforceable rights to continue to place asylum seekers in direct 
provision, sometimes for years.19  The EU has cited the importance of improving access 
to the labour market for refugees and asylum seekers20 – this should be an influence on 
Irish policy in limiting the use of direct provision.  Yet with increasing control over Irish 
national asylum law, the Irish government is unlikely to continue to evolve the human 
rights standard in the law and treatment of asylum seekers – particularly the treatment of 
mothers and families seeking asylum in Ireland.21 
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The EU has attempted to divide the treatment of vulnerable asylum seekers from 
those it views as fraudulent.22  The UK, in particular, has repeatedly cited its advocacy 
for women who have experienced sexual violence – and yet continued to detain women 
affected as part of their routine detention of asylum seekers.23  Yet it is impossible to 
better protect vulnerable asylum seekers while chipping away at protections for all 
asylum seekers.  In order to increase support for asylum seekers who have encountered 
gender-based violence, it is essential to improve the fundamental rights incorporated into 
member states’ asylum processes.  There should, of course, be particular protections for 
vulnerable asylum seekers.  There is currently no EU-wide definition of asylum seekers 
or a directive discussing essential accommodations to be made to better help vulnerable 
asylum seekers through their applications.24  In order to take an intersectional approach to 
asylum, which recognise the many barriers that women who have experienced gender-
based violence face, the EU and member states need to recognise multiple vulnerabilities 
through legislation.  It is fundamental to the purpose of the CEAS not only to recognise 
the difficulties and discrimination that all asylum seekers face, but also to enshrine in 
legislation an appreciation of the impact other forms of discrimination have on asylum 
seekers. 
I. The EU: migration crisis and the future 
 It is indisputable that the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is in a time 
of transition.  Since the beginning of the Arab spring political movement in 2013, there 
has been an increase of asylum seekers crossing into Europe both through land borders 
(such as Turkey) and through the waters of the Mediterranean Sea.25  Over a million 
asylum seekers have fled the Middle East hoping for asylum.  Particularly concerning is 
that 2,000 migrants drowned while trying to enter Europe – there is clearly a growing 
demand for humanitarian protection within Europe.26  According to UNICEF, over half 
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of women and children have reported sexual harassment or abuse while fleeing from 
these war-torn states.  27 
 Unfortunately, the response throughout Europe to this increased number of 
asylum seekers has fragmented the EU.28  It is indisputable that certain countries, like 
Germany, have welcomed those in need of humanitarian protection and suspended 
transfers under the Dublin Regulation;29 yet primarily, this increase in the need for 
humanitarian protection has caused conflict between member states regarding the burden-
sharing agreements30 while the EU itself has seemed reluctant to enforce a human rights 
standard for the asylum process or to confront some of the fundamental contradictions 
and problems of the CEAS.31  It is disappointing that the impact on asylum seekers, and 
particularly vulnerable asylum seekers, such as those suffering from gender-based 
violence, has not been an essential consideration in amending the asylum system. The 
European Commission has made several proposals for the next stage of the CEAS,32 but 
these proposals do not question the underlying assumptions of the CEAS.  Without a 
reconsideration of the basic tenets of the CEAS, new legislation is unlikely address the 
long-standing issues which have faced EU member states and their asylum processes, 
harming asylum seekers.33 
 The stated goals of the CEAS have been standardisation (both of procedures and 
of protection of human rights) and burden-sharing (both through amount of applicants 
and financially).34  It is indisputable that these aims have never been met.35  EU member 
states have always had wide variations in acceptance rates of asylum claims.36  The 
number of applicants processed in each country – and the treatment of these received 
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asylum seekers – has also been far from uniform.37  The overwhelming number of 
applicants in Greece and the government’s inability to provide a sufficient standard of 
human rights to these applicants led to both the European Court of Human Rights38 and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union39 finding that transferring asylum seekers to 
Greece under the Dublin Regulation was a violation of their fundamental rights.  As 
previously noted, the high rates of sexual violence amongst asylum seekers, both in 
transit and dwelling within displacement camps, would demonstrate that the EU is not 
sufficiently protecting the most vulnerable asylum seekers or providing support and 
protection services for those who have encountered sexual violence.40 
The EU has not taken the recent increase in asylum seekers as an opportunity to 
reconsider the CEAS and to provide. a better plan for times of political and economic 
crises, times when more people are pushed to leave their states of origin.   For example, 
the most-cited reason for transferring an asylum applicant under the Dublin Regulation is 
to transfer to the state of first legal entry into the EU.42  This has created an imbalance of 
the number of asylum seekers in countries such as Greece and Italy, on the edge of the 
EU, as opposed to countries such as Ireland and the UK, harder to access for fleeing 
refugees.43  The high numbers of asylum seekers in Greece, Italy and Malta, 
overwhelming the facilities of their respective governments, has long been a concern for 
human rights organisation.44  Reliance on displacement camps has meant that many 
women and children are in a vulnerable situation, often experiencing sexual violence.45  
The EU has never released a detailed explanation as to why this burden sharing, which 
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would obviously disproportionately affect member states on the borders of the European 
Union and the refugees there, is consistently reaffirmed in legislation which is intended to 
more fairly divide asylum applications.  Using the “first legal country of entry” as a 
criteria in the Dublin Regulation has not been helpful in securing burden-sharing46 and 
the European Commission should certainly discuss whether this aspect of allocation 
should remain in proposed future legislation. 
The response of many EU member states has been to pull away from common 
agreements and act individually, rather than by consensus, in the area of asylum.47  The 
actions of various member states have been portrayed as an avowal of the CEAS.  A 
German decision to apply their discretion to process all Syrian refugees currently within 
Germany was viewed and reported on as a rejection of the Dublin Regulation,48 rather 
than a commitment to sharing applications within Europe.  Campaigners advocating for 
the recent British referendum to leave the European Union produced harsh posters linking 
the increase of Syrian refugees to membership of the EU.49  Member states politically and 
geographically have sought to block free movement within Europe.  The United 
Kingdom’s vote to withdraw from the European Union occurred in the context of many 
critics advocating the end of all free movement to and from the UK.  Several countries 
such as Hungary and Austria,50 have chosen to close their borders to asylum seekers 
altogether.  American academic Philip L. Martin argues that recent terrorist attacks by 
asylum seekers and crimes such as the sexual assaults in Cologne have stoked fears of 
migrants.51  It is disappointing that when sexual assaults are discussed, the focus is on 
European women who would potentially be assaulted by migrants, rather than migrant 
women fleeing sexual violence.  Some commentators argue there are links between 
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support of far-right nationalist parties and worries over migration.52  As even the EU 
notes, 
Emergency measures have been necessary because the collective 
European policy on the matter has fallen short. While most Europeans 
have responded to the plight of the migrants, the reality is that across 
Europe, there are serious doubts about whether our migration policy is 
equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants, to the need to integrate 
migrants in our societies, or to the economic demands of a Europe in 
demographic decline.53 
 
Instead of responding through cooperation to ensure humanitarian protection throughout 
the EU, a majority of member states seem to prefer to retreat behind strengthened internal 
borders, regardless of the humanitarian needs of asylum seekers.54 
The EU’s response has not been to prioritise the protection of a human rights 
standard, but to compromise in response to the demands of member states.  In the 
‘European Agenda on Migration’,55 the EU notes the importance of providing 
humanitarian protection both within Europe and around the world,56 citing the essential 
nature of frontline services and development aid to end the conflicts and unrest that create 
the need for asylum.57  The EU did not acknowledge some of the major criticisms aimed 
at the current CEAS.  For example, the EU cites approvingly the measures taken to 
provide Turkey with financial support in order to prevent asylum seekers passing through 
Turkey in order to reach the EU.58  Yet Turkey’s recent political upheaval and human 
rights record59 add weight to criticism that treating Turkey as a safe third country (both 
for processing asylum seekers and to consider Turkish nationals as having manifestly 
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unfounded claims for asylum within the EU)60 ignore the reality of Turkey’s human 
rights record, particularly towards women and other vulnerable minorities.61  Similarly, 
the document cites the importance of the Return Directive,62 which allows those with 
rejected asylum claims to be removed from Europe,63 rather than emphasising the 
importance of ensuring all asylum claims and humanitarian concerns are adequately 
addressed. 
The ‘European Agenda on Migration’ also cites the need to ensure that there are not 
disparate rates of asylum recognition in member states,64 noting that this affects trust 
between member states, as well as leading to a public perception that treatment would be 
different throughout the EU.65  The document does not address the human rights concern 
which may be caused by these disparate acceptances, simply arguing for the need to 
reduce “fraud” within the asylum system.66  It is concerning that rejected applications are 
cited as being obviously abusive; the EU does not address whether some of these 
rejections may stem from inadequate standards for asylum status being applied in 
member states.  The EU is not debating whether member states could improve their 
procedures or better incorporate human rights, but simply assuming that rejected claims 
are fraudulent67 and relying on harsh penalties for rejected asylum seekers.68 
In a recent press release, the European Commission has expanded on their ideas 
for the next stage of the CEAS and changes to regulation.69  It notes that asylum 
procedures are intended to be conducted more quickly, with accelerated procedures 
concluding within a month or two and all cases resolved within six months.70  While this 
would certainly be an improvement on the long delays affecting asylum seekers in direct 
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provision in Ireland,71 the criticism of the accelerated procedures in the UK’s Yarl’s 
Wood would indicate that it is incredibly difficult to ensure consistent human rights 
protections without allowing applicants sufficient time to prepare an asylum application, 
confer with legal counsel and, if necessary, appeal.72  Women also need more time to be 
able to open up to a legal representative or decision-maker about a deeply traumatic, 
painful experience such as gender-based violence.73  The legislation will also increase 
sanctions imposed on asylum seekers who are judged to be insufficiently cooperative, 
including removing access to social welfare.74  The EU also emphasised a need for a list 
of safe third countries.75  The EU’s use of safe third countries violates international law;76 
this list of safe third countries seems to be compiled on a political basis, including 
countries with whom the EU wishes to have open relationships, regardless of the 
treatment of political dissidents or minorities in the state.77 
The EU continues to legally enshrine the idea of two categories of asylum seeker: 
“fraudulent” asylum seekers (who seem to attract the title simply by applying for refugee 
status which is not granted – regardless of whether the fault was government error, the 
applicant’s lack of understanding of international law or deliberate misinterpretation) and 
vulnerable asylum seeker.78  This simplistic view leaves no room for migrants who fail to 
understand the nuances of international law, traumatised survivors reluctant to share 
details of their ordeals with strangers, or vulnerable children smuggled into Europe 
without legal entry.  If trauma is treated as a sign of fraud, women who have experienced 
gender-based violence will certainly be affected.  The EU is allowed to deport migrants 
or deprive them of financial support if migrants do not fit a stereotype of vulnerability.  
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This is concerning for any applicant who has suffered trauma and particularly for the 
asylum applicants who have entered Europe through unapproved passage across the 
Mediterranean79 and so are easily dismissed as uncooperative and fraudulent, regardless 
of the validity of their claims. 
The EU suggests that the updated Qualification Directive will impose harsher 
restrictions against asylum seekers: such as further prohibition of secondary movement of 
asylum seekers within the EU80 and specific circumstances in which access to social 
welfare and state protection will be removed.81  While this will not affect asylum seekers 
in the UK and Ireland, the changes to the Reception Conditions Directive do include 
more attention to fundamental rights; as well as including contingency plans for times of 
crisis,82 the directive will also focus on earlier access to the labour market for refugees83 
and particular recognition of the needs of vulnerable asylum seekers.84  While the EU 
should acknowledge that vulnerable asylum seekers need specific protection, the EU is 
simultaneously removing support for all asylum seekers, a strategy which will affect and 
harm all asylum seekers, including ones who need additional care.  The EU cannot 
provide additional support to vulnerable asylum seekers while removing protections from 
the general asylum system.  The two aims are contradictory.  In order to improve the 
fundamental rights within the CEAS, the EU has several basic principles of the CEAS 
which need to be re-examined. 
The first change would be to allow asylum seekers to choose the member state in 
which to apply for asylum.  The CEAS has never been effective in equally dividing the 
number of asylum applications processed in each member state.85  The current migrant 
crisis has made this gap more vivid, with certain states such as Germany voluntarily 
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choosing to process more asylum claims86 while others such as Ireland87 and the UK88 are 
reluctant to allow entry to Syrian migrants.  Clémentine d’Oultremont suggests that 
instead of treating migration by asylum seekers as a burden to be passed onto member 
states, EU border officials should help asylum seekers find the appropriate member state 
for them – whether through discussion of the needs of each state’s labour market or 
through a decision based on a common language, family ties, cultural connection.89  The 
K v. Bundesasylamt90 case demonstrated that a strict reading of regulations (such as what 
constitutes a family member) will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable asylum 
seeker.  An intersectional approach takes into account the vulnerabilities of asylum 
seekers and would allow them to choose the state with the most specific match to their 
complex needs.91  If the EU is invested in ensuring that financial support will be available 
to any member state processing a larger percentage of asylum claims, then natural ebbs 
and flows based on the culture and connection of refugee-producing countries will adjust 
over time. 
The EU has assumed that if given a choice, most asylum seekers would “asylum 
shop”, placing an application in the state with the highest recognition rate.92  Yet Bulgaria 
and Sweden, which have the highest rates of recognition, have not been the top 
destination states for asylum seekers.93  Would it be so problematic for asylum seekers to 
“asylum shop” on the basis of childcare or rape crisis services or would this highlight 
problematic resources in some EU member states?  The Dublin Regulation has not been 
able to better divide asylum applications throughout the EU,94 which raises serious 
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questions about whether the aim of burden-sharing, which intrudes on the human rights 
of asylum seekers, is a worthwhile goal of the CEAS. 
The next suggestion is for the EU to move forward on denationalising border 
forces.95  Commentators have noted that it would be politically difficult to centralise 
control of migration at a time when member states are increasingly receding from EU-
wide asylum policy96 yet, as noted in interviews, the political aims of state governments 
can often interfere with the humanitarian decisions reached by border officials.97 
There has been an increased reliance on the EU to provide frontline service in 
areas which have needed to process a large number of asylum seekers.98  While this does 
not necessarily mean that member states are willing to relinquish political control of the 
asylum process within their states, it does indicate that there are circumstances in which 
states will accept the services of an EU-wide organisation processing asylum claims.  In 
order to ensure that the EU member states meet their obligations under the Refugee 
Convention, officials must not face political pressure to reject applications or impose 
quotas that ignore the state’s international and European commitments. 
While a centralised European border force may not be a workable solution, it is 
essential that the EU attempts to separate the member states political views on migration 
from humanitarian protection for those in need of asylum.  Ideally this border force 
would be trained to be responsive to the intersectional needs of asylum seekers, able to 
facilitate the needs of vulnerable asylum seekers, whether reproductive health services for 
survivors who have been sexually assaulted, childcare provisions and any other 
accommodations to meet specific intersectional requirements.  
The EU’s current focus seems to be on providing harsher punishments for asylum 
seekers who move within the EU;99 a more humane and effective method would be to 
focus on meeting international obligations toward asylum seekers, including those with 
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vulnerable needs.  Further research should be done to evaluate the best method of 
divorcing national asylum procedures from political pressures of EU member states and 
instead treating asylum decisions as an EU obligation to fundamental rights. 
Finally, the ability of member states to opt out of aspects of the CEAS will 
obviously prevent the EU from completely harmonising the asylum system.  The 
resistance of the Republic of Ireland to opt into the Reception Conditions Directive has 
meant that Ireland does not allow asylum seekers access to the labour market, regardless 
of the length of their time in Ireland.100  The prohibition on internal movement means that 
despite the need for additional workers in Germany’s labour market,101 asylum seekers 
must remain in Ireland indefinitely on direct provision.  This is obviously a wide 
discrepancy in treatment and so when the EU, in its 2015 agenda, discussed the public 
perception that treatment of asylum seekers varies,102 it seems indisputable that this is not 
simply a public perception, but a reality.  Basic treatment of asylum seekers does vary 
according to which EU member state they are being processed in; when member states do 
not opt in to certain pieces of legislation, this treatment is even more varied.  It has been 
politically essential in some member states (such as Euroskeptic UK)103 to allow an opt 
out from EU legislation, but the EU must accept that this opt out undercuts the EU’s 
ability to harmonise asylum legislation in the CEAS, rather than ignoring this reality and 
citing a “public perception” of differences.104  Refusing to allow member states to opt out 
of key CEAS legislation would better provide the harmonisation that the EU is aiming to 
provide. 
The EU is currently navigating between the xenophobic political pressure of 
member states due to the increase in asylum seekers105 and its obligation in international 
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law, and European law, to ensure an equal and fair treatment of asylum seekers across 
Europe.106  With member states strengthening internal borders and attempting to limit the 
rights of asylum seekers, there is likely little political will for the EU to make these 
changes.  Yet it is concerning to consider the potential erosion of protections for asylum 
seekers in the name of emergency circumstances.  This would disproportionately affect 
the most vulnerable and traumatised asylum seekers.  It seems unlikely that member 
states will choose independently to increase protections for asylum seekers, but the EU 
trend against protection and solidarity could mean that policy will be increasingly left to 
member states. 
II. The UK and Ireland 
 The current trend towards allowing member states to protect their internal borders 
and determine whether they are willing to process additional asylum applications from 
migrants currently in refugee camps107 does not seem likely to change the EU’s 
relationship with the UK and Ireland in the area of asylum.  The UK and Ireland have 
always remained at the periphery of the EU’s focus on border control, both by declining 
to participate in the Schengen Agreement in favour of a Common Travel Area108 and by 
maintaining an opt out for any legislation within the CEAS.109  Both member states have 
historically maintained a great deal of autonomy within this area of competence.110 
 Far more likely to be influential should be the United Kingdom’s decision to 
leave the EU.  It is currently unclear what the relationship between the UK and the EU 
will be or which legislation from the EU will be maintained within UK domestic law.111  
There have been no decisions released regarding the future of the UK’s current national 
asylum legislation. Statements made by Britain’s new Prime Minister in her previous role 
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as Home Secretary,112 as well as her desire to remove Britain’s obligations under the 
European Convention of Human Rights113 would indicate that Prime Minister May may 
seek to uncouple Britain’s asylum law from the human rights protections set out by the 
CEAS.  This is concerning not only for asylum seekers who are particularly vulnerable, 
but for all applicants for refugee protection in the UK.  As Home Secretary and Prime 
Minister, Theresa May has been an advocate for increased legal protection for survivors 
of gender-based violence.114  
It is disheartening that this advocacy does not extend to vocal protection for 
refugees who have experienced similar violence.  The UK government has maintained a 
culture of disbelief,115 which has meant that asylum seekers are often treated as dishonest 
and ineligible for protection until proven otherwise.116  It can be incredibly re-
traumatising for gender-based violence survivor to be questioned in a harsh manner, from 
the viewpoint of disproving and finding inconsistencies in their stories.  Traumatic 
memories are inconsistent117.  Instead of using the asylum process as an opportunity to 
build trust, listen to the applicant’s narrative and then determine if the Refugee 
Convention is applicable, asylum applications have often been treated as an adversarial 
process between the government and the asylum seeker. 
When the UK government uses a circular thinking which treats low acceptance 
rates as evidence of abusiveness and fraud amongst asylum seekers, providing 
justification to impose more difficulties and procedural barriers to asylum applications,118 
asylum seekers should be protected by international treaties which create obligations on 
behalf of member states. 
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 While the UK is unlikely to ever completely repudiate its commitments under the 
Refugee Convention, the treaty does not provide an enforcement mechanism for the 
rights within.  Although the EU has not vigorously enforced the rights-based content of 
the CEAS, the CJEU’s decision in NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department119 
indicates that there is a minimum threshold of treatment which the EU will enforce on 
member states.  Membership of the Council of Europe120 will ensure some procedural 
protections to asylum seekers in Britain121, but by keeping its obligations under the 
CEAS, Britain would ensure that all asylum seekers, including those with particular 
vulnerabilities, are given a minimum standard of human rights enshrined in legislation.  
Unfortunately, the culture of disbelief for asylum seekers seems unlikely to change, 
limiting the effects that legislation and guidelines have on improving the treatment of all 
those applying for protection under the Refugee Convention. 
 It is also unclear how the UK’s exit from the EU will affect the Common Travel 
Area and thus Irish migration and asylum policy.122  Ireland currently seems removed 
from the core of the CEAS – having opted out of all the recent recast directives as well as 
the minimum standards Reception Conditions directive.123  The recent increase in 
migrants within the EU has not been a catalyst to reconsider Ireland’s treatment of 
asylum seekers.  Ireland has announced its intention to accept up to 4,000 resettled 
migrants – and to process additional applications for family reunification.124  As of the 
beginning of July 2016, only 273 asylum applicants had been resettled in Ireland from 
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Greece.125  Yet it is unclear whether a move from a resettlement camp to the Irish direct 
provision provides additional safety to women vulnerable to sexual violence. 
 Prominent Irish NGOs have noted that the Irish government’s handling of this 
situation, potentially resettling a larger concentration of asylum seekers, has highlighted 
deficiencies in the Irish resettlement and asylum system.126  Ireland still has separate 
processes for refugee protection under the Refugee Convention versus humanitarian 
protection and resettlement.127 The International Protection Act 2015 was intended to 
combine these processes and incorporate a higher standard of fundamental rights.128  It 
includes several elements of the recast directives which Ireland had rejected opting into 
as part of the CEAS.129  While the International Protection Act was disappointing to 
NGOs as the attempt to redraft Ireland’s humanitarian protections,130 it was an attempt to 
ensure a higher level of human rights protection in the Irish asylum system.131  The 
International Protection Act has not been activated, nor has a replacement act been 
announced or considered.132  This would indicate that any changes to the Irish asylum 
system have been postponed.  The Irish asylum scheme has come under criticism by 
NGOs, particularly for the policy of direct provision,133 and if Ireland does indeed allow 
4,000 migrants to be resettled in Ireland, these problems and lack of support for asylum 
seekers will be magnified if not solved. 
 The NGOs suggest that this increase in refugees within Europe creates an 
opportunity for Ireland to rethink its asylum process, to make changes in order to better 
embed rights protections.134  They have made several recommendations for permanent 
changes that would not only improve the treatment and application process for recent 
Syrian migrants, but for all asylum seekers within Ireland.135 
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 The direct provision system is currently insufficient for the need of asylum 
seekers.136  The Irish Refugee Council has emphasised the importance of accommodation 
provision by non-profit organisations trained in supporting survivors of trauma who can 
assist asylum seekers both legally and psychologically.137  As noted in chapter 6, the 
isolating concept of direct provision is contrary to an intersectional understanding of the 
difficulties asylum seekers, particularly vulnerable women and children, experience in the 
Irish asylum system.  Yet if the Irish government is not currently willing to prioritise 
humanitarian protection over financial concerns and eliminate direct provision in favour 
of integration within the community, a minimum requirement of trained NGO providers 
would improve the treatment within direct provision.  The Irish government should end 
the current practice of allowing profit-making companies to run direct provision services 
which ignore the most vulnerable asylum seekers. 
 As discussed in chapter 6, the Irish government has embraced the Dublin 
Regulation and the opportunity to transfer asylum applications to other EU member 
states.  However, several member states have sought to deny applicants the opportunity to 
apply for asylum in accordance with international standards.138  As a result, NGOs 
recommend that the Irish government makes greater use of their option to process asylum 
applications within Ireland, rather than transferring them to member states with 
overwhelmed asylum systems or poor treatment of asylum seekers.139  Of course, these 
recommendations should be taken in conjunction with an improvement of Irish treatment 
of asylum seekers.  This should similarly extend to the EU’s idea of “safe third 
countries.”  The only way to determine whether an applicant is safe in their country of 
origin is through processing an asylum application.140  The Irish government should 
ensure that all applicants receive the same sensitive examination of their individual 
circumstances.  Lists of “safe countries of origin” can lead to applicants having to meet a 
higher standard of proof, being given fewer resources to prove their application and 
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receiving only cursory consideration by Irish decision-makers.141  The Irish government 
should ensure to never transfer an asylum applicant without having assessed that the 
applicant will receive treatment in accordance with the principles of the CEAS.  
 Both the UK and Ireland should guarantee that national asylum systems reflect 
not only the minimum of their obligations under international law, but the constantly 
evolving norms regarding humanitarian protection.  These norms include specific 
protection for women who have experienced gender based violence: interactions with 
female staff members, childcare, accommodation without access to male asylum seekers 
and staff, and sensitivity during questioning.  The EU has previously increased the 
protections in the CEAS over time by drafting recast versions.142  This focus on a slow 
increase of human rights has been jeopardised by the EU’s reliance on internal borders 
during the increase in migration.143  The UK and Ireland should seek to dismiss the EU’s 
assertions of a divide between abusive and vulnerable asylum seekers – by ensuring fair, 
uncomplicated, non-adversarial procedures for all asylum seekers, national decision 
makers are better able to determine if applicants are eligible for protection and can 
provide support for particularly vulnerable asylum seekers. 
III. Intersectional approaches to supporting women claiming asylum 
 The EU’s focus in the wake of the increase in asylum seekers is concerning from 
a human rights perspective.  Focusing on the need to fund development aid to third 
countries in order to reduce the number of asylum seekers144 is a worrying strategy, as it 
could result in insufficient resources being devoted to supporting and processing asylum 
seekers.145  The EU seems to find reducing the push factor to be more politically 
palatable to member states than focusing on ensuring a level of protection for those 
fleeing.146  But regardless of support for development and the economic situation in their 
countries of origins, there will be applicants who have a well-founded fear of persecution 
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for a Convention reason.147  Unfortunately, gender-based violence, and deliberate state 
ignorance or perpetration of gender-based violence is far too common and unlikely to be 
eliminated in the near future.148  These applicants should be protected under the Refugee 
Convention and the CEAS and their human rights need to continue to be prioritised, 
regardless of world events. 
Feminism has been able to increasingly vocalise the discrimination that women, 
including and especially women who also face other forms of oppression, experience 
worldwide.149  In many states, vulnerability and ill-treatment of women, ignored by their 
government, can reach the status of persecution.150  This is unlikely to be remedied 
merely by funding and development. These women are guaranteed international 
protection by the Refugee Convention, which all EU member states have ratified.151  In 
order to truly apply gender mainstreaming to the EU’s legislation in the CEAS, it is 
essential for the EU to incorporate some of the intersectional norms proposed by the 
UNHCR,152 including particular awareness of the effects of the trauma of gender-based 
violence.153  This requires a complete reconsideration of the more problematic elements 
of the EU’s rhetoric, and treatment, of asylum seekers. 
 The EU’s divide between genuine and abusive asylum seekers154 is concerning 
from an intersectional feminist perspective.  It completely fails to acknowledge the 
struggles of a traumatised woman, which can often appear to decision-makers to be an 
abuse of the system.155  For example, the EU has cited the need for stricter rules to ensure 
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that asylum seekers in the EU swiftly cooperate with asylum decision makers.156  Yet the 
Rape Crisis Network Ireland noted that a high percentage of the asylum seekers who used 
their services cited their state’s government or security forces as their abusers157 – forcing 
these trauma survivors to immediately trust government agents in the EU is dismissive of 
their disturbing experiences with government.  An intersectional approach requires a 
better understanding of the trauma of sexual violence and how it may influence a reaction 
to insensitive treatment by government officials.  While it is certainly arguable that 
accelerated asylum processes are not appropriate to any asylum claims,158 it is certain that 
decisions on gender-based violence cannot be rushed. Accelerated procedures should 
never be allowed for gendered asylum claims.159  The EU should also set out enforceable 
codes of treatment of gendered asylum claims.  The UK Gender Guidelines,160 which 
draw on those of the UNHCR,161 have set out best practice, but unfortunately have not 
been followed by the UK Home Office in practice,162 perhaps because these guidelines 
are not binding on UK law.  The EU should create enforceable guidelines as part of the 
CEAS, based on the suggestions of the UNHCR.  The EU could then better incorporate 
this aspect of gender mainstreaming into the CEAS, forcing member states to take 
account of the needs of asylum seekers making gendered asylum claims. 
 The EU should also ensure that there is a gendered awareness of the protection of 
reception conditions in the member states.  In both Ireland and the UK, female asylum 
seekers have complained of sexual violence and sexual harassment upon arrival.163  
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Changing relationship dynamics and cultural expectations for women in a new country 
are also risk factors for experiencing domestic violence in their relationships.164  Unsafe 
living conditions, such as detention in the UK165 or direct provision in Ireland,166 have 
left women vulnerable to exploitation by staff and fellow asylum seekers.  A large 
number of asylum seekers who have recently arrived in Europe are currently housed in 
large resettlement camps,167 a living situation which does create a risk of sexual 
violence.168 
It is essential that the EU’s guidance on reception conditions includes provisions 
to prevent gender-based violence, and protections for women with specific 
vulnerabilities.  This could include separate facilities for women and families, access to 
women-only and women-focused services and areas, and better training for those who 
work directly with asylum seekers as to the effects and experiences of those with trauma.  
The EU also needs to develop an understanding that women often have additional 
obligations and limitations which are not placed on male asylum seekers, such as a need 
to find childcare for appointments.169  Minimum standards for reception conditions 
should never be relaxed due to an increase of asylum seekers, nor barriers to the asylum 
system increased.   
 EU member states must also facilitate integration by refugees into existing 
communities.  Both the direct provision system170 and the recent resettlement camps171 
isolate asylum seekers from local communities, making it difficult to form normal lives 
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and routines in their new home.172  There is also extreme difficulty in accessing 
vocational training and employment, in order to be eventually self-supporting.173  This is 
particularly essential if dependent on an abusive partner.174  Women have also 
complained about the difficulties of childcare in communal living – unsafe conditions for 
toilet training and inadequate control of children’s diet.175  The EU should emphasise the 
importance of reception conditions which meet international standards for vulnerable 
women in children, regardless of whether states believe an increased number of asylum 
applications creates extenuating circumstances; as the EU noted, it is essential to have 
plans for these circumstances,176 plans which do not violate human rights. 
 The best way to create a more intersectional feminist asylum system is to ensure 
that all asylum seekers have access to fair procedures which are considerate of both 
international law (particularly UNHCR guidance to interpret the Refugee Convention177 
and of the oppression that each individual asylum seeker faces.  Relying on stereotypes of 
asylum seekers, their reaction to trauma and their trust in government decision-makers is 
unhelpful.  EU member states cannot rely on a culture of disbelief178 which judges that a 
massive percentage of asylum seekers are abusive of the asylum system;179 this will 
disproportionately affect asylum seekers who seem unresponsive due to vulnerability or 
trauma.180 
Improving treatment of vulnerable asylum seekers is both linked to that of all 
other asylum seekers – fair procedures and ending the culture of disbelief are helpful to 
ensure decision makers gain the trust of applicants and make the most informed decisions 
regarding asylum applications.  Yet a policy of gender mainstreaming, particularly 
gender mainstreaming from an intersectional perspective, proposed by the EU would be 
invaluable.  Member states should look at policies which may seem sensible when 
applied to traditional male applicants (asking them to share a communal kitchen and 
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living area) and understand the less neutral effects that this would have on traumatised 
women who are now forced to share space with men.  The EU’s current response to the 
crisis, by allowing member states to more fully control internal borders,181 does not 
coordinate an intersectional feminist emphasis within the CEAS or even demonstrate a 
commitment to gender mainstreaming.   
IV. Conclusion 
 The EU and the CEAS are at a time of evolution.  The recent increase of migrants 
in the EU is not a crisis.  As the Irish Refugee Council notes, it is ridiculous to describe 
less than a million people seeking refuge in an area as large as the European Union as a 
crisis.182  The EU is one of the wealthiest regions in the world, contains over 500 million 
people and is currently dealing with the effects of declining birthrates.183  To describe the 
current situation as a “crisis” speaks of a political viewpoint that wishes to close internal 
borders and deny access to asylum seekers.  The EU has allowed member states to exert 
increasing control over borders and internal policy towards asylum seekers.184  It is 
reassuring that the EU has expressed its commitment to protecting human rights and 
unifying the treatment of asylum seekers throughout the EU.185 
It is less reassuring that EU communications have not emphasised improving the 
fundamental rights record of the CEAS or rethinking some of the problematic core 
assumptions of the CEAS.  There is no mention of the need for an intersectional approach 
to the CEAS in the EU’s European Agenda on Migration.186  There is instead a dismissal 
of clear problematic elements of the CEAS as the result of abusive asylum seekers or 
poor public understanding of the Dublin Regulation.187  If the EU is serious about 
engaging with the weaknesses of the CEAS – the lack of success in dividing applications 
and the varying standards of human rights protection – it is essential to acknowledge that 
these issues exist.   The EU should deliberately attempt to apply intersectional gender 
mainstreaming to the CEAS, ensuring that measures are introduced both to ensure fair 
procedures in all applications and to protect the most vulnerable asylum seekers. 
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Yet recommendations must be applied at every level.  The EU does not have sole 
competence over the asylum system and as noted, in times of economic pressure, there 
seems to be more autonomy granted to the member states.188  It is essential that this 
commitment to intersectional gender mainstreaming be expressed through tangible, 
enforceable actions at every level of the EU.  Political pressures in the EU may currently 
seem aimed at restricting human rights of asylum seekers,189 but this will always result in 
a breach of international obligations – and abandoning the most vulnerable to a lack of 
protection. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This interdisciplinary research has used several perspectives and disciplines in 
order to examine critically the treatment of vulnerable asylum seekers, particularly 
women who have experienced gender-based violence, within the European Union.  The 
EU’s policy of gender mainstreaming, in which implications for both men and women 
should be considered in all legislation and policy making, was intended to be applied to 
all areas of competence for the EU.1  Previous research had left gaps as to how exactly 
gender mainstreaming had been applied within the EU outside of the internal market.  
This thesis found that while elements of feminist thinking had been incorporated through 
gender mainstreaming, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) had not made a 
concerted effort to ensure that member states regulated an intersectional awareness of the 
barriers and oppressions that vulnerable women in the asylum system may face. 
This thesis engaged with several areas of law and culture, feminist theory, 
migration policy within the EU, and the treatment of women within member states. The 
first section of this conclusion will summarise the findings of the research. From the 
analysis of the theoretical assumptions underpinning treatment of women, and migrant 
women, to the recommendations for improvement within the CEAS and EU member 
states, the totality of this research combines to provide a complete perspective of fallacies 
and solutions within the CEAS and the asylum process of two particular member states. 
This conclusion also recognises that no thesis can provide a complete 
understanding; a comprehensive examination of the effects of gender mainstreaming on 
all vulnerable migrants in EU member states and the influence of the CEAS would be far 
beyond the scope of the PhD.  Along with highlighting the findings of this research, the 
second section of this concluding chapter will include a focus on opportunities for future 
complementary research.  This thesis has contributed to academic knowledge of the 
effects of gender mainstreaming within the EU and its member states in the hope of 
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inspiring further examinations of the treatment of other vulnerable asylum seekers, such 
as lone children or the LGBT community, and suggestions for a more humane asylum 
process for all applicants in accordance with international law. 
As discussed throughout chapter 7, the EU is at a time of transition, in which the 
aims and objectives of the CEAS are being tested; stress points are being revealed.  This 
research is better able to advise both Britain and the EU as to how to use the British 
departure from the EU and the migrant “crisis” as an opportunity.  It is an opportunity to 
not simply abandon the CEAS and its rights protections in favour of division and internal 
borders, but to harmonise the effects of CEAS in member states in a way that ensures that 
intersectional gender equality is embedded throughout the asylum system, from reception 
conditions upon arrival through the decision-making process to integration within the EU.  
The idea of a British redrafting of asylum laws2 is potentially concerning, yet this 
reconsideration could be used to impose a stronger rights standard and end detention for 
vulnerable asylum seekers.3 
This research was conducted in order to impact EU policy – to utilise feminist 
theory to better understand what the CEAS and the political culture of member states has 
meant for vulnerable female asylum seekers and to use that understanding to propose 
improvements within the CEAS.  The various organs of the EU, particularly the often 
feminist-influenced European Parliament,4 as well as NGO commentators, can use this 
research to embed better intersectional fundamental rights into the CEAS.  The chapter 
concludes with my final thoughts on the future of the CEAS and European asylum policy. 
I. Essential findings of this research 
My research began with broad questions – I had identified the gaps in current 
publications, which have discussed the EU’s gender mainstreaming in broad terms, with 
an emphasis on economic policy.  There was far less focus on gender mainstreaming’s 
practical effects in broader areas of EU competence. Gender mainstreaming in the CEAS 
and the EU member states had not been explained and understood through the lens of 
feminist theory which could be used to better explain policies and their everyday 
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consequences for asylum seekers.  After an extensive literature review and interviews, 
this research’s focus narrowed into four major research questions; the answers to these 
questions were then embedded throughout the six substantive chapters of the thesis.  The 
first asked how has the EU incorporated the concept of gender mainstreaming into 
asylum and migration law, particularly into the CEAS?  This major question relied on 
feminist theory to examine critically the use of gender in EU legislation, soft law and 
judgements.  The second question asked how have the political culture and views of 
gender equality in member states influenced mainstreaming to provide greater protections 
for vulnerable women who have experienced gender based violence and are now 
claiming asylum? 
My initial literature review clearly found that the EU does not have sole 
jurisdiction in asylum nor does it provide the main influence in the political culture of 
asylum within the member states.  It was essential for this thesis to discuss EU treatment 
of asylum seekers while balancing recognition of the influence of the member state in 
which the individual asylum seeker is making an application.  The aim of gender 
mainstreaming within the CEAS is to embed gender throughout the asylum process of all 
EU member states.  However, this research found that any influence of the CEAS is 
clearly outweighed by the treatment of gender equality mainstreamed into the law of 
member states.  
In various chapters of this research, the CEAS and the member states’ treatment 
of women, particularly within asylum policies, were described in terms of different 
strands of feminism in order to better analyse treatment of vulnerable women.  This 
question directly led to the third major research question, asking what theoretical view of 
feminism and gender equality is more applicable to the EU and member states’ view of 
gender mainstreaming?  After demonstrating that the EU’s legislation has the same 
pitfalls and inequalities as the theories espoused by Catharine MacKinnon and other 
radical feminists, this research then compared the EU’s policies with the lack of 
intersectional understanding of the needs of vulnerable migrant women in the UK and 
Ireland.  This thesis found that the EU has not affected gendered policy or practice within 
member states.  These interlinked conclusions lead to the final question, which asked 
how could applying intersectional gender policy of gender mainstreaming influenced 
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asylum seekers in various member states differently?  The thesis culminated with 
recommendations for improvements both within the CEAS and member states, 
suggestions which stem from the results of this research which emphasise the importance 
of adopting an intersectional approach to violence against women, including women in 
the asylum system. 
Each chapter of this research was pivotal in answering one or more of these 
research questions and presenting the recommendations for improvements with the CEAS 
and member states asylum systems.  Chapter 2 found that an intersectional understanding 
of gender mainstreaming is essential in meeting the needs of asylum seekers.  The other 
two theories discussed, separate spheres and radical feminism, do not produce a legal 
perspective with an awareness of the multiple oppressions that migrant women face and 
result in campaigns to eliminate gender-based violence which do not take into account 
race, culture and migration status. 
Chapter 3 noted that the EU presented a unique opportunity for research amongst 
international organisations in that it has assumed some competence for migration and 
asylum, a sensitive area of national concern, for its member states.  This chapter both 
clearly established that the EU does have the competence to set asylum policy for its 
member states and dispelled myths that the EU itself can be perceived as one unified 
actor with a clear hierarchy of priorities for its asylum policy.  The research found that 
attempts to combine the agenda of a variety of actors within the EU – such as the 
European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament –has created the problematic 
aspects of the current CEAS.5  This chapter concluded that the CEAS has two main goals: 
to fairly share asylum applications and the financial responsibility for these applications 
and to harmonise a minimum human rights standard.  These two goals have often messily 
conflicted.  Understanding the EU’s attempt to balance these two priorities has been 
essential for this research to explain the CEAS’s ever-evolving equilibrium between 
imposing stricter controls to restrict asylum seekers and improving the treatment and 
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fundamental rights of asylum seekers.6  While chapter 3 clearly determined that the EU 
had competence to increase support for asylum seekers, it also observed that the EU had 
not always used this competence to focus on human rights within the asylum procedure. 
In the subsequent chapter, this research forcefully demonstrated that the EU had 
not only a right, but an obligation, under the gender mainstreaming provision of the 
TFEU to ensure that a gendered perspective was applied to all legislation, policies, and 
judgements regarding the CEAS.   Unfortunately, the EU has not released an 
intersectional agenda for the CEAS which sets forth enforceable goals for support and 
integration for women in the asylum system.  While the EU and its member states have 
not completely ignored obligations under international law, and have even provided 
written advocacy for the importance of intersectional policies, chapter 4 found that the 
EU has not sought to draft enforceable, specific proposals or plans targeted at improving 
the treatment and integration of women in the asylum system in an intersectional manner.  
Without a clear understanding and adoption of an intersectional feminist perspective, EU 
organs can obviously not signpost these values to the EU member states. 
Unfortunately, the EU’s lack of an intersectional focus has allowed a gap which 
has been filled by the theoretical perspectives of gender roles in the member states.  This 
has not benefitted vulnerable women in the asylum system.  My research recognised that 
simply reading the content of the CEAS provided an incomplete picture of the legislation, 
guidelines and cultures which affect vulnerable women throughout EU member states.  
The research concluded that regardless of the EU’s attempts to adopt one uniform asylum 
process which would be treated identically in every member state, asylum decisions in 
each member state are a complicated mix of international legal commitments, binding EU 
legislation and judgements and national law measures. 
In order to understand how effective the CEAS has been in practice, the thesis 
provided an indirect contrast of the treatment of this segment of asylum seekers and 
refugees in two particular member states.  The research contained in the national law 
chapters focusing on the UK and Ireland found that despite some legislative similarities 
echoing the CEAS, asylum decisions were increasingly influenced by the national views 
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of asylum and gender equality within the member states.  This thesis found that member 
state views on gender equality and intersectional treatment of women within national law 
were far more influential than the efforts of the CEAS. 
Chapter 5 was influenced heavily by the prior work of NGOs such as Asylum 
Aid7 and Human Rights Watch.8 Access to UK Home Office internal information has 
allowed NGOs to document deficiencies in the human rights protections within the UK.  
This thesis was able to build on previous NGO findings to demonstrate that the gaps in 
fundamental rights protection have disproportionately affected women in the asylum 
system who have encountered gender-based violence.  
The CEAS has been ineffective in combating a political narrative within the 
United Kingdom which disbelieves and seeks to disenfranchise asylum seekers.  This 
thesis illustrated the dissonance of the UK’s attempts to better support survivors of 
gender-based violence both in British criminal law and through foreign aid while limiting 
protection and provision for asylum seekers who have experienced gender-based 
violence.  There is a lack of coherent intersectional awareness – creating the discrepancy 
of a legal system which treats survivors differently depending whether they are reporting 
a rape to a police officer or an asylum official.  While the UK government has 
acknowledged an understanding of the trauma and persecution of violence against 
women, this has not been reflected in intersectional policies or practices. 
The research in chapter 6 concluded that Ireland has not even incorporated the 
trappings of intersectional understanding in Irish national law.  Unlike the UK, in which 
at least some thoughtful intersectional arguments9 have been presented and argued, the 
focus regarding women asylum seekers in Ireland is almost entirely through their role as 
                                                        
7 Helen Muggeridge and Chen Maman, ‘Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in 
Women’s Asylum Claims’ (Asylum Aid website, January 2011).  
<http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/unsustainableweb.pdf> last accessed 31 
August 2017.  Discussed in chapter 5. 
8 Human Rights Watch, ‘Fast Tracked Unfairness: Detention and Denial of Women Asylum Seekers in the 
UK’ (Human Rights Watch website. February 2010).  
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk0210webwcover.pdf> last accessed 31 August 
2017.  Discussed in chapter 5. 
9 See Islam (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Regina v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Another Ex Parte Shah (AP ) (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 AC 629 and SSHD v K and Fornah v 
SSHD [2007] 1 AC 412.  Both discussed in chapter 5. 
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mothers.10  This original thesis was able to apply the research from Irish academics such 
as Ronit Lentin11 and Ruth Fletcher12 to apply the constitution13 role of women to the 
treatment of migrant women and the (lack of) influence of the CEAS.  
This chapter concluded that the system of direct provision for Irish asylum 
seekers is an extension of the Irish government’s racialised perception of women’s roles.  
The opposite of intersectional feminism, the Irish government has pressured Irish women 
into the role of mothers while denying asylum seekers the resources to help them parent.  
Ireland’s focus on the racial nature of motherhood has meant that Ireland has failed to 
develop an intersectional treatment of women who have experienced gender-based 
violence. The non-binding and non-enforceable nature of the CEAS has left a void for 
Ireland’s view of women to be, instead of challenged, replicated in legislation. 
These five substantive chapters argue that the EU has been granted the 
competence to incorporate gender mainstreaming into asylum law, although organs of the 
EU have been more concerned with integration and burden sharing between member 
states rather than vigorously enforcing gendered protections for vulnerable women in the 
asylum system.  My research found that the EU has enforced minimum standards for 
asylum seekers, but has not met best practice within international law in incorporating 
gender into the CEAS.  The EU has certainly promoted a strong or intersectional feminist 
approach to asylum.  The weakness of the CEAS (particularly on the UK and Ireland, 
which have strategically chosen to opt out of certain directives) has allowed these 
member states to simply continue the status quo of their treatment of migrant women in 
national law without having to make changes to accommodate the CEAS. 
In deference to these disappointing conclusions, the next section of this chapter 
will explain opportunities for related future research which would continue to scrutinise 
the CEAS and its relationships with member states. 
                                                        
10 See Fajujonu v. Minister for Justice [1990] 2 IR 151 and Lobe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2003] IESC 3.    Discussed in chapter 6. 
11 See Ronit Lentin, ‘Illegal in Ireland, Irish Illegals: Diaspora Nation as a Racial State’ (2007) 22  Irish 
Political Studies 433, Ronit Lentin, ‘Pregnant Silence: (en)gendering Ireland’s Asylum Space’  
(2003) 37 Patterns of Prejudice 301 and Ronit Lentin, ‘Strangers and Strollers: Feminist Notes on 
Researching Migration M/others’ (2004) 27 Women’s Studies International Forum 301.  Discussed 
in chapter 6. 
12 Ruth Fletcher, ‘Reproducing Irishness: Race, Gender and Abortion Law’ (2005) 17 Canadian Journal of 
Women and Law 365.  Discussed in chapter 6. 
13 Bunreacht na hEireann.  Discussed in chapter 6. 
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II. Opportunities for future research 
As with all independent research, the thesis had a limited focus and so was not 
able to explore all areas of the CEAS and the asylum processes within member states.  
This section of the conclusion will discuss gaps in the current research which could be 
filled in future in order to improve the effectiveness and human rights protection of EU 
asylum policy. 
Chapter 3 discussed the two primary goals of the CEAS: to evenly distribute 
asylum applications throughout Europe and to ensure a minimum threshold of rights 
protection.  It is outside the focus of this current research to evaluate whether these are 
worthwhile objectives which the EU should be pursuing through legislation within the 
CEAS.  Yet the Dublin Regulation14 is a particularly confusing example of this 
conundrum.  The Dublin Regulation is the main legislation within the CEAS intended to 
evenly divide asylum applications.  The most utilised provision of the Dublin Regulation 
is the clause which allows transfers of asylum applications to the first country of entry 
into the EU.15  The existence of this clause seems incredibly counter-intuitive.  Instead of 
allowing asylum seekers to move to member states with fewer asylum applications, it 
means that applications are often clustered in a few member states.  Having access to the 
travaux préparatoires of the various versions of the Dublin Regulation, or a statement 
justifying this imbalanced clause, would have been helpful in better understanding why 
this clause, which has not helped to disperse applications or protect human rights in the 
EU,16 has remained embedded in the CEAS.  The Dublin Regulation has been a 
cornerstone of the EU’s attempts to allow asylum applications to be processed in a broad 
manner across Europe and research which touches on why the EU has never addressed 
                                                        
14 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast.)  OJ L 180/31. 
15 Madeline Garlick, ‘Protecting Rights and Courting Controversy: Leading Jurisprudence of the European 
Courts on the EU Dublin Regulation’ (2015) 29 Journal of Asylum, Immigration and Nationality 
Law 192, 194. 
16 Discussed in chapter 3. 
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this discrepancy within the Dublin Convention would be illuminating and invaluable for 
better explaining the CEAS and its objectives. 
The research in Chapter 5 was aided by the work of Asylum Aid and the access 
that Asylum Aid was given to Home Office internal statistics regarding their decisions 
for women in the asylum system.17  Unfortunately, the Irish government has never 
granted similar access to its asylum statistics, neither releasing gender-aggregated 
statistics nor discussing its treatment of gender-related asylum claims.18  Almost all of the 
discussions of the Irish asylum system contained in this thesis are derived from findings 
by NGOs without the support of the Irish government.  Accordingly, there is a greater 
emphasis on the easily observable reception conditions in Ireland, rather than decisions 
on refugee status within chapter 6.  Reception conditions in Ireland were particularly 
relevant to this research, as the isolation of the asylum seekers within the Irish asylum 
process was demonstrated to be clearly linked to the Irish view of separate spheres.  Yet 
it would have benefitted this research to be able to also compare gendered asylum 
decisions between the UK and Ireland.  In the future, this research would suggest that 
governments should submit to analysis by NGOs of asylum statistics in order to create a 
more complete picture of women in the Irish asylum process. 
These gaps in the research present options and possibilities for further academic 
exploration.  The EU’s role in asylum, the CEAS and the relationship between the EU 
and its member states in the area of asylum and migration are areas rich with possibilities 
for research and publication, both from the perspective of gendered asylum claims, but 
also for other categories of vulnerable asylum seekers.  
My research used feminist theory to increase understanding of the failures of 
treatment of female asylum seekers within the EU.  It certainly did not include all 
member states or all aspects of the asylum process.  Undoubtedly, my findings would be 
complemented by certain specific types of future research, including notably, a better 
understanding of the interaction between the rights of minority and margnialised groups 
and international refugee protection. 
                                                        
17 Muggeridge and Maman (n 7.)  Discussed in chapter 5. 
18 Samantha K. Arnold.  (2012.)  “Nexus with a Convention Ground: The Particular Social Group and 
Sexual Minority Refugees in Ireland and the United Kingdom.”  (2012) 1Irish Law Journal 93,108. 
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This research focused on two specific member states: the UK and Ireland.  These 
two particular countries provided an interesting contrast due to their similarities (both use 
Anglo-inspired common law systems, with judicial review for human rights laws) and 
their differences (the United Kingdom was historically an imperialist power, while 
Ireland was directly under colonial control for hundreds of years.)  Both are able to 
strategically opt out of CEAS Directives.  Other contrasts would prove just as 
enlightening as to the effectiveness of the CEAS, if not more so.  A comparison between 
Bulgaria (with the highest rates of accepted asylum applications)19 and Portugal (with the 
lowest rate of acceptance rates)20 could be useful in illustrating the strong distinctions 
between EU member states and attitudes towards asylum seekers. Similarly, Sweden, 
which has opted into the CEAS has a lower acceptance rate than its neighbour Denmark, 
which has not.21  These specific member states comparisons would spark further useful 
discussion on how effective the CEAS has been at ensuring protections and fair treatment 
across Europe. 
III. The Future of the EU and the CEAS 
The final chapter of the thesis, chapter 7, examined the current events regarding 
migration in Europe.  The recent increase in asylum applications in the EU, after the 
political turmoil in the nearby Middle East, has disrupted the evolution of the CEAS.22  
The EU responded to political pressure by member states to allow the strengthening of 
internal borders,23 ignoring doubts as to the effectiveness of the Dublin Regulation24 and, 
unfortunately, has chosen not to engage with concerns as to the effectiveness of the 
CEAS in guaranteeing human rights, instead deciding to dismiss rejected applications as 
                                                        
19 Eurostat, ‘Asylum Statistics’  (European Commission website, 02 March 2016). 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics> last accessed 31 August 2017. 
20 Eurostat (n 19).  For a more in-depth understanding of the Portuguese asylum process, see Nuno Ferreira, 
‘Portuguese Refugee Law in the European Context: The Case of Sexuality-Based Claims’  (2015) 27 
International Journal of Refugee Law 411. 
21 Eurostat (n 19), 
22 See Justin Borg-Barthet and Carole Lyons, ‘The European Union Migration Crisis’  (2016) 20 Edinburgh 
Law Review 20 pp230-235 and Clémentine d’Oultremont, ‘The Migration Crisis: A Stress Test for 
European Values.’(2015) European Policy Brief 38.  
23 Borg-Barthet and Lyons (n 22).  Discussed in chapter 7. 
24 European Commission, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’.  COM(2015) 240 final. Discussed in chapter 
7. 
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abuses within the asylum system.25  This is not mainstreaming gendered awareness into 
the CEAS.  The importance of ensuring an intersectional feminist approach to asylum 
decisions and reception conditions has not been emphasised by communications from the 
EU.  My research has found that in EU’s renewed emphasis in the aftermath of the 
political unrest in the Middle East has been to ignore the human rights concerns inherent 
in the Dublin Convention and instead focus on accelerating asylum decisions.  The EU 
has effectively disregarded the majority of ill-treatment of asylum seekers stemming from 
inadequate procedures within member states. 
The thesis has focused in particular on the UK as one key example of an EU 
member state struggling to apply EU migration and asylum policy.  The future of the UK 
and its relationship with the EU is unclear after a popular vote to exit the EU, colloquially 
known as “Brexit.”26  The UK will need to carefully consider, in accordance with 
negotiations with the EU, which EU legislation will be retained within UK national law.  
As discussed in chapter 5, the UK has had a complex relationship with the CEAS.27  
While certain provisions of the CEAS seem to echo the UK case-law and perspective on 
asylum policy,28 the UK continually retained the right to opt out of legislation.29  While 
the UK did draft guidelines that promoted best gender practice,30 political pressure and 
migration targets have meant that these guidelines, and national case-law are often 
divorced from the reality of asylum decision-making.  While this research did not find 
that the CEAS acted a strong counterbalance to the UK’s system of disbelief,31 the more 
recent developments in UK asylum law would indicate that the UK is currently not 
interested in enforcing a minimum rights standard within the EU.  Brexit, worryingly, 
now grants the UK additional opportunities to ignore enforceable international law 
obligations to asylum seekers. 
                                                        
25 See ibid. 
26 Discussed in chapter 7. 
27 Elgot. (n 2) 
28 See R v. Adan & Aitseguer [2000] UKHL 67, discussed in chapter 3 
29 See chapter 5. 
30 UK Home Office, ‘Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim.’  (UK Visas and Immigration website, 
September 2010).  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257386/gender-
issue-in-the-asylum.pdf> last accessed 31 August 2017. 
31 See chapter 5. 
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As this research was concluded, the UK was still negotiating its exit from the UK 
and legislation could be changed.  Yet the UK’s attempt to regain pure control of its 
migration and asylum policy is part of a larger trend within Europe against EU influence 
in these policy areas.32  The EU has so far expediently chosen to accommodate this 
national autonomy, but future research should continue to evaluate the balance between 
CEAS harmonisation and member states’ fear of increased migration. 
Above all, it seems clear that the member states of the EU are reconsidering the 
usefulness of the CEAS and whether it is an effective method of fairly processing asylum 
applications throughout Europe.  My research has concluded that there have always been 
gaps in the CEAS, both in its ability to ensure fundamental rights (including gender 
equality) and in creating a fair division of asylum applications across the EU.  Gender 
mainstreaming has been incorporated into the CEAS, but its integration has not been 
enforced within member states.  Nor has the EU continued to review and critique the 
treatment of gender equality within the asylum systems of member states.  At a time of 
such profound change within Europe and the world, it is essential that the EU takes 
advantage of the present opportunity to examine why the current CEAS has not been 
effective in achieving its goals.  This thesis has made recommendations as to how the EU 
can better incorporate intersectional gender mainstreaming into the CEAS and enforce a 
better understanding of the oppressions faced by migrant women within the member 
states.  The CEAS does face political pressure to decentralise asylum policy; yet as 
discussed throughout this research, the EU is granted competence over both asylum 
policy and gender mainstreaming by the EU Treaties, signed by the member states.  It is 
essential that the EU uses this competence to promote an intersectional consideration of 
gender equality, particularly if the EU seeks to lead human rights protections in the 
asylum process. 
While the CEAS has incorporated aspects of an intersectional feminist approach 
to asylum, drafting legislation with UNHCR influences, the EU has chosen to take a 
softer approach to member states, allowing opt outs and declining to enforce gendered 
protections through the CJEU.33  This has meant that member states are not challenged to 
                                                        
32 See chapter 7. 
33 Discussed in chapter 4. 
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change their treatment of women in the asylum system.  The ensuing autonomy provides 
a more comfortable, less pressured relationship between the EU and member states at a 
time when member states are reluctant to affirm fundamental rights for asylum seekers.34  
It seems unlikely that the organs of the EU will push for a stronger emphasis on 
intersectional gender mainstreaming while member state governments attempt to secure 
internal borders and the EU itself seeks to dismiss asylum applications as abusive.  
However, it is suggested that by adopting some of this research’s recommendations, the 
asylum process could become a more uniform and humane experience across the member 
states. 
Violence against women is often dismissed and minimised within international 
law due to its prevalence across the world.  One British judge stated, when confronted 
with evidence of a government dismissal of domestic violence, that it was hard to 
imagine a society in which women faced discrimination simply for being women.35  An 
academic commentator wryly noted that it was harder to imagine a society where women 
did not face discrimination due to their gender.36  The EU’s commitment to eradicating 
gender-based discrimination in all areas of competence is laudable, but, as this research 
has shown, incomplete.  At the time of writing, the EU is responding to some great 
transitions: the political turmoil in Syria, the UK’s denouncement of the EU and 
increased nationalism within Europe.  There is an opportunity for the organs of the EU to 
make changes in the asylum system that can more effectively benefit women in the 
member states who have experienced gender-based violence.  Hopefully this PhD will be 
of benefit to those seeking to understand in more depth how the EU can better enforce 
gender equality within the asylum system of its member states. 
 
                                                        
34 Philip L. Martin, ‘Europe’s Migrant Crisis: an American Perspective’  (2016) 13 Migration Letters 307.  
Discussed in chapter 7. 
35 Islam (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Regina v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Another Ex Parte Shah (AP ) (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 AC 629, 660. 
36 Sinead Conneely, ‘Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another ex parte Shah: Somewhere to Run To – Gender Persecution and Refugee 
Status’ (1999) 11 Child & Family Law Quarterly 321, 330. 
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